Coordinated Multi-Agent Imitation Learning

We study the problem of imitation learning from demonstrations of multiple coordinating agents. One key challenge in this setting is that learning a good model of coordination can be difficult, since coordination is often implicit in the demonstrations and must be inferred as a latent variable. We propose a joint approach that simultaneously learns a latent coordination model along with the individual policies. In particular, our method integrates unsupervised structure learning with conventional imitation learning. We illustrate the power of our approach on a difficult problem of learning multiple policies for fine-grained behavior modeling in team sports, where different players occupy different roles in the coordinated team strategy. We show that having a coordination model to infer the roles of players yields substantially improved imitation loss compared to conventional baselines.Comment: International Conference on Machine Learning 201

A Regularized Opponent Model with Maximum Entropy Objective

In a single-agent setting, reinforcement learning (RL) tasks can be cast into an inference problem by introducing a binary random variable o, which stands for the "optimality". In this paper, we redefine the binary random variable o in multi-agent setting and formalize multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) as probabilistic inference. We derive a variational lower bound of the likelihood of achieving the optimality and name it as Regularized Opponent Model with Maximum Entropy Objective (ROMMEO). From ROMMEO, we present a novel perspective on opponent modeling and show how it can improve the performance of training agents theoretically and empirically in cooperative games. To optimize ROMMEO, we first introduce a tabular Q-iteration method ROMMEO-Q with proof of convergence. We extend the exact algorithm to complex environments by proposing an approximate version, ROMMEO-AC. We evaluate these two algorithms on the challenging iterated matrix game and differential game respectively and show that they can outperform strong MARL baselines.Comment: Accepted to International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCA2019

Resilient Autonomous Control of Distributed Multi-agent Systems in Contested Environments

An autonomous and resilient controller is proposed for leader-follower multi-agent systems under uncertainties and cyber-physical attacks. The leader is assumed non-autonomous with a nonzero control input, which allows changing the team behavior or mission in response to environmental changes. A resilient learning-based control protocol is presented to find optimal solutions to the synchronization problem in the presence of attacks and system dynamic uncertainties. An observer-based distributed H_infinity controller is first designed to prevent propagating the effects of attacks on sensors and actuators throughout the network, as well as to attenuate the effect of these attacks on the compromised agent itself. Non-homogeneous game algebraic Riccati equations are derived to solve the H_infinity optimal synchronization problem and off-policy reinforcement learning is utilized to learn their solution without requiring any knowledge of the agent's dynamics. A trust-confidence based distributed control protocol is then proposed to mitigate attacks that hijack the entire node and attacks on communication links. A confidence value is defined for each agent based solely on its local evidence. The proposed resilient reinforcement learning algorithm employs the confidence value of each agent to indicate the trustworthiness of its own information and broadcast it to its neighbors to put weights on the data they receive from it during and after learning. If the confidence value of an agent is low, it employs a trust mechanism to identify compromised agents and remove the data it receives from them from the learning process. Simulation results are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach

An Adversarial Interpretation of Information-Theoretic Bounded Rationality

Recently, there has been a growing interest in modeling planning with information constraints. Accordingly, an agent maximizes a regularized expected utility known as the free energy, where the regularizer is given by the information divergence from a prior to a posterior policy. While this approach can be justified in various ways, including from statistical mechanics and information theory, it is still unclear how it relates to decision-making against adversarial environments. This connection has previously been suggested in work relating the free energy to risk-sensitive control and to extensive form games. Here, we show that a single-agent free energy optimization is equivalent to a game between the agent and an imaginary adversary. The adversary can, by paying an exponential penalty, generate costs that diminish the decision maker's payoffs. It turns out that the optimal strategy of the adversary consists in choosing costs so as to render the decision maker indifferent among its choices, which is a definining property of a Nash equilibrium, thus tightening the connection between free energy optimization and game theory.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figures. Proceedings of AAAI-1