Maritime threat response

This report was prepared by Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort Nine (SEA-9) Maritime Threat Response, (MTR) team members.Background: The 2006 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Cross-Campus Integrated Study, titled “Maritime Threat Response” involved the combined effort of 7 NPS Systems Engineering students, 7 Singaporean Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) students, 12 students from the Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) curriculum, and numerous NPS faculty members from different NPS departments. After receiving tasking provided by the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering at NPS in support of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the study examined ways to validate intelligence and respond to maritime terrorist attacks against United States coastal harbors and ports. Through assessment of likely harbors and waterways to base the study upon, the San Francisco Bay was selected as a representative test-bed for the integrated study. The NPS Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 9 (SEA-9) Maritime Threat Response (MTR) team, in conjunction with the TDSI students, used the Systems Engineering Lifecycle Process (SELP) [shown in Figure ES-1, p. xxiii ] as a systems engineering framework to conduct the multi-disciplinary study. While not actually fabricating any hardware, such a process was well-suited for tailoring to the team’s research efforts and project focus. The SELP was an iterative process used to bound and scope the MTR problem, determine needs, requirements, functions, and to design architecture alternatives to satisfy stakeholder needs and desires. The SoS approach taken [shown in Figure ES-2, p. xxiv ]enabled the team to apply a systematic approach to problem definition, needs analysis, requirements, analysis, functional analysis, and then architecture development and assessment.In the twenty-first century, the threat of asymmetric warfare in the form of terrorism is one of the most likely direct threats to the United States homeland. It has been recognized that perhaps the key element in protecting the continental United States from terrorist threats is obtaining intelligence of impending attacks in advance. Enormous amounts of resources are currently allocated to obtaining and parsing such intelligence. However, it remains a difficult problem to deal with such attacks once intelligence is obtained. In this context, the Maritime Threat Response Project has applied Systems Engineering processes to propose different cost-effective System of Systems (SoS) architecture solutions to surface-based terrorist threats emanating from the maritime domain. The project applied a five-year time horizon to provide near-term solutions to the prospective decision makers and take maximum advantage of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions and emphasize new Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) for existing systems. Results provided insight into requirements for interagency interactions in support of Maritime Security and demonstrated the criticality of timely and accurate intelligence in support of counterterror operations.This report was prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland DefenseApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Riverine sustainment 2012

Student Integrated ProjectIncludes supplementary materialThis technical report analyzed the Navy's proposed Riverine Force (RF) structure and capabilities for 2012. The Riverine Sustainment 2012 Team (RST) examined the cost and performance of systems of systems which increased RF sustainment in logistically barren environments. RF sustainment was decomposed into its functional areas of supply, repair, and force protection. The functional and physical architectures were developed in parallel and were used to construct an operational architecture for the RF. The RST used mathematical, agent-based and queuing models to analyze various supply, repair and force protection system alternatives. Extraction of modeling data revealed several key insights. Waterborne heavy lift connectors such as the LCU-2000 are vital in the re-supply of the RF when it is operating up river in a non-permissive environment. Airborne heavy lift connectors such as the MV-22 were ineffective and dominated by the waterborne variants in the same environment. Increase in manpower and facilities did appreciable add to the operational availability of the RF. Mean supply response time was the biggest factor effecting operational availability and should be kept below 24 hours to maintain operational availability rates above 80%. Current mortar defenses proposed by the RF are insufficient.N

MH-60 Seahawk / MQ-8 Fire Scout interoperability

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimitedAs part of a Naval Postgraduate School's capstone project in Systems Engineering, a project team from Cohort 311-0911 performed a Systems Engineering analysis. This Project focused on defining alternatives for enhanced Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) mission effectiveness through increased interoperability and integration for the Fire Scout Unmanned Air Vehicle and Seahawk helicopter. Specifically, the Project explored the available trade space for enhancing communications back to the ship for analysis and decision-making. Modeling and Simulation (MandS) was used to assess the impact of enhanced communication on specific Key performance Parameters (KPPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) associated with the ASUW mission. Once the trade space was defined, alternatives were analyzed and a recommendation provided that supports near-, mid-, and long-term mission enhancement

Implication of FORCEnet on coalition forces

The coalition navies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States (AUSCANNZUKUS) are in a period of transformation. They are stepping out of the Industrial Age of warfare and into the Informational Age of warfare. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is the emerging theory to accomplish this undertaking. NCW describes "the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive war fighting advantage." 1 This theory is turned into a concept through Network Centric Operations (NCO) and implemented through the FORCEnet operational construct and architectural framework. The coalition navies are moving in a direction to develop and leverage information more effectively and efficiently. This will lead to an informational advantage that can be used as a combat multiplier to shape and control the environment, so as to dissuade, deter, and decisively defeat any enemy. This analysis was comprised of defining three TTCP AG-6 provided vignettes into ARENA model that captured Coalition ESG configurations at various FORCEnet levels. The results of the analysis demonstrated that enhanced FORCEnet capabilities such as FORCEnet Levels 2 and 4 would satisfy the capability gap for a needed network-centric ESG force that can effectively counter insurgency operations in Maritime warfare. Furthermore, the participating allied navies in the Coalition ESG should pursue acquisition strategies to upgrade their ship platforms in accordance with our recommendation which indicates that FORCEnet Level 2 is the best value.http://archive.org/details/implicationoffor109456926N

A Cross-Disciplinary Approach to the Maritime Security Risk of Piracy and Lessons Learned From Agent-Based Modeling

This dissertation takes a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding pirate activity. Maritime piracy presents a dynamic ever-evolving problem. In today’s globalized world, contemporary maritime piracy presents a transnational threat. It is a complex socio-economic and political problem which the modern world considers to be criminal activity. Like all complex problems it must be deconstructed to fully comprehend it. All criminal activity, maritime piracy included, has certain elements of supply and demand. For the activity to occur there must be a certain level, or supply, of targets. At the same time, we can posit that there must be a lack of other opportunities for the pirates, who calculate that the risk of engaging in piracy is worthwhile. This risk calculation is a function of the potential rewards minus the sum of the risks. An increase in pirate attacks creates a demand for better maritime security. An increase in maritime security causes an increase in risk to pirates. Improved pirate capabilities may decrease this risk. The result is a constantly evolving complex problem. This study proposes a parsimonious agent-based model, focused on the socio-economic and political variables that encourage piracy, with utility across many specific regional domains. By simplifying the details of certain aspects of the model, the focus is placed on the issues at the heart of the problem. This allows for new insights into the dynamic relationship between these factors

ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF LETHALITY AND SURVIVABILITY FOR THE MARINE LITTORAL REGIMENT

As the Marine Corps activates the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) to serve as the joint force’s reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance effort, questions abound regarding the MLR’s ability to provide a persistent and lethal presence well inside the reach of our adversaries’ advanced long-range precision fires. In this study, the author uses agent-based combat simulations to inform future force design decisions, live-force experimentation, and tactics. The simulated scenario imagines a future MLR conducting sea control operations in the littorals of the Western Pacific against a peer naval threat. This research investigates the effect that a guard force of autonomous and/or semi-autonomous surface vessels, operating as the guard force of the MLR’s defense in depth, has on the survivability and lethality of the MLR’s land-based anti-ship missile platforms. Summary statistics generated by the simulation indicate that the future battlefield will see high losses on both sides. However, based on the results of 27,200 simulated engagements, this study finds that an MLR using a guard force of armed and unarmed “scouts” as described above can inflict a prohibitively high and unsustainable cost on an enemy naval force.Outstanding ThesisMajor, United States Marine CorpsApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

After Action Report

17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under review.Prepared by Lyla Englehorn, NPS Faculty Associate – Research for VADM David Lewis USN (ret) NWSI Director; CAPT Jeff Kline USN retired, Professor of the Practice NPS Operations Research Department; and Dr. Brian Bingham, CRUSER DirectorThe September 2021 workshop “Hybrid Force 2045” tasked participants to apply emerging technologies to shape the way we fight in a 2045 global conflict depicted in the fictional scenario “Hybrid War 2045.” Concept generation teams were given the design challenge: How might emerging technologies, new operational concepts, and alternative fleet designs contribute to a more effective naval force across the spectrum from competition to conflict? How do the alternative fleet designs enhance the effectiveness and resilience of joint, combined and coalition forces across all domains? Following panel discussions and presentations from leading technical and policy experts, the teams and their embedded facilitators had fourteen hours of scheduled concept generation time to meet that challenge and presented their best concepts on the final morning of the workshop.UNCLASSIFIED//Approved for public release: distribution unlimite

An Agent Based Model to Assess Crew Temporal Variability During U.S. Navy Shipboard Operations

Understanding the factors that affect human performance variability as well as their temporal impacts is an essential element in fully integrating and designing complex, adaptive environments. This understanding is particularly necessary for high stakes, time-critical routines such as those performed during nuclear reactor, air traffic control, and military operations. Over the last three decades significant efforts have emerged to demonstrate and apply a host of techniques to include Discrete Event Simulation, Bayesian Belief Networks, Neural Networks, and a multitude of existing software applications to provide relevant assessments of human task performance and temporal variability. The objective of this research was to design and develop a novel Agent Based Modeling and Simulation (ABMS) methodology to generate a timeline of work and assess impacts of crew temporal variability during U.S. Navy Small Boat Defense operations in littoral waters. The developed ABMS methodology included human performance models for six crew members (agents) as well as a threat craft, and incorporated varying levels of crew capability and task support. AnyLogic ABMS software was used to simultaneously provide detailed measures of individual sailor performance and of system-level emergent behavior. This methodology and these models were adapted and built to assure extensibility across a broad range of U.S. Navy shipboard operations. Application of the developed ABMS methodology effectively demonstrated a way to visualize and quantify impacts/uncertainties of human temporal variability on both workload and crew effectiveness during U.S. Navy shipboard operations

Overview of Security Plan for Offshore Floating Nuclear Plant

A new Offshore Floating Nuclear Plant (OFNP) concept with high potential for attractive economics and an unprecedented level of safety is presented, along with an overview of work done in the area of security. The OFNP creatively combines state-of-the-art Light Water Reactors (LWRs) with floating platforms such as those used in offshore oil/gas operations, both of which are well-established technologies which can allow implementation on a time scale consistent with combating climate change in the near future. OFNP is a plant that can be entirely built within a floating platform in a shipyard, transferred to the site. OFNP eliminates earthquakes and tsunamis as accident precursors; its ocean-based passive safety systems eliminate the loss of ultimate heat sink accident by design. The defense of an OFNP poses new security opportunities and challenges compared to land-based plants. Such a plant can be more easily defended by virtue of the clear 360 degree lines of sight and the relative ease of identifying surface threats. Conversely the offshore plant is potentially vulnerable to underwater approaches by mini-submarines and divers. We investigate security considerations of the OFNP applicable to two potential plant options, an OFNP-300 with a 300 MWe reactor, and an OFNP-1100 with an 1100 MWe reactor. Three innovative security system approaches could be combined for the offshore plant. The first is a comprehensive detection system which integrates radar, sonar and unmanned vehicles for a long distance overview of the vicinity of the plant. The second approach is the use of passive physical barriers about 100 meters from the plant, which will force a fast-moving power boat to lose speed or stop at the barrier allowing the plant security force more time to respond. The third approach takes advantage of the offshore plant siting and the monthly or biweekly rotation of crew to reduce the total on-plant and onshore security force by using the off-duty security force on the plant as a reserve force. Through the use of these approaches, the OFNP-300 should be able to achieve a similar security cost (on a per Megawatt basis) as land-based plants of similar or somewhat larger power rating. Due to non-linear scaling of cost, the security cost of the OFNP-1100 has the potential to be reduced significantly compared to its land-based equivalents