A Note on the Information-Theoretic-(in)Security of Fading Generated Secret Keys

In this work we explore the security of secret keys generated via the electromagnetic reciprocity of the wireless fading channel. Identifying a new sophisticated colluding attack, we explore the information-theoretic-security for such keys in the presence of an all-powerful adversary constrained only by the laws of quantum mechanics. Specifically, we calculate the reduction in the conditional mutual information between transmitter and receiver that can occur when an adversary with unlimited computational and communication resources places directional antenna interceptors at chosen locations. Such locations, in principal, can be arbitrarily far from the intended receiver yet still influence the secret key rate.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures. This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be accessibl

Secret Key Agreement from Correlated Data, with No Prior Information

A fundamental question that has been studied in cryptography and in information theory is whether two parties can communicate confidentially using exclusively an open channel. We consider the model in which the two parties hold inputs that are correlated in a certain sense. This model has been studied extensively in information theory, and communication protocols have been designed which exploit the correlation to extract from the inputs a shared secret key. However, all the existing protocols are not universal in the sense that they require that the two parties also know some attributes of the correlation. In other words, they require that each party knows something about the other party's input. We present a protocol that does not require any prior additional information. It uses space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity to measure correlation and it allows the two legal parties to obtain a common key that looks random to an eavesdropper that observes the communication and is restricted to use a bounded amount of space for the attack. Thus the protocol achieves complexity-theoretical security, but it does not use any unproven result from computational complexity. On the negative side, the protocol is not efficient in the sense that the computation of the two legal parties uses more space than the space allowed to the adversary.Comment: Several small errors have been fixed and the presentation has been improved, following the reviewers' observation

Shared Information for a Markov Chain on a Tree

Shared information is a measure of mutual dependence among multiple jointly distributed random variables with finite alphabets. For a Markov chain on a tree with a given joint distribution, we give a new proof of an explicit characterization of shared information. The Markov chain on a tree is shown to possess a global Markov property based on graph separation; this property plays a key role in our proofs. When the underlying joint distribution is not known, we exploit the special form of this characterization to provide a multiarmed bandit algorithm for estimating shared information, and analyze its error performance.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figures, submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theor

Multiterminal secrecy by public discussion

Multiterminal Secrecy by Public Discussion describes the principles of information theoretic secrecy generation by legitimate parties with public discussion in the presence of an eavesdropper