44,592 research outputs found
Evaluating Resilience of Electricity Distribution Networks via A Modification of Generalized Benders Decomposition Method
This paper presents a computational approach to evaluate the resilience of
electricity Distribution Networks (DNs) to cyber-physical failures. In our
model, we consider an attacker who targets multiple DN components to maximize
the loss of the DN operator. We consider two types of operator response: (i)
Coordinated emergency response; (ii) Uncoordinated autonomous disconnects,
which may lead to cascading failures. To evaluate resilience under response
(i), we solve a Bilevel Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Program which is
computationally challenging due to mixed-integer variables in the inner problem
and non-convex constraints. Our solution approach is based on the Generalized
Benders Decomposition method, which achieves a reasonable tradeoff between
computational time and solution accuracy. Our approach involves modifying the
Benders cut based on structural insights on power flow over radial DNs. We
evaluate DN resilience under response (ii) by sequentially computing autonomous
component disconnects due to operating bound violations resulting from the
initial attack and the potential cascading failures. Our approach helps
estimate the gain in resilience under response (i), relative to (ii)
Attack-Resilient Supervisory Control of Discrete-Event Systems
In this work, we study the problem of supervisory control of discrete-event
systems (DES) in the presence of attacks that tamper with inputs and outputs of
the plant. We consider a very general system setup as we focus on both
deterministic and nondeterministic plants that we model as finite state
transducers (FSTs); this also covers the conventional approach to modeling DES
as deterministic finite automata. Furthermore, we cover a wide class of attacks
that can nondeterministically add, remove, or rewrite a sensing and/or
actuation word to any word from predefined regular languages, and show how such
attacks can be modeled by nondeterministic FSTs; we also present how the use of
FSTs facilitates modeling realistic (and very complex) attacks, as well as
provides the foundation for design of attack-resilient supervisory controllers.
Specifically, we first consider the supervisory control problem for
deterministic plants with attacks (i) only on their sensors, (ii) only on their
actuators, and (iii) both on their sensors and actuators. For each case, we
develop new conditions for controllability in the presence of attacks, as well
as synthesizing algorithms to obtain FST-based description of such
attack-resilient supervisors. A derived resilient controller provides a set of
all safe control words that can keep the plant work desirably even in the
presence of corrupted observation and/or if the control words are subjected to
actuation attacks. Then, we extend the controllability theorems and the
supervisor synthesizing algorithms to nondeterministic plants that satisfy a
nonblocking condition. Finally, we illustrate applicability of our methodology
on several examples and numerical case-studies
Disaster-Resilient Control Plane Design and Mapping in Software-Defined Networks
Communication networks, such as core optical networks, heavily depend on
their physical infrastructure, and hence they are vulnerable to man-made
disasters, such as Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) or Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) attacks, as well as to natural disasters. Large-scale disasters may cause
huge data loss and connectivity disruption in these networks. As our dependence
on network services increases, the need for novel survivability methods to
mitigate the effects of disasters on communication networks becomes a major
concern. Software-Defined Networking (SDN), by centralizing control logic and
separating it from physical equipment, facilitates network programmability and
opens up new ways to design disaster-resilient networks. On the other hand, to
fully exploit the potential of SDN, along with data-plane survivability, we
also need to design the control plane to be resilient enough to survive network
failures caused by disasters. Several distributed SDN controller architectures
have been proposed to mitigate the risks of overload and failure, but they are
optimized for limited faults without addressing the extent of large-scale
disaster failures. For disaster resiliency of the control plane, we propose to
design it as a virtual network, which can be solved using Virtual Network
Mapping techniques. We select appropriate mapping of the controllers over the
physical network such that the connectivity among the controllers
(controller-to-controller) and between the switches to the controllers
(switch-to-controllers) is not compromised by physical infrastructure failures
caused by disasters. We formally model this disaster-aware control-plane design
and mapping problem, and demonstrate a significant reduction in the disruption
of controller-to-controller and switch-to-controller communication channels
using our approach.Comment: 6 page
Self-triggered Coordination over a Shared Network under Denial-of-Service
The issue of security has become ever more prevalent in the analysis and
design of cyber-physical systems. In this paper, we analyze a consensus network
in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent
communication among the network agents. By introducing a notion of
Persistency-of-Communication (PoC), we provide a characterization of DoS
frequency and duration such that consensus is not destroyed. An example is
given to substantiate the analysis
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