Modeling water resources management at the basin level: review and future directions

Water quality / Water resources development / Agricultural production / River basin development / Mathematical models / Simulation models / Water allocation / Policy / Economic aspects / Hydrology / Reservoir operation / Groundwater management / Drainage / Conjunctive use / Surface water / GIS / Decision support systems / Optimization methods / Water supply

THE EFFECT OF STOCHASTIC IRRIGATION DEMANDS AND SURFACE WATER SUPPLIES ON ON-FARM WATER MANAGEMENT

This study presents a procedure for simultaneously addressing stochastic input demands and resource supplies for irrigated agriculture within a linear modeling framework. Specifically, the effect of stochastic crop net irrigation requirements and streamflow supplies on irrigation water management is examined. Irrigators pay a self-protection cost, in terms of water management decisions, to increase the probability that stochastic crop water demand is satisfied and anticipated water supply is available. Self-protection cost is lower when increasing the probability that anticipated water supplies are delivered, ceteris paribus, than when increasing the probability that the crop receives full net irrigation requirement in the study region.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players’ strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players’ objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.bargaining, non-cooperative game theory, simulation models, uncertainty

A stochastic multiple players multi-issues bargaining model for the Piave river basin

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players’ strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players’ objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.Bargaining, non-cooperative game theory, simulation models, uncertainty

An Introduction to Temporal Optimisation using a Water Management Problem

Optimisation problems usually take the form of having a single or multiple objectives with a set of constraints. The model itself concerns a single problem for which the best possible solution is sought. Problems are usually static in the sense that they do not consider changes over time in a cumulative manner. Dynamic optimisation problems to incorporate changes. However, these are memoryless in that the problem description changes and a new problem is solved - but with little reference to any previous information. In this paper, a temporally augmented version of a water management problem which allows farmers to plan over long time horizons is introduced. A climate change projection model is used to predict both rainfall and temperature for the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area in Australia for up to 50 years into the future. Three representative decades are extracted from the climate change model to create the temporal data sets. The results confirm the utility of the temporal approach and show, for the case study area, that crops that can feasibly and sustainably be grown will be a lot fewer than the present day in the challenging water-reduced conditions of the future

A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players’ strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players’ objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.Bargaining, Non-Cooperative Game Theory, Simulation Models, Uncertainty

Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 3. application to water resources

This paper reviews various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of water resources. With an increase in the competition over various water resources, the incidents of disputes have been in the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of various water uses, such as multi-objective water projects, irrigation, groundwater, hydropower, urban water supply, wastewater, and transboundary water disputes. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce water resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. In particular, the various approaches for cost sharing and for allocation of physical water infrastructure and flow can serve as a basis for stable and efficient agreement, such that long-term investments in water projects are profitable and sustainable. The latter point is especially important, given recent developments in water policy in various countries and regional institutions such as the European Union (Water Framework Directive), calling for full cost recovery of investments and operation and maintenance in water projects. The CGT approaches discussed and demonstrated in this paper can provide a solid basis for finding possible and stable cost-sharing arrangements.Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water Supply and Systems,Water and Industry

Economic Analysis of Management Practices to Reduce Phosphorus Load to Lake Eucha and Spavinaw

Changes in management practices are often proposed to reduce phosphorus loading from a watershed due to over application of poultry litter. This study determines the choice, location, and level of each best management practice in the watershed to meet a Total Maximum Daily Load and margins of safety at least cost.best management practice, phosphorus runoff, poultry litter, Target MOTAD, Environmental Economics and Policy,

Applications of negotiation theory to water issues

The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to waterrelated issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the"rules of the game"that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource.Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Water and Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Conservation