Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

Influence-Optimistic Local Values for Multiagent Planning --- Extended Version

Recent years have seen the development of methods for multiagent planning under uncertainty that scale to tens or even hundreds of agents. However, most of these methods either make restrictive assumptions on the problem domain, or provide approximate solutions without any guarantees on quality. Methods in the former category typically build on heuristic search using upper bounds on the value function. Unfortunately, no techniques exist to compute such upper bounds for problems with non-factored value functions. To allow for meaningful benchmarking through measurable quality guarantees on a very general class of problems, this paper introduces a family of influence-optimistic upper bounds for factored decentralized partially observable Markov decision processes (Dec-POMDPs) that do not have factored value functions. Intuitively, we derive bounds on very large multiagent planning problems by subdividing them in sub-problems, and at each of these sub-problems making optimistic assumptions with respect to the influence that will be exerted by the rest of the system. We numerically compare the different upper bounds and demonstrate how we can achieve a non-trivial guarantee that a heuristic solution for problems with hundreds of agents is close to optimal. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the upper bounds may improve the effectiveness of heuristic influence search, and discuss further potential applications to multiagent planning.Comment: Long version of IJCAI 2015 paper (and extended abstract at AAMAS 2015