EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work

European Union competition policy is often described as neoliberal, without this leading to more investigation. This paper highlights how the European Competition policy doctrine has been shaped, how the ordoliberal movement and the Chicago school ideas have been implemented and supported by the political work of some key actors. We show that, contrary to what is sometimes said in literature, ordoliberal actors were neither hegemonic nor leaders between Rome Treaty and the eighties, even if some neoliberal principles were introduced in antitrust law. These laws are much more a compromise between French and German representatives, and between neo-mercantilists and ordoliberals. However, things have dramatically changed since the eighties, when both (1) new political work from members of the Commission introduced in the European competition policy elements of Chicago School doctrine to complete the European market and (2) some decisions from the ECJ clarified the doctrine of EU Competition law. Nowadays, European competition policy is a mix between an ordoliberal spirit and some Chicago School doctrinal elements.competition, policy, European Union, neoliberalism, ordoliberalism, political work

Argument schemes for two-phase democratic deliberation

A formal two-phase model of democratic policy deliberation is presented, in which in the first phase sufficient and necessary criteria for proposals to be accepted are determined (the ‘acceptable’ criteria) and in the second phase proposals are made and evaluated in light of the acceptable criteria resulting from the first phase. Such a separation gives the discussion a clear structure and prevents time and resources from being wasted on evaluating arguments for proposals based on unacceptable criteria. Argument schemes for both phases are defined and formalised in a logical framework for structured argumentation. The process of deliberation is abstracted from and it is assumed that both deliberation phases result in a set of arguments and attack and defeat relations between them. The acceptability status of criteria and proposals within the resulting argumentation framework is then evaluated using preferred semantics. For cases where preferences are required to choose between proposals, inference rules for deriving preferences between sets from an ordering of their elements are given.MediamaticsElectrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Scienc

On the integration of trust with negotiation, argumentation and semantics

Agreement Technologies are needed for autonomous agents to come to mutually acceptable agreements, typically on behalf of humans. These technologies include trust computing, negotiation, argumentation and semantic alignment. In this paper, we identify a number of open questions regarding the integration of computational models and tools for trust computing with negotiation, argumentation and semantic alignment. We consider these questions in general and in the context of applications in open, distributed settings such as the grid and cloud computing. © 2013 Cambridge University Press.This work was partially supported by the Agreement Technology COST action (IC0801). The authors would like to thank for helpful discussions and comments all participants in the panel on >Trust, Argumentation and Semantics> on 16 December 2009, Agia Napa, CyprusPeer Reviewe

Interpretive Interactions among Legal Systems and Argumentation Schemes

This thesis is about argumentation schemes that help to deal with interactions between national and foreign canons of interpretation in private international law cases. In fact, many legal orders, like Italy, require that, in conflict of laws disputes, courts apply the relevant foreign law using canons of interpretation and rules of application of the original foreign system. Our research hypothesis is that, in interpreting the foreign rule, domestic courts incur interpretive divergences of many kinds among the involved legal systems. Foreign law interpretation may result in linguistic and/or conceptual misalignments, in normative and/or interpretive gaps, and in specific incompatibilities between inner and foreign canons of interpretation. By focusing on interpretive conflicts within one legal system, legal theorists and AI and Law scholars have not yet paid sufficient attention to the issue, even if pluralist logics and argumentation have been generally applied to legal pluralism and conflict of laws. The present study fills this gap in the literature: it explores the feasibility of a theory for arguing and interpreting in private international law contexts, providing an argument-based conceptual framework that encompasses plausible interpretive interactions. To this end, and after addressing the epistemic concerns foreign law raises for domestic judges, the thesis gives a definition of cross-border interpretive incompatibilities and proposes argumentation schemes to reason with interpretive canons coming from different legal systems. An illustrative list of critical questions is used to evaluate the correctness of such interpretive reasoning. Lastly, the thesis presents the first formal developments of the study, based on the concept of meta-argumentation. It is possible to detect two main contributions to knowledge. First, this work identifies the components of foreign law interpretation, an interpretation activity with significant practical implications for legal systems today. In so doing, it also indirectly contributes to better understand interpretation at large. Secondly, its argument-based analysis paves the way for further formal applications in the domain of AI and Law

Порівняльна характеристика судової аргументації в різних правових системах

The article analyzes methods of usage judicial reasoning in different legal systems and the impact of this judicial practice on law-application process in Ukraine.У статті досліджено методи використання судової аргументації в різних правових системах, а також вплив такої судової практики на правозастосовчий процес в Україні

Law Informs Code: A Legal Informatics Approach to Aligning Artificial Intelligence with Humans

We are currently unable to specify human goals and societal values in a way that reliably directs AI behavior. Law-making and legal interpretation form a computational engine that converts opaque human values into legible directives. "Law Informs Code" is the research agenda embedding legal knowledge and reasoning in AI. Similar to how parties to a legal contract cannot foresee every potential contingency of their future relationship, and legislators cannot predict all the circumstances under which their proposed bills will be applied, we cannot ex ante specify rules that provably direct good AI behavior. Legal theory and practice have developed arrays of tools to address these specification problems. For instance, legal standards allow humans to develop shared understandings and adapt them to novel situations. In contrast to more prosaic uses of the law (e.g., as a deterrent of bad behavior through the threat of sanction), leveraged as an expression of how humans communicate their goals, and what society values, Law Informs Code. We describe how data generated by legal processes (methods of law-making, statutory interpretation, contract drafting, applications of legal standards, legal reasoning, etc.) can facilitate the robust specification of inherently vague human goals. This increases human-AI alignment and the local usefulness of AI. Toward society-AI alignment, we present a framework for understanding law as the applied philosophy of multi-agent alignment. Although law is partly a reflection of historically contingent political power - and thus not a perfect aggregation of citizen preferences - if properly parsed, its distillation offers the most legitimate computational comprehension of societal values available. If law eventually informs powerful AI, engaging in the deliberative political process to improve law takes on even more meaning.Comment: Forthcoming in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, Volume 2

TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES FOR E-SCIENCE: The Scope of the Challenge

The three-fold purpose of this Report to the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) of the Research Councils (UK) is to: • articulate the nature and significance of the non-technological issues that will bear on the practical effectiveness of the hardware and software infrastructures that are being created to enable collaborations in e- Science; • characterise succinctly the fundamental sources of the organisational and institutional challenges that need to be addressed in regard to defining terms, rights and responsibilities of the collaborating parties, and to illustrate these by reference to the limited experience gained to date in regard to intellectual property, liability, privacy, and security and competition policy issues affecting scientific research organisations; and • propose approaches for arriving at institutional mechanisms whose establishment would generate workable, specific arrangements facilitating collaboration in e-Science; and, that also might serve to meet similar needs in other spheres such as e- Learning, e-Government, e-Commerce, e-Healthcare. In carrying out these tasks, the report examines developments in enhanced computer-mediated telecommunication networks and digital information technologies, and recent advances in technologies of collaboration. It considers the economic and legal aspects of scientific collaboration, with attention to interactions between formal contracting and 'private ordering' arrangements that rest upon research community norms. It offers definitions of e-Science, virtual laboratories, collaboratories, and develops a taxonomy of collaborative e-Science activities which is implemented to classify British e-Science pilot projects and contrast these with US collaboratory projects funded during the 1990s. The approach to facilitating inter-organizational participation in collaborative projects rests upon the development of a modular structure of contractual clauses that permit flexibility and experience-based learning.

Moral Uncertainty and Political Philosophy

This thesis addresses a methodological tendency in political philosophy whereby philosophers develop their ethical views independently of the political realm and then import those views into political argumentation intact, without considering whether this sort of primacy of the ethical is appropriate. Observing that the political is non-accidentally typified by disagreement about all manner of things, including, importantly, the ethical, reveals this to be deeply problematic. Through a discussion of moral epistemology, the thesis aims to show that we should not be certain about our moral beliefs in the face of disagreement, which means in turn that we must alter the way in which we approach political philosophy. It considers two responses to this concern: the Unilateral Solution, which argues that if you have access to the moral facts you may ignore disagreement, and the Pluralist Solution, which argues that moral disagreement ought to be taken seriously and that it is the job of political philosophy to provide a framework in which this disagreement can play out. After arguing that neither of these solutions is satisfactory, the thesis concludes that the moral uncertainty caused by disagreement is unavoidable, and offers some suggestions for how we might practice political philosophy in light of this situation