Online Influence Maximization in Non-Stationary Social Networks

Social networks have been popular platforms for information propagation. An important use case is viral marketing: given a promotion budget, an advertiser can choose some influential users as the seed set and provide them free or discounted sample products; in this way, the advertiser hopes to increase the popularity of the product in the users' friend circles by the world-of-mouth effect, and thus maximizes the number of users that information of the production can reach. There has been a body of literature studying the influence maximization problem. Nevertheless, the existing studies mostly investigate the problem on a one-off basis, assuming fixed known influence probabilities among users, or the knowledge of the exact social network topology. In practice, the social network topology and the influence probabilities are typically unknown to the advertiser, which can be varying over time, i.e., in cases of newly established, strengthened or weakened social ties. In this paper, we focus on a dynamic non-stationary social network and design a randomized algorithm, RSB, based on multi-armed bandit optimization, to maximize influence propagation over time. The algorithm produces a sequence of online decisions and calibrates its explore-exploit strategy utilizing outcomes of previous decisions. It is rigorously proven to achieve an upper-bounded regret in reward and applicable to large-scale social networks. Practical effectiveness of the algorithm is evaluated using both synthetic and real-world datasets, which demonstrates that our algorithm outperforms previous stationary methods under non-stationary conditions.Comment: 10 pages. To appear in IEEE/ACM IWQoS 2016. Full versio

Defending Elections Against Malicious Spread of Misinformation

The integrity of democratic elections depends on voters' access to accurate information. However, modern media environments, which are dominated by social media, provide malicious actors with unprecedented ability to manipulate elections via misinformation, such as fake news. We study a zero-sum game between an attacker, who attempts to subvert an election by propagating a fake new story or other misinformation over a set of advertising channels, and a defender who attempts to limit the attacker's impact. Computing an equilibrium in this game is challenging as even the pure strategy sets of players are exponential. Nevertheless, we give provable polynomial-time approximation algorithms for computing the defender's minimax optimal strategy across a range of settings, encompassing different population structures as well as models of the information available to each player. Experimental results confirm that our algorithms provide near-optimal defender strategies and showcase variations in the difficulty of defending elections depending on the resources and knowledge available to the defender.Comment: Full version of paper accepted to AAAI 201

Constrained Signaling in Auction Design

We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that he is selling. Instead, he must come up with a constrained signalling scheme: a (non injective) mapping from goods to signals, that satisfies the constraints of his setting. For example, the auctioneer may be able to communicate only a bounded length message for each good, or he might be legally constrained in how he can advertise the item being sold. Each candidate signaling scheme induces an incomplete-information game among the buyers, and the goal of the auctioneer is to choose the signaling scheme and accompanying auction format that optimizes welfare. In this paper, we use techniques from submodular function maximization and no-regret learning to give algorithms for computing constrained signaling schemes for a variety of constrained signaling problems