135,842 research outputs found

    Gender Differences Among College Students With Respect to Work-Parenting Balance

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    Do gender differences exist among Trinity students with respect to career and parenting expectations? Do gender differences also exist with respect to hostile versus benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996)? Is sexism associated with career and parenting expectations for oneself? From these questions, I hypothesized that women would be more likely to hold career and parenting expectations that are mutually dependent; men would be more likely to hold career expectations that are independent of parenting expectations. More sexist women would hold more dependent expectations; more sexist men would hold more independent expectations. An online survey was fielded to a stratified random sample of 200 Trinity women and 400 Trinity men. This survey included the Life Role Salience Scales (Amatea, Cross, Clark, & Bobby, 1986) and the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996). In a Trinity College sample of 40 women and 35 men, men scored significantly higher than women with respect to occupational role commitment, but women scored marginally significantly higher on parental role commitments; there was no gender difference in marital role commitments. Trinity men scored higher than women in hostile sexism, but there was no gender difference in benevolent sexism. Results also showed that for women overall (those who demonstrated both high and low hostile sexism), occupational and parental role commitments were negatively correlated. Additionally, occupational and marital role commitments were negatively correlated for women. For men who were high in hostile sexism, these roles were also negatively correlated – but for men low in hostile sexism, these roles were positively correlated with one another. The findings suggest that Trinity women believe families and careers require a trade-off, while Trinity men are split: more sexist men hold beliefs similar to women’s, while less sexist men believe the role commitments are compatible

    Complex Economic Systems: Using Collective Intentionality Analysis to Explain Individual ldentity in Networks

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    Une approche particuliĂšre de l\u27analyse de Ă©conomies vues comme des systĂšmes complexes Ă©tudie l\u27interaction entre les individus dans des rĂ©seaus locaux ou de voisinage qui sont un sous-ensemble des Ă©conomies plus larges. En rejetant la vision traditionnelle des fondations microĂ©conomiques de la relation entre le comportement Ă©conomique individuel et agrĂ©gĂ© comme s\u27influençant rĂ©ciproquement. Ce papier Ă©tudie la conception des rĂ©seaux de l\u27individu interactif utilisĂ©e dans l\u27analyse d\u27Alan Kirman (2001) dans le cadre de relations de loyautĂ© entre les acheteurs et les vendeurs sur le marchĂ© aux poissons de Marseille, en utilisant le cadre du test d\u27identitĂ© que j\u27ai appliquĂ© prĂ©cĂ©demment Ă  la conception atomistique standard de l\u27individu [Davis (2003c)]. Pour ce faire, le papier interprĂšte l\u27individu interactif dans les termes de l\u27analyse de l\u27intention collective et d\u27engagements communs tel qu\u27ils ont Ă©tĂ© considĂ©rĂ©s par Margaret Gilbert. Il donne alors en premier lieu une explication sur la formation par les acheteurs et vendeurs d\u27engagements communs, tout restant quand mĂȘme des individus distincts, et, deuxiĂšmement, argumente qu\u27Ă  travers le temps les individus ainsi compris peuvent Ă©galement ĂȘtre reidentifiĂ©s comme des ĂȘtre distincts. Le papier montre ainsi que le cadre d\u27analyse des rĂ©seaux prĂ©sente une approche pertinente des individus compris en termes de relations sociales qui Ă©mergent au travers d\u27engagements communs. One approach to the analysis of economies as complex systems investigates interaction between individuals in local networks or neighborhoods that are subsets of larger economies. Rejecting the traditional microfoundations view of the relation between individual and aggregate economic behavior, network approaches explain individual and aggregate behavior as mutually influencing. This paper investigates the network conception of the interactive individual as employed in Alan Kirman\u27s (2001) analysis of loyalty relationships between buyers and sellers in the Marseille fish market using the identity test framework I previously applied to the standard atomistic conception of the individual [Davis (2003c)]. To do so, the paper interprets the interactive individual in terms of collective intentionality analysis and joint commitments, as understood by Margaret Gilbert. It then, first, gives an explanation of how buyers and sellers can form joint commitments and yet still remain distinct individuals, and, second, argues that over time individuals thus understood can also be re-identified as distinct individuals. The paper thus presents the network framework as offering a viable account of individuals understood in terms of social relationships that emerge out of joint commitments

    Hegel and the Ethics of Brandom’s Metaphysics

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    In order to develop his pragmatist and inferentialist framework, Robert Brandom appropriates, reconstructs and revises key themes in German Idealism such as the self-legislation of norms, the social institution of concepts and facts, a norm-oriented account of being and the critique of representationalist accounts of meaning and truth. However, these themes have an essential ethical dimension, one that Brandom has not explicitly acknowledged. For Hegel, the determination of norms and facts and the institution of normative statuses take place in the context of Sittlichkeit (‘ethical life’). By engaging with some of the more ontologically and ethically substantive points raised by Hegel, I argue that, from a Hegelian perspective, Brandom’s project regarding the social determination of truth and meaning cannot be divorced from ethics, specifically, the ethical dimension of social recognition. Furthermore, I argue that, in real situations (as opposed to ideal ones), claims to normative authority cannot be considered independently from the legitimacy of those claims, a legitimacy that Brandom is unable to reasonably explain. Finally, I argue that a Hegelian solution to the problems facing Brandom’s framework calls into question the unity of reason that is at the core of Brandom’s normative pragmatics and inferential semantics

    Agent Identity in Economics

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    China's Engagement With African Countries: Key Findings and Recommendations

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    Summarizes findings on China's engagement with Africa and implications for the latter's social and economic conditions. Makes recommendations for African policy makers to ensure the engagement is mutually beneficial, broadly distributed, and monitored

    Epistemic Peer Disagreement

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    We offer a critical survey of the most discussed accounts of epistemic peer disagreement that are found in the recent literature. We also sketch an alternative approach in line with a pluralist understanding of epistemic rationality

    Internal goods to legal practice: reclaiming fuller with macintyre

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    Lon Fuller rejected legal positivism because he believed that the ‘procedural morality of law’ established a necessary connection between law and morals. Underpinning his argument is a claim that law is a purposive activity grounded by a relationship of political reciprocity between lawgivers and legal subjects. This paper argues that his reliance on political reciprocity implicates a necessary connection between his procedural morality and an unarticulated ‘substantive morality of law’: it presupposes that law is properly understood by reference to the political task of achieving a common good. To establish this necessary connection, I propose we look to Alasdair MacIntyre. Understanding law as a ‘social practice’, on MacIntyre’s terms, can provide the necessary socio-political context to explain why and how legal practice is conditioned by political reciprocity. If we apply MacIntyre’s distinction between the internal and external goods of a social practice, legal positivism can be understood as confusing law as a co-operative social practice with the instrumentalisation of that practice by legal officials
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