An Implementation-theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations

This paper reconsiders the literature on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative solutions. The goal of non-cooperative foundations is to provide credible non-cooperative models of negotiation and coalition formation whose equilibrium outcomes agree with a given cooperative solution. Here we argue that this goal is best achieved by explicitly modeling the physical environment and individual preferences, and constructing game forms {independent of preferences} to implement the cooperative solution. In addition, the game form should reflect salient aspects of negotiation. We propose a general model (called a {strategic environment}) of the physical environment; we characterize the coalitional functions arising from strategic environments; we demonstrate our approach for the case of the core; and we provide conditions under which core payoffs correspond to payoffs from core outcomes.Non-cooperative foundations, Implementation

Decentralized Manufacturing Supply Chains Coordination under Uncertain Competitiveness

AbstractThe coordination of decentralized multi-product manufacturing SCs is achieved through negotiations based on expected win-win principles in an uncertain competitive environment. Based on non-symmetrical roles of the different actors, the client (as leader) is supposed to propose coordination contracts according to its best expected conditions, taking into account the uncertain reaction of the provider (follower). This uncertain reaction is modeled as a probability of acceptance, computed according to the overall scenario conditions, which include the presence of 3rd parties. Different negotiation scenarios are analyzed considering cooperative and non-cooperative cases. The resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated using a case study with different providers (follower SC) around a client (leader SC) interacting in a global decentralized scenario. The negotiations based on non-cooperative cases proves to identify the situation with higher independent profit expectations. Moreover, the proposed approach shows the importance of considering the uncertainty associated with the response of the follower to the leader's decisions, resulting from a wider knowledge of its options

Decentralized supply chains coordination under uncertain competitiveness

The coordination of decentralized multi - site multi - product manufacturing SCs is achieved through Scenario - Based Negotiation s (SBN s ) based on expected win - win principles in an uncertain competitive environment . Based on the non - symmetric roles of t he different actors , the client (SC leader ) is supposed to propose coordination contract s according to its best expected conditions , taking into account the uncertain reaction of the provider ( follower ). This uncertain reaction is modeled as a probability of acceptance , computed according to the overall scenario conditions, which include the presence of third parties . Different negotiation scenarios are analyzed considering i) Standalone, ii) Cooperative, and iii) Non - Cooperative cases . The resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated using a case study with different providers ( follower SCs ) around a client ( SC leader ) interacting in a global decentralized scenario. The Non - Cooperative Negotiation Scenario ( nCNS ) proves to identify the situation with , hi gher independent profit expectations , while cooperation would lead to higher overall profit . Moreover, the proposed approach show s the importance of considering the uncertainty associated with the response of the follower s to the leader's decision - making, resulting from a wider knowledge of its optionsPostprint (published version

Mechanisms for Automated Negotiation in State Oriented Domains

This paper lays part of the groundwork for a domain theory of negotiation, that is, a way of classifying interactions so that it is clear, given a domain, which negotiation mechanisms and strategies are appropriate. We define State Oriented Domains, a general category of interaction. Necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation are outlined. We use the notion of worth in an altered definition of utility, thus enabling agreements in a wider class of joint-goal reachable situations. An approach is offered for conflict resolution, and it is shown that even in a conflict situation, partial cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents (that is, agents in fundamental conflict might still agree to cooperate up to a certain point). A Unified Negotiation Protocol (UNP) is developed that can be used in all types of encounters. It is shown that in certain borderline cooperative situations, a partial cooperative agreement (i.e., one that does not achieve all agents' goals) might be preferred by all agents, even though there exists a rational agreement that would achieve all their goals. Finally, we analyze cases where agents have incomplete information on the goals and worth of other agents. First we consider the case where agents' goals are private information, and we analyze what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. Then, we consider the situation where the agents' goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but the worth they attach to their goals is private information. We introduce two mechanisms, one 'strict', the other 'tolerant', and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

No Grice: Computers that Lie, Deceive and Conceal

In the future our daily life interactions with other people, with computers, robots and smart environments will be recorded and interpreted by computers or embedded intelligence in environments, furniture, robots, displays, and wearables. These sensors record our activities, our behavior, and our interactions. Fusion of such information and reasoning about such information makes it possible, using computational models of human behavior and activities, to provide context- and person-aware interpretations of human behavior and activities, including determination of attitudes, moods, and emotions. Sensors include cameras, microphones, eye trackers, position and proximity sensors, tactile or smell sensors, et cetera. Sensors can be embedded in an environment, but they can also move around, for example, if they are part of a mobile social robot or if they are part of devices we carry around or are embedded in our clothes or body. \ud \ud Our daily life behavior and daily life interactions are recorded and interpreted. How can we use such environments and how can such environments use us? Do we always want to cooperate with these environments; do these environments always want to cooperate with us? In this paper we argue that there are many reasons that users or rather human partners of these environments do want to keep information about their intentions and their emotions hidden from these smart environments. On the other hand, their artificial interaction partner may have similar reasons to not give away all information they have or to treat their human partner as an opponent rather than someone that has to be supported by smart technology.\ud \ud This will be elaborated in this paper. We will survey examples of human-computer interactions where there is not necessarily a goal to be explicit about intentions and feelings. In subsequent sections we will look at (1) the computer as a conversational partner, (2) the computer as a butler or diary companion, (3) the computer as a teacher or a trainer, acting in a virtual training environment (a serious game), (4) sports applications (that are not necessarily different from serious game or education environments), and games and entertainment applications

Advances in practical optimal coalition structure algorithms

This thesis presents a number of algorithms for forming coalitions among cooperative agents in pragmatic domains where traditional cooperative game theory solution concepts do not apply due to bounded rationality of agents. While previous work in coalition formation in multi-agent systems research operated on relatively small number of agents, e.g. less than 30 agents, this work explores coalition formation among 100 agents, this is due to limited computational resources not the performance of the our algorithms. We explore a bestfirst search centralized algorithm for optimal coalition structures which is based on a novel idea of deciding what is the best coalition to put into coalition structure being generated. Empirical results show that the solution reaches optimality quickly and terminates quickly in pragmatic domains. We further explore on optimal coalition structures with distributed algorithms in linear and non-linear domains. For the linear domains, we explore linear production and integer programming. For the non-linear domains we explore logistic providers. Based on existing algorithms, we explore a novel environment of forming coalitions in supply networks involving buyers, sellers and logistics providers agents. In this setting, buyers form coalitions to increase their negotiation power while sellers and logistics providers form coalitions to aggregate their supply power and optimize their resources usage

Designing electronic collaborative learning environments

Electronic collaborative learning environments for learning and working are in vogue. Designers design them according to their own constructivist interpretations of what collaborative learning is and what it should achieve. Educators employ them with different educational approaches and in diverse situations to achieve different ends. Students use them, sometimes very enthusiastically, but often in a perfunctory way. Finally, researchers study them and—as is usually the case when apples and oranges are compared—find no conclusive evidence as to whether or not they work, where they do or do not work, when they do or do not work and, most importantly, why, they do or do not work. This contribution presents an affordance framework for such collaborative learning environments; an interaction design procedure for designing, developing, and implementing them; and an educational affordance approach to the use of tasks in those environments. It also presents the results of three projects dealing with these three issues