Evaluation of Anonymized ONS Queries

Electronic Product Code (EPC) is the basis of a pervasive infrastructure for the automatic identification of objects on supply chain applications (e.g., pharmaceutical or military applications). This infrastructure relies on the use of the (1) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to tag objects in motion and (2) distributed services providing information about objects via the Internet. A lookup service, called the Object Name Service (ONS) and based on the use of the Domain Name System (DNS), can be publicly accessed by EPC applications looking for information associated with tagged objects. Privacy issues may affect corporate infrastructures based on EPC technologies if their lookup service is not properly protected. A possible solution to mitigate these issues is the use of online anonymity. We present an evaluation experiment that compares the of use of Tor (The second generation Onion Router) on a global ONS/DNS setup, with respect to benefits, limitations, and latency.Comment: 14 page

Is DNS Ready for Ubiquitous Internet of Things?

The vision of the Internet of Things (IoT) covers not only the well-regulated processes of specific applications in different areas but also includes ubiquitous connectivity of more generic objects (or things and devices) in the physical world and the related information in the virtual world. For example, a typical IoT application, such as a smart city, includes smarter urban transport networks, upgraded water supply, and waste-disposal facilities, along with more efficient ways to light and heat buildings. For smart city applications and others, we require unique naming of every object and a secure, scalable, and efficient name resolution which can provide access to any object\u27s inherent attributes with its name. Based on different motivations, many naming principles and name resolution schemes have been proposed. Some of them are based on the well-known domain name system (DNS), which is the most important infrastructure in the current Internet, while others are based on novel designing principles to evolve the Internet. Although the DNS is evolving in its functionality and performance, it was not originally designed for the IoT applications. Then, a fundamental question that arises is: can current DNS adequately provide the name service support for IoT in the future? To address this question, we analyze the strengths and challenges of DNS when it is used to support ubiquitous IoT. First, we analyze the requirements of the IoT name service by using five characteristics, namely security, mobility, infrastructure independence, localization, and efficiency, which we collectively refer to as SMILE. Then, we discuss the pros and cons of the DNS in satisfying SMILE in the context of the future evolution of the IoT environment

Understanding the Role of Registrars in DNSSEC Deployment

The Domain Name System (DNS) provides a scalable, flexible name resolution service. Unfortunately, its unauthenticated architecture has become the basis for many security attacks. To address this, DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were introduced in 1997. DNSSEC’s deployment requires support from the top-level domain (TLD) registries and registrars, as well as participation by the organization that serves as the DNS operator. Unfortunately, DNSSEC has seen poor deployment thus far: despite being proposed nearly two decades ago, only 1% of .com, .net, and .org domains are properly signed. In this paper, we investigate the underlying reasons why DNSSEC adoption has been remarkably slow. We focus on registrars, as most TLD registries already support DNSSEC and registrars often serve as DNS operators for their customers. Our study uses large-scale, longitudinal DNS measurements to study DNSSEC adoption, coupled with experiences collected by trying to deploy DNSSEC on domains we purchased from leading domain name registrars and resellers. Overall, we find that a select few registrars are responsible for the (small) DNSSEC deployment today, and that many leading registrars do not support DNSSEC at all, or require customers to take cumbersome steps to deploy DNSSEC. Further frustrating deployment, many of the mechanisms for conveying DNSSEC information to registrars are error-prone or present security vulnerabilities. Finally, we find that using DNSSEC with third-party DNS operators such as Cloudflare requires the domain owner to take a number of steps that 40% of domain owners do not complete. Having identified several operational challenges for full DNSSEC deployment, we make recommendations to improve adoption

Evaluation of Dnssec in Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2

The Domain Name System (DNS) provides important name resolution services on the Internet. The DNS has been found to have security flaws which have the potential to undermine the reliability of many Internet-based systems. DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) offers a long-term solution these DNS security flaws. However, DNSSEC adoption has been slow because it is challenging to deploy and administer. DNSSEC has also been criticized for not being an end-toend solution. Microsoft included support for DNSSEC in its latest operating systems, Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7. This thesis concluded that DNSSEC features in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 are not fully developed and are unlikely to impact DNSSEC adoption rates

The Evolution of DNS Security and Privacy

DNS, one of the fundamental protocols of the TCP/IP stack, has evolved over the years to protect against threats and attacks. This study examines the risks associated with DNS and explores recent advancements that contribute towards making the DNS ecosystem resilient against various attacks while safeguarding user privacy.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures - original manuscript submitted to IEEE Security & Privacy Magazin