Optimal pricing in a free market wireless network

We consider an ad-hoc wireless network operating within a free market economic model. Users send data over a choice of paths, and scheduling and routing decisions are updated dynamically based on time varying channel conditions, user mobility, and current network prices charged by intermediate nodes. Each node sets its own price for relaying services, with the goal of earning revenue that exceeds its time average reception and transmission expenses. We first develop a greedy pricing strategy that maximizes social welfare while ensuring all participants make non-negative profit. We then construct a (non-greedy) policy that balances profits more evenly by optimizing a profit fairness metric. Both algorithms operate in a distributed manner and do not require knowledge of traffic rates or channel statistics. This work demonstrates that individuals can benefit from carrying wireless devices even if they are not interested in their own personal communication

Advance reservation games

Advance reservation (AR) services form a pillar of several branches of the economy, including transportation, lodging, dining, and, more recently, cloud computing. In this work, we use game theory to analyze a slotted AR system in which customers differ in their lead times. For each given time slot, the number of customers requesting service is a random variable following a general probability distribution. Based on statistical information, the customers decide whether or not to make an advance reservation of server resources in future slots for a fee. We prove that only two types of equilibria are possible: either none of the customers makes AR or only customers with lead time greater than some threshold make AR. Our analysis further shows that the fee that maximizes the provider’s profit may lead to other equilibria, one of which yields zero profit. In order to prevent ending up with no profit, the provider can elect to advertise a lower fee yielding a guaranteed but smaller profit. We refer to the ratio of the maximum possible profit to the maximum guaranteed profit as the price of conservatism. When the number of customers is a Poisson random variable, we prove that the price of conservatism is one in the single-server case, but can be arbitrarily high in a many-server system.CNS-1117160 - National Science Foundationhttp://people.bu.edu/staro/ACM_ToMPECS_AR.pdfAccepted manuscrip

Stability and Distributed Power Control in MANETs with Outages and Retransmissions

In the current work the effects of hop-by-hop packet loss and retransmissions via ARQ protocols are investigated within a Mobile Ad-hoc NET-work (MANET). Errors occur due to outages and a success probability function is related to each link, which can be controlled by power and rate allocation. We first derive the expression for the network's capacity region, where the success function plays a critical role. Properties of the latter as well as the related maximum goodput function are presented and proved. A Network Utility Maximization problem (NUM) with stability constraints is further formulated which decomposes into (a) the input rate control problem and (b) the scheduling problem. Under certain assumptions problem (b) is relaxed to a weighted sum maximization problem with number of summants equal to the number of nodes. This further allows the formulation of a non-cooperative game where each node decides independently over its transmitting power through a chosen link. Use of supermodular game theory suggests a price based algorithm that converges to a power allocation satisfying the necessary optimality conditions of (b). Implementation issues are considered so that minimum information exchange between interfering nodes is required. Simulations illustrate that the suggested algorithm brings near optimal results.Comment: 25 pages, 6 figures, 1 table, submitted to the IEEE Trans. on Communication

EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON QUEUEING THEORY 2016

International audienceThis booklet contains the proceedings of the second European Conference in Queueing Theory (ECQT) that was held from the 18th to the 20th of July 2016 at the engineering school ENSEEIHT, Toulouse, France. ECQT is a biannual event where scientists and technicians in queueing theory and related areas get together to promote research, encourage interaction and exchange ideas. The spirit of the conference is to be a queueing event organized from within Europe, but open to participants from all over the world. The technical program of the 2016 edition consisted of 112 presentations organized in 29 sessions covering all trends in queueing theory, including the development of the theory, methodology advances, computational aspects and applications. Another exciting feature of ECQT2016 was the institution of the Takács Award for outstanding PhD thesis on "Queueing Theory and its Applications"