Network Neutrality

Much of the advocacy of legislatively-mandated network neutrality is based on a simple fallacy, namely, that differing charges to suppliers of content to the Internet for correspondingly differing speeds of delivery are inherently discriminatory. They are not; and an attempt to prohibit them would prevent the Internet's offering a full range of services, with widely diverging tolerances for latency. Preservation of the open end-to-end character of the Internet may well, however, require vigilant prohibition of vertical squeezes and other unfair methods of competition and authority of an antitrust agency to compel interconnections.

Revisiting network neutrality

The paper discusses the topical subject of network neutrality, from a US and European legal perspective. The article will begin by first defining network neutrality before addressing the underpinning technology and will then compare the legal approaches adopted by Europe and the US. In Europe, there is an existing electronic communications regulatory framework which can be used to address the network neutrality problem rendering any further legislation unnecessary and perhaps, detrimental to the current framework. In the US, however, the main concern arising is a potential for a 'fragmented' internet, which leads to our conclusion that network neutrality legislation is necessary on multiple levels. The article will conclude that the US' stance on network neutrality legislation will cause a seismic shift in the way we view technology and the way that networks are accessed and utilised

Network Neutrality and the Evolution of the Internet

In order to create incentives for Internet traffic providers not to discriminate with respect to certain applications on the basis of network capacity requirements, the concept of market driven network neutrality is introduced. Its basic characteristics are that all applications are bearing the opportunity costs of the required traffic capacities. An economic framework for market driven network neutrality in broadband Internet is provided, consisting of congestion pricing and quality of service differentiation. However, network neutrality regulation with its reference point of the traditional TCP would result in regulatory micromanagement of traffic network management. --Broadband Internet,network neutrality,quality of service differentiation,congestion pricing,interclass externality pricing,interconnection agreements

Network Neutrality: A Research Guide

The conclusion in a research handbook should emphasise the complexity of the problem than trying to claim a one-size-fits-all solution. I have categorised net neutrality into positive and negative (content discrimination) net neutrality indicating the latter as potentially harmful. Blocking content without informing customers appropriately is wrong: if it says ‘Internet service’, it should offer an open Internet (alongside walled gardens if that is expressly advertised as such). The issue of uncontrolled Internet flows versus engineered solutions is central to the question of a ‘free’ versus regulated Internet. A consumer- and citizen-orientated intervention depends on passing regulations to prevent unregulated nontransparent controls exerted over traffic via DPI equipment, whether imposed by ISPs for financial advantage or by governments eager to use this new technology to filter, censor and enforce copyright against their citizens. Unraveling the previous ISP limited liability regime risks removing the efficiency of that approach in permitting the free flow of information for economic and social advantage. These conclusions support a light-touch regulatory regime involving reporting requirements and co-regulation with, as far as is possible, market-based solutions. Solutions may be international as well as local, and international coordination of best practice and knowledge will enable national regulators to keep up with the technology ‘arms race’

Net Neutrality as Global Principle for Internet Governance

This paper discusses the concept of network neutrality (NN) and explores its relevance to global Internet governance. The paper identifies three distinct ways in which the concept of network neutrality might attain a status as a globally applicable principle for Internet governance. The paper concludes that the concept of a "neutral" Internet has global applicability in a variety of contexts relevant to Internet governance

Network neutrality and the evolution of the internet

In order to create incentives for Internet traffic providers not to discriminate with respect to certain applications on the basis of network capacity require-ments, the concept of market driven network neutrality is introduced. Its basic characteristics are that all applications are bearing the opportunity costs of the required traffic capacities. An economic framework for market driven network neutrality in broadband Internet is provided, consisting of congestion pricing and quality of service differentiation. However, network neutrality regulation with its reference point of the traditional TCP would result in regulatory micro-management of traffic network management. --

The State of Network Neutrality Regulation

The Network Neutrality (NN) debate refers to the battle over the design of a regulatory framework for preserving the Internet as a public network and open innovation platform. Fueled by concerns that broadband access service providers might abuse network management to discriminate against third party providers (e.g., content or application providers), policymakers have struggled with designing rules that would protect the Internet from unreasonable network management practices. In this article, we provide an overview of the history of the debate in the U.S. and the EU and highlight the challenges that will confront network engineers designing and operating networks as the debate continues to evolve.BMBF, 16DII111, Verbundprojekt: Weizenbaum-Institut für die vernetzte Gesellschaft - Das Deutsche Internet-Institut; Teilvorhaben: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)EC/H2020/679158/EU/Resolving the Tussle in the Internet: Mapping, Architecture, and Policy Making/ResolutioNe

The Economics of Network Neutrality

Pricing of Internet access has been characterized by two properties. Parties are directly billed only by the Internet Service Provider (ISP) through which they connect to the Internet and the ISP charges them on the basis of the amount of information transmitted rather than its content. These properties define a regime known as “network neutrality.” In 2005, some large ISPs proposed that application and content providers directly pay them additional fees for accessing the ISPs’ residential clients, as well as differential fees for prioritizing certain content. We analyze the private and social incentives to introduce such fees when the network is congested and more traffic implies delays. We find that network neutrality is welfare superior to bandwidth subdivision (granting or selling priority service). We also consider the welfare properties of the various regimes that have been proposed as alternatives to network neutrality. In particular, we show that the benefit of a zero-price “slow lane” is a function of the bandwidth the regulator mandates be allocated it. Extending the analysis to consider ISPs’ incentives to invest in more bandwidth, we show that, under general conditions, their incentives are greatest when they can price discriminate; this investment incentive offsets to some degree the allocative distortion created by the introduction of price discrimination. A priori, it is ambiguous whether the offset is sufficient to justify departing from network neutrality.network neutrality, two-sided markets, Internet, monopoly, price discrimination, regulation, congestion

Network neutrality: Hong Kong's perspectives

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