1,659 research outputs found
A distributed auctioneer for resource allocation in decentralized systems
In decentralized systems, nodes often need to coordinate to access shared resources in a fair manner. One approach to perform such arbitration is to rely on auction mechanisms. Although there is an extensive literature that studies auctions, most of these works assume the existence of a central, trusted auctioneer. Unfortunately, in fully decentralized systems, where the nodes that need to cooperate operate under separate spheres of control, such central trusted entity may not exist. Notable examples of such decentralized systems include community networks, clouds of clouds, cooperative nano data centres, among others. In this paper, we make theoretical and practical contributions to distribute the role of the auctioneer. From the theoretical perspective, we propose a framework of distributed simulations of the auctioneer that are Nash equilibria resilient to coalitions and asynchrony. From the practical perspective, our protocols leverage the distributed nature of the simulations to parallelise the execution. We have implemented a prototype that instantiates the framework for bandwidth allocation in community networks, and evaluated it in a real distributed setting.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum
trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is
continually updated on the webpage
\url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers
suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail
(\textit{[email protected]})
Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase.
In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase (1959) exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the "price system." The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform the administrative allocation system. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took until July 25, 1994 for FCC license sales to commence. Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been held, 27,484 licenses sold, and 17 billion in U.S. welfare losses have been averted. Not bad for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law & Economics.
Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Spectrum Markets
In this paper, we study spectrum allocation mechanisms in hierarchical
multi-layer markets which are expected to proliferate in the near future based
on the current spectrum policy reform proposals. We consider a setting where a
state agency sells spectrum channels to Primary Operators (POs) who
subsequently resell them to Secondary Operators (SOs) through auctions. We show
that these hierarchical markets do not result in a socially efficient spectrum
allocation which is aimed by the agency, due to lack of coordination among the
entities in different layers and the inherently selfish revenue-maximizing
strategy of POs. In order to reconcile these opposing objectives, we propose an
incentive mechanism which aligns the strategy and the actions of the POs with
the objective of the agency, and thus leads to system performance improvement
in terms of social welfare. This pricing-based scheme constitutes a method for
hierarchical market regulation. A basic component of the proposed incentive
mechanism is a novel auction scheme which enables POs to allocate their
spectrum by balancing their derived revenue and the welfare of the SOs.Comment: 9 page
NOMA based resource allocation and mobility enhancement framework for IoT in next generation cellular networks
With the unprecedented technological advances witnessed in the last two decades, more devices are connected to the internet, forming what is called internet of things (IoT). IoT devices with heterogeneous characteristics and quality of experience (QoE) requirements may engage in dynamic spectrum market due to scarcity of radio resources. We propose a framework to efficiently quantify and supply radio resources to the IoT devices by developing intelligent systems. The primary goal of the paper is to study the characteristics of the next generation of cellular networks with non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) to enable connectivity to clustered IoT devices. First, we demonstrate how the distribution and QoE requirements of IoT devices impact the required number of radio resources in real time. Second, we prove that using an extended auction algorithm by implementing a series of complementary functions, enhance the radio resource utilization efficiency. The results show substantial reduction in the number of sub-carriers required when compared to conventional orthogonal multiple access (OMA) and the intelligent clustering is scalable and adaptable to the cellular environment. Ability to move spectrum usages from one cluster to other clusters after borrowing when a cluster has less user or move out of the boundary is another soft feature that contributes to the reported radio resource utilization efficiency. Moreover, the proposed framework provides IoT service providers cost estimation to control their spectrum acquisition to achieve required quality of service (QoS) with guaranteed bit rate (GBR) and non-guaranteed bit rate (Non-GBR)
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