Spillback Changes the Long-Term Behavior of Dynamic Equilibria in Fluid Queuing Networks

We study the long-term behavior of dynamic traffic equilibria and find that it heavily depends on whether spillback is captured in the traffic model or not. We give an example where no steady state is reached. Although the example consists of a single-commodity instance with constant inflow rate, the Nash flow over time consists of infinitely many phases. This is in contrast to what has been proven for Nash flows over time without spillback [Cominetti et al., 2021; N. Olver et al., 2021]. Additionally, we show that similar phase oscillations as in the Nash flow over time with spillback can be observed in the co-evolutionary transport simulation MATSim. This reaffirms the robustness of the findings as the simulation does (in contrast to Nash flows over time) not lead to exact user equilibra and, moreover, models discrete time steps and vehicles

A bi-level model of dynamic traffic signal control with continuum approximation

This paper proposes a bi-level model for traffic network signal control, which is formulated as a dynamic Stackelberg game and solved as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The lower-level problem is a dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) with embedded dynamic network loading (DNL) sub-problem based on the LWR model (Lighthill and Whitham, 1955; Richards, 1956). The upper-level decision variables are (time-varying) signal green splits with the objective of minimizing network-wide travel cost. Unlike most existing literature which mainly use an on-and-off (binary) representation of the signal controls, we employ a continuum signal model recently proposed and analyzed in Han et al. (2014), which aims at describing and predicting the aggregate behavior that exists at signalized intersections without relying on distinct signal phases. Advantages of this continuum signal model include fewer integer variables, less restrictive constraints on the time steps, and higher decision resolution. It simplifies the modeling representation of large-scale urban traffic networks with the benefit of improved computational efficiency in simulation or optimization. We present, for the LWR-based DNL model that explicitly captures vehicle spillback, an in-depth study on the implementation of the continuum signal model, as its approximation accuracy depends on a number of factors and may deteriorate greatly under certain conditions. The proposed MPEC is solved on two test networks with three metaheuristic methods. Parallel computing is employed to significantly accelerate the solution procedure

Dynamic Congestion and Tolls with Mobile Source Emission

This paper proposes a dynamic congestion pricing model that takes into account mobile source emissions. We consider a tollable vehicular network where the users selfishly minimize their own travel costs, including travel time, early/late arrival penalties and tolls. On top of that, we assume that part of the network can be tolled by a central authority, whose objective is to minimize both total travel costs of road users and total emission on a network-wide level. The model is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) problem and then reformulated as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC). The MPCC is solved using a quadratic penalty-based gradient projection algorithm. A numerical study on a toy network illustrates the effectiveness of the tolling strategy and reveals a Braess-type paradox in the context of traffic-derived emission.Comment: 23 pages, 9 figures, 5 tables. Current version to appear in the Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory, 2013, the Netherland

Side-Constrained Dynamic Traffic Equilibria

We study dynamic traffic assignment with side-constraints. We first give a counter-example to a key result from the literature regarding the existence of dynamic equilibria for volume-constrained traffic models in the classical edge-delay model. Our counter-example shows that the feasible flow space need not be convex and it further reveals that classical infinite dimensional variational inequalities are not suited for the definition of side-constrained dynamic equilibria. We propose a new framework for side-constrained dynamic equilibria based on the concept of feasible $\varepsilon$-deviations of flow particles in space and time. Under natural assumptions, we characterize the resulting equilibria by means of quasi-variational and variational inequalities, respectively. Finally, we establish first existence results for side-constrained dynamic equilibria for the non-convex setting of volume-constraints.Comment: 57 pages, 8 figure

Atomic Splittable Flow Over Time Games

In an atomic splittable flow over time game, finitely many players route flow dynamically through a network, in which edges are equipped with transit times, specifying the traversing time, and with capacities, restricting flow rates. Infinitesimally small flow particles controlled by the same player arrive at a constant rate at the player's origin and the player's goal is to maximize the flow volume that arrives at the player's destination within a given time horizon. Here, the flow dynamics are described by the deterministic queuing model, i.e., flow of different players merges perfectly, but excessive flow has to wait in a queue in front of the bottle-neck. In order to determine Nash equilibria in such games, the main challenge is to consider suitable definitions for the players' strategies, which depend on the level of information the players receive throughout the game. For the most restricted version, in which the players receive no information on the network state at all, we can show that there is no Nash equilibrium in general, not even for networks with only two edges. However, if the current edge congestions are provided over time, the players can adapt their route choices dynamically. We show that a profile of those strategies always lead to a unique feasible flow over time. Hence, those atomic splittable flow over time games are well-defined. For parallel-edge networks Nash equilibria exists and the total flow arriving in time equals the value of a maximum flow over time leading to a price of anarchy of 1.ISSN:1868-896