Australia and Cyberwarfare

This book explores Australia’s prospective cyber-warfare requirements and challenges. It describes the current state of planning and thinking within the Australian Defence Force with respect to Network Centric Warfare, and discusses the vulnerabilities that accompany the use by Defence of the National Information Infrastructure (NII), as well as Defence’s responsibility for the protection of the NII. It notes the multitude of agencies concerned in various ways with information security, and argues that mechanisms are required to enhance coordination between them. It also argues that Australia has been laggard with respect to the development of offensive cyber-warfare plans and capabilities. Finally, it proposes the establishment of an Australian Cyber-warfare Centre responsible for the planning and conduct of both the defensive and offensive dimensions of cyber-warfare, for developing doctrine and operational concepts, and for identifying new capability requirements. It argues that the matter is urgent in order to ensure that Australia will have the necessary capabilities for conducting technically and strategically sophisticated cyber-warfare activities by the 2020s. The Foreword has been contributed by Professor Kim C. Beazley, former Minister for Defence (1984–90), who describes it as ‘a timely book which transcends old debates on priorities for the defence of Australia or forward commitments, [and] debates about globalism and regionalism’, and as ‘an invaluable compendium’ to the current process of refining the strategic guidance for Australia’s future defence policies and capabilities

American National Security Strategy as it Pertains to the Afghanistan War

Following 16 years of war in Afghanistan the number of U.S. military, Coalition forces and Afghan civilian fatalities has exceeded the number of Americans lost on 9/11 and has cost the United States nearly $841 billion dollars. The results are that Afghanistan remains in turmoil and that terrorist attacks, the reason for the invasion, continues. The question is should United States assess a different approach that would result in less blood and treasure being spent to address the need to mitigate terrorist threats. Guided by the analysis of conventional- centric and asymmetric-centric approaches to a counterterrorism strategy, this qualitative study focused on evaluating the effects of U.S. national strategy for the Afghanistan war between 2001 and 2016. A narrative inquiry was employed that used extensive in-depth interviews with five implementers and five recipients of the American strategy based in Afghanistan. The participants were recruited from the U.S. Special Forces community that implemented American strategy in Afghanistan, and from Afghans that experienced the American strategy firsthand. Data were analyzed by employing an inductive coding method. The literature review revealed an intention to use large military forces to conduct a conventional-centric counterterrorism strategy, but the narrative inquiry revealed a negative effect of the conventional-centric counterterrorism strategy. Though more research in this area is needed the implications from the findings for positive social change that an asymmetric-centric strategy could offer as a possible effective solution for countering terrorism. These recommendations may help national strategy developers develop a structure to develop future counterterrorism strategies

Implication of FORCEnet on coalition forces

The coalition navies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States (AUSCANNZUKUS) are in a period of transformation. They are stepping out of the Industrial Age of warfare and into the Informational Age of warfare. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is the emerging theory to accomplish this undertaking. NCW describes "the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive war fighting advantage." 1 This theory is turned into a concept through Network Centric Operations (NCO) and implemented through the FORCEnet operational construct and architectural framework. The coalition navies are moving in a direction to develop and leverage information more effectively and efficiently. This will lead to an informational advantage that can be used as a combat multiplier to shape and control the environment, so as to dissuade, deter, and decisively defeat any enemy. This analysis was comprised of defining three TTCP AG-6 provided vignettes into ARENA model that captured Coalition ESG configurations at various FORCEnet levels. The results of the analysis demonstrated that enhanced FORCEnet capabilities such as FORCEnet Levels 2 and 4 would satisfy the capability gap for a needed network-centric ESG force that can effectively counter insurgency operations in Maritime warfare. Furthermore, the participating allied navies in the Coalition ESG should pursue acquisition strategies to upgrade their ship platforms in accordance with our recommendation which indicates that FORCEnet Level 2 is the best value.http://archive.org/details/implicationoffor109456926N

The Politics of Coalition Burden-Sharing: The Case of the War in Afghanistan

Why do states join military coalitions? After joining wartime coalitions, why do states contribute differently to support the coalitions? What influences the decision process and the burden-sharing outcome of coalition countries? This dissertation investigates these questions by reviewing the contributions of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan to the U.S.-led War in Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2010. Conventional wisdom focuses on neo-realist and strategic culture theories to analyze a country's coalition behavior. The neo-realist theory of international relations suggests a systemic level explanation, and argues that the distribution of power in the international system determines the coalition behavior of states. Strategic culture theorists reject systemic level explanations, and argue that neo-realism cannot explain why states, under the same international system, behave differently. They embrace a domestic level analysis, which emphasizes national strategic decision makers, their belief systems, and the organizational culture of the military—in short a 'national style' of coalition behavior. This study demonstrates that both neo-realism and strategic culture fail to offer sufficient explanations for analyzing and predicting the coalition behavior of states. Taking a middle ground, it proposes a neo-classical realist model of coalition burden-sharing. It argues that international systemic incentives and constraints are channeled through domestic political and culture-induced processes to produce unique burden-sharing behaviors for states. My theoretical model examines the effect of three systemic variables - alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action; and three domestic level variables - domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability - in explaining the politics of coalition burden-sharing. I test the model in the cases of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan. My research provides empirical support for the integrated burden-sharing model. It shows that among the coalition countries in Afghanistan, Britain pursued a policy of 'punching above the weight.' The British forces in Afghanistan's Helmand province were overstretched, with few troops and few resources. By contrast, the German forces in Kunduz had mostly pursued a risk-averse strategy. This was due to the imposition of national caveats or restricted rules of engagement, which constrained the ability of the German forces to participate in offensive military operations against the Taliban insurgents. Pakistan joined and supported the war in Afghanistan by severing diplomatic relations with the Taliban; and deploying up to 150,000 troops along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Despite providing critical logistical support, and conducting numerous military offensives against Al Qaeda and Taliban militias in its tribal areas, Pakistan was widely labeled as an uncertain partner with conflicted goals. This was due to Pakistan's overt contribution to the war on terrorism, and its covert support for various Afghan-focused insurgent groups. This dissertation concludes with a brief discussion on the theoretical and policy implications of coalition burden-sharing

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols

This report culminated almost two years of effort at CSIS, which began by developing an approach for both revisiting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and for addressing issues that were beyond the scope of that landmark legislation

2005 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)

Half a decade into the new millennium, the strategic environment continues to change rapidly, and in important ways. Some of those changes, of course, challenge U.S. interests, while others advance them. And the challenges assume regular and, increasingly now, irregular forms. Yet, while the causes of change are many, the discernable patterns are few. It is all the more important, therefore, that the U.S. Army maintain a strategic perspective—that it take advantage of the collective insights of scholars and senior-level students both within the defense community and beyond. The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), developed at the U.S. Army War College by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), helps the Army identify and bring together those insights. SSI develops the draft list, based on input from its expert researchers, and vets it with the rest of the Army War College, the Army Staff, Army Major Commands, Army Component Commands, the Combatant Commands, and the Joint Staff. The various topic recommendations and comments SSI receives are worked into the final document, either for inclusion in the general topic areas or as part of agency-specific concerns found in the Expanded KSIL. The Key Strategic Issues portion of the KSIL identifies research topics considered essential to the Armand to the role of landpower in general; many are broad enough to encompass different research approaches, and to allow researchers to modify or expand the issues as appropriate. Similarly, the Expanded KSIL enables researchers to focus on the concerns of, or to benefit from the perspectives of, individual KSIL sponsors. The KSIL is meant tube extensive, but not exhaustive. No list could capture every issue of potential concern, particularly given the identified dynamic nature of today\u27s strategic environment. The SSI points of contact herein maintain general oversight of their topic areas, and thus can recommend individual sponsors or subject matter experts.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1742/thumbnail.jp

Low Intensity Conflict: Contemporary Approaches and Strategic Thinking

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a significant feature of the contemporary world and it is a particular challenge to the armed forces of many states which are involved is such conflict, or are likely to become so. This thesis is not concerned with how such difficult conflict situations arise. Rather it is concerned with how, from the point of view of the state, they may be contained and ultimately brought to a satisfactory resolution. The work is thus concerned with the practicalities of ending LIC. More specifically, the purpose of this research is to establish a framework of doctrinal and military principles applicable to the prevention and resolution of LIC. The principles of this thesis are based in numerous historical examples of LIC and six in depth case studies. These distilled principles are analysed in two central chapters, and are then applied in two latter defence force chapters so as to ensure there practicality and resilience. Numerous defence academics and military practitioners have been consulted in the production of this thesis; their contribution has further reinforced the functionality of the principles examined in this research. The research illustrates the criticality of a holistic approach to LIC. The function of this approach is to guarantee the stability of the sovereign state, by unifying civil, police, intelligence and military services. The effectiveness of the military elements must also be ensured, as military force is central to the suppression of LIC. Consequently, the research makes strategic and operational prescriptions, so as to improve the capability of defence forces that are concerned with preventing or resolving LIC

Flattening the Learning Curve: SOF as the Supported Command in the Irregular Warfare Environment

When the United States commits forces to a war, overseas contingency operations, or any other large-scale military effort that centers on conflict with belligerents other than another countrys armed military forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF) should be the supported command. Joint doctrine allows for support of such a concept, but that doctrine has not always been followed in practice. Consequently, this thesis argues for SOF being the supported command in an irregular warfare environment. By selecting the force specifically trained for the task at hand, the United States will dramatically reduce the time lost on the learning curve that results from relying predominantly on General Purpose Forces (GPF) commanders in all combat situations. Advocating for SOF being the supported command is not an argument for SOF only, but rather aims for a synergistic and truly unified approach that makes the best possible use of local national forces, partner nations, and GPF in an irregular warfare environment.http://archive.org/details/flatteninglearni109457395Major, United States Army,Major, United States Army,Major, United States Arm