854 research outputs found
Note on Integer Factoring Methods IV
This note continues the theoretical development of deterministic integer
factorization algorithms based on systems of polynomials equations. The main
result establishes a new deterministic time complexity bench mark in integer
factorization.Comment: 20 Pages, New Versio
Cryptography from tensor problems
We describe a new proposal for a trap-door one-way function. The new proposal belongs to the "multivariate quadratic" family but the trap-door is different from existing methods, and is simpler
Notes on Small Private Key Attacks on Common Prime RSA
We point out critical deficiencies in lattice-based cryptanalysis of common
prime RSA presented in ``Remarks on the cryptanalysis of common prime RSA for
IoT constrained low power devices'' [Information Sciences, 538 (2020) 54--68].
To rectify these flaws, we carefully scrutinize the relevant parameters
involved in the analysis during solving a specific trivariate integer
polynomial equation. Additionally, we offer a synthesized attack illustration
of small private key attacks on common prime RSA.Comment: 15 pages, 1 figur
A Unified Method for Private Exponent Attacks on RSA using Lattices
International audienceLet (n = pq, e = n^β) be an RSA public key with private exponent d = n^δ , where p and q are large primes of the same bit size. At Eurocrypt 96, Coppersmith presented a polynomial-time algorithm for finding small roots of univariate modular equations based on lattice reduction and then succussed to factorize the RSA modulus. Since then, a series of attacks on the key equation ed − kφ(n) = 1 of RSA have been presented. In this paper, we show that many of such attacks can be unified in a single attack using a new notion called Coppersmith's interval. We determine a Coppersmith's interval for a given RSA public key (n, e). The interval is valid for any variant of RSA, such as Multi-Prime RSA, that uses the key equation. Then we show that RSA is insecure if δ < β + 1/3 α − 1/3 √ (12αβ + 4α^2) provided that we have approximation p0 ≥ √ n of p with |p − p0| ≤ 1/2 n^α , α ≤ 1/2. The attack is an extension of Coppersmith's result
PASCAL: Timing SCA Resistant Design and Verification Flow
A large number of crypto accelerators are being deployed with the widespread
adoption of IoT. It is vitally important that these accelerators and other
security hardware IPs are provably secure. Security is an extra functional
requirement and hence many security verification tools are not mature. We
propose an approach/flow-PASCAL-that works on RTL designs and discovers
potential Timing Side-Channel Attack(SCA) vulnerabilities in them. Based on
information flow analysis, this is able to identify Timing Disparate Security
Paths that could lead to information leakage. This flow also (automatically)
eliminates the information leakage caused by the timing channel. The insertion
of a lightweight Compensator Block as balancing or compliance FSM removes the
timing channel with minimum modifications to the design with no impact on the
clock cycle time or combinational delay of the critical path in the circuit.Comment: Total page number: 4 pages; Figures: 5 figures; conference: 25th IEEE
International Symposium on On-Line Testing and Robust System Design 201
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