Collective Decision-Making in Ideal Networks: The Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff

We study collective decision-making in a model of human groups, with network interactions, performing two alternative choice tasks. We focus on the speed-accuracy tradeoff, i.e., the tradeoff between a quick decision and a reliable decision, for individuals in the network. We model the evidence aggregation process across the network using a coupled drift diffusion model (DDM) and consider the free response paradigm in which individuals take their time to make the decision. We develop reduced DDMs as decoupled approximations to the coupled DDM and characterize their efficiency. We determine high probability bounds on the error rate and the expected decision time for the reduced DDM. We show the effect of the decision-maker's location in the network on their decision-making performance under several threshold selection criteria. Finally, we extend the coupled DDM to the coupled Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model for decision-making in two alternative choice tasks with recency effects, and to the coupled race model for decision-making in multiple alternative choice tasks.Comment: to appear in IEEE TCN

Information Processing in Decisions under Risk: Evidence for Compensatory Strategies based on Automatic Processes

Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, decision times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field theory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed forty decision tasks of two gambles with two non-negative outcomes each. Information search was recorded using eye-tracking technology. Results for all dependent measures conflict with the prediction of the non-compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensatory strategies. Choice proportions are well predicted by a cumulative prospect theory. Process measures, however, indicate that individuals do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models.Risky Decisions, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Decision Field Theory, Priority Heuristic, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction, Eye Tracking, Intuition

Preference fusion and Condorcet's Paradox under uncertainty

Facing an unknown situation, a person may not be able to firmly elicit his/her preferences over different alternatives, so he/she tends to express uncertain preferences. Given a community of different persons expressing their preferences over certain alternatives under uncertainty, to get a collective representative opinion of the whole community, a preference fusion process is required. The aim of this work is to propose a preference fusion method that copes with uncertainty and escape from the Condorcet paradox. To model preferences under uncertainty, we propose to develop a model of preferences based on belief function theory that accurately describes and captures the uncertainty associated with individual or collective preferences. This work improves and extends the previous results. This work improves and extends the contribution presented in a previous work. The benefits of our contribution are twofold. On the one hand, we propose a qualitative and expressive preference modeling strategy based on belief-function theory which scales better with the number of sources. On the other hand, we propose an incremental distance-based algorithm (using Jousselme distance) for the construction of the collective preference order to avoid the Condorcet Paradox.Comment: International Conference on Information Fusion, Jul 2017, Xi'an, Chin

Rationality and dynamic consistency under risk and uncertainty

For choice with deterministic consequences, the standard rationality hypothesis is ordinality - i.e., maximization of a weak preference ordering. For choice under risk (resp. uncertainty), preferences are assumed to be represented by the objectively (resp. subjectively) expected value of a von Neumann{Morgenstern utility function. For choice under risk, this implies a key independence axiom; under uncertainty, it implies some version of Savage's sure thing principle. This chapter investigates the extent to which ordinality, independence, and the sure thing principle can be derived from more fundamental axioms concerning behaviour in decision trees. Following Cubitt (1996), these principles include dynamic consistency, separability, and reduction of sequential choice, which can be derived in turn from one consequentialist hypothesis applied to continuation subtrees as well as entire decision trees. Examples of behavior violating these principles are also reviewed, as are possible explanations of why such violations are often observed in experiments

Joint Centrality Distinguishes Optimal Leaders in Noisy Networks

We study the performance of a network of agents tasked with tracking an external unknown signal in the presence of stochastic disturbances and under the condition that only a limited subset of agents, known as leaders, can measure the signal directly. We investigate the optimal leader selection problem for a prescribed maximum number of leaders, where the optimal leader set minimizes total system error defined as steady-state variance about the external signal. In contrast to previously established greedy algorithms for optimal leader selection, our results rely on an expression of total system error in terms of properties of the underlying network graph. We demonstrate that the performance of any given set of leaders depends on their influence as determined by a new graph measure of centrality of a set. We define the $joint \; centrality$ of a set of nodes in a network graph such that a leader set with maximal joint centrality is an optimal leader set. In the case of a single leader, we prove that the optimal leader is the node with maximal information centrality. In the case of multiple leaders, we show that the nodes in the optimal leader set balance high information centrality with a coverage of the graph. For special cases of graphs, we solve explicitly for optimal leader sets. We illustrate with examples.Comment: Conditionally accepted to IEEE TCN