An extensive research survey on data integrity and deduplication towards privacy in cloud storage

Owing to the highly distributed nature of the cloud storage system, it is one of the challenging tasks to incorporate a higher degree of security towards the vulnerable data. Apart from various security concerns, data privacy is still one of the unsolved problems in this regards. The prime reason is that existing approaches of data privacy doesn't offer data integrity and secure data deduplication process at the same time, which is highly essential to ensure a higher degree of resistance against all form of dynamic threats over cloud and internet systems. Therefore, data integrity, as well as data deduplication is such associated phenomena which influence data privacy. Therefore, this manuscript discusses the explicit research contribution toward data integrity, data privacy, and data deduplication. The manuscript also contributes towards highlighting the potential open research issues followed by a discussion of the possible future direction of work towards addressing the existing problems

Securely Scaling Blockchain Base Layers

This thesis presents the design, implementation and evaluation of techniques to scale the base layers of decentralised blockchain networks---where transactions are directly posted on the chain. The key challenge is to scale the base layer without sacrificing properties such as decentralisation, security and public verifiability. It proposes Chainspace, a blockchain sharding system where nodes process and reach consensus on transactions in parallel, thereby scaling block production and increasing on-chain throughput. In order to make the actions of consensus-participating nodes efficiently verifiable despite the increase of on-chain data, a system of fraud and data availability proofs is proposed so that invalid blocks can be efficiently challenged and rejected without the need for all users to download all transactions, thereby scaling block verification. It then explores blockchain and application design paradigms that enable on-chain scalability on the outset. This is in contrast to sharding, which scales blockchains designed under the traditional state machine replication paradigm where consensus and transaction execution are coupled. LazyLedger, a blockchain design where the consensus layer separated from the execution layer is proposed, where the consensus is only responsible for checking the availability of the data in blocks via data availability proofs. Transactions are instead executed off-chain, eliminating the need for nodes to execute on-chain transactions in order to verify blocks. Finally, as an example of a blockchain use case that does not require an execution layer, Contour, a scalable design for software binary transparency is proposed on top of the existing Bitcoin blockchain, where all software binary records do not need to be posted on-chain

Scaling Distributed Ledgers and Privacy-Preserving Applications

This thesis proposes techniques aiming to make blockchain technologies and smart contract platforms practical by improving their scalability, latency, and privacy. This thesis starts by presenting the design and implementation of Chainspace, a distributed ledger that supports user defined smart contracts and execute user-supplied transactions on their objects. The correct execution of smart contract transactions is publicly verifiable. Chainspace is scalable by sharding state; it is secure against subsets of nodes trying to compromise its integrity or availability properties through Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT). This thesis also introduces a family of replay attacks against sharded distributed ledgers targeting cross-shard consensus protocols; they allow an attacker, with network access only, to double-spend resources with minimal efforts. We then build Byzcuit, a new cross-shard consensus protocol that is immune to those attacks and that is tailored to run at the heart of Chainspace. Next, we propose FastPay, a high-integrity settlement system for pre-funded payments that can be used as a financial side-infrastructure for Chainspace to support low-latency retail payments. This settlement system is based on Byzantine Consistent Broadcast as its core primitive, foregoing the expenses of full atomic commit channels (consensus). The resulting system has extremely low-latency for both confirmation and payment finality. Finally, this thesis proposes Coconut, a selective disclosure credential scheme supporting distributed threshold issuance, public and private attributes, re-randomization, and multiple unlinkable selective attribute revelations. It ensures authenticity and availability even when a subset of credential issuing authorities are malicious or offline, and natively integrates with Chainspace to enable a number of scalable privacy-preserving applications

End-to-End Encrypted Group Messaging with Insider Security

Our society has become heavily dependent on electronic communication, and preserving the integrity of this communication has never been more important. Cryptography is a tool that can help to protect the security and privacy of these communications. Secure messaging protocols like OTR and Signal typically employ end-to-end encryption technology to mitigate some of the most egregious adversarial attacks, such as mass surveillance. However, the secure messaging protocols deployed today suffer from two major omissions: they do not natively support group conversations with three or more participants, and they do not fully defend against participants that behave maliciously. Secure messaging tools typically implement group conversations by establishing pairwise instances of a two-party secure messaging protocol, which limits their scalability and makes them vulnerable to insider attacks by malicious members of the group. Insiders can often perform attacks such as rendering the group permanently unusable, causing the state of the group to diverge for the other participants, or covertly remaining in the group after appearing to leave. It is increasingly important to prevent these insider attacks as group conversations become larger, because there are more potentially malicious participants. This dissertation introduces several new protocols that can be used to build modern communication tools with strong security and privacy properties, including resistance to insider attacks. Firstly, the dissertation addresses a weakness in current two-party secure messaging tools: malicious participants can leak portions of a conversation alongside cryptographic proof of authorship, undermining confidentiality. The dissertation introduces two new authenticated key exchange protocols, DAKEZ and XZDH, with deniability properties that can prevent this type of attack when integrated into a secure messaging protocol. DAKEZ provides strong deniability in interactive settings such as instant messaging, while XZDH provides deniability for non-interactive settings such as mobile messaging. These protocols are accompanied by composable security proofs. Secondly, the dissertation introduces Safehouse, a new protocol that can be used to implement secure group messaging tools for a wide range of applications. Safehouse solves the difficult cryptographic problems at the core of secure group messaging protocol design: it securely establishes and manages a shared encryption key for the group and ephemeral signing keys for the participants. These keys can be used to build chat rooms, team communication servers, video conferencing tools, and more. Safehouse enables a server to detect and reject protocol deviations, while still providing end-to-end encryption. This allows an honest server to completely prevent insider attacks launched by malicious participants. A malicious server can still perform a denial-of-service attack that renders the group unavailable or "forks" the group into subgroups that can never communicate again, but other attacks are prevented, even if the server colludes with a malicious participant. In particular, an adversary controlling the server and one or more participants cannot cause honest participants' group states to diverge (even in subtle ways) without also permanently preventing them from communicating, nor can the adversary arrange to covertly remain in the group after all of the malicious participants under its control are removed from the group. Safehouse supports non-interactive communication, dynamic group membership, mass membership changes, an invitation system, and secure property storage, while offering a variety of configurable security properties including forward secrecy, post-compromise security, long-term identity authentication, strong deniability, and anonymity preservation. The dissertation includes a complete proof-of-concept implementation of Safehouse and a sample application with a graphical client. Two sub-protocols of independent interest are also introduced: a new cryptographic primitive that can encrypt multiple private keys to several sets of recipients in a publicly verifiable and repeatable manner, and a round-efficient interactive group key exchange protocol that can instantiate multiple shared key pairs with a configurable knowledge relationship