Model-based Safety and Security Co-analysis: a Survey

We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and security analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures, and security absence of malicious attacks. We consider ten model-based formalisms, comparing their modeling principles, the interaction between safety and security, and analysis methods. In each formalism, we model the classical Locked Door Example where possible. Our key finding is that the exact nature of safety-security interaction is still ill-understood. Existing formalisms merge previous safety and security formalisms, without introducing specific constructs to model safety-security interactions, or metrics to analyze trade offs

Model-based Joint Analysis of Safety and Security:Survey and Identification of Gaps

We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and security joint analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures, and security to absence of malicious attacks. We conduct a thorough literature review and - as a result - we consider fourteen model-based formalisms and compare them with respect to several criteria: (1) Modelling capabilities and Expressiveness: which phenomena can be expressed in these formalisms? To which extent can they capture safety-security interactions? (2) Analytical capabilities: which analysis types are supported? (3) Practical applicability: to what extent have the formalisms been used to analyze small or larger case studies? Furthermore, (1) we present more precise definitions for safety-security dependencies in tree-like formalisms; (2) we showcase the potential of each formalism by modelling the same toy example from the literature and (3) we present our findings and reflect on possible ways to narrow highlighted gaps. In summary, our key findings are the following: (1) the majority of approaches combine tree-like formal models; (2) the exact nature of safety-security interaction is still ill-understood and (3) diverse formalisms can capture different interactions; (4) analyzed formalisms merge modelling constructs from existing safety- and security-specific formalisms, without introducing ad hoc constructs to model safety-security interactions, or (5) metrics to analyze trade offs. Moreover, (6) large case studies representing safety-security interactions are still missing

Ein mehrschichtiges sicheres Framework für Fahrzeugsysteme

In recent years, significant developments were introduced within the vehicular domain, evolving the vehicles to become a network of many embedded systems distributed throughout the car, known as Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Each one of these ECUs runs a number of software components that collaborate with each other to perform various vehicle functions. Modern vehicles are also equipped with wireless communication technologies, such as WiFi, Bluetooth, and so on, giving them the capability to interact with other vehicles and roadside infrastructure. While these improvements have increased the safety of the automotive system, they have vastly expanded the attack surface of the vehicle and opened the door for new potential security risks. The situation is made worse by a lack of security mechanisms in the vehicular system which allows the escalation of a compromise in one of the non-critical sub-systems to threaten the safety of the entire vehicle and its passengers. This dissertation focuses on providing a comprehensive framework that ensures the security of the vehicular system during its whole life-cycle. This framework aims to prevent the cyber-attacks against different components by ensuring secure communications among them. Furthermore, it aims to detect attacks which were not prevented successfully, and finally, to respond to these attacks properly to ensure a high degree of safety and stability of the system.In den letzten Jahren wurden bedeutende Entwicklungen im Bereich der Fahrzeuge vorgestellt, die die Fahrzeuge zu einem Netzwerk mit vielen im gesamten Fahrzeug verteile integrierte Systeme weiterentwickelten, den sogenannten Steuergeräten (ECU, englisch = Electronic Control Units). Jedes dieser Steuergeräte betreibt eine Reihe von Softwarekomponenten, die bei der Ausführung verschiedener Fahrzeugfunktionen zusammenarbeiten. Moderne Fahrzeuge sind auch mit drahtlosen Kommunikationstechnologien wie WiFi, Bluetooth usw. ausgestattet, die ihnen die Möglichkeit geben, mit anderen Fahrzeugen und der straßenseitigen Infrastruktur zu interagieren. Während diese Verbesserungen die Sicherheit des Fahrzeugsystems erhöht haben, haben sie die Angriffsfläche des Fahrzeugs erheblich vergrößert und die Tür für neue potenzielle Sicherheitsrisiken geöffnet. Die Situation wird durch einen Mangel an Sicherheitsmechanismen im Fahrzeugsystem verschärft, die es ermöglichen, dass ein Kompromiss in einem der unkritischen Subsysteme die Sicherheit des gesamten Fahrzeugs und seiner Insassen gefährdet kann. Diese Dissertation konzentriert sich auf die Entwicklung eines umfassenden Rahmens, der die Sicherheit des Fahrzeugsystems während seines gesamten Lebenszyklus gewährleistet. Dieser Rahmen zielt darauf ab, die Cyber-Angriffe gegen verschiedene Komponenten zu verhindern, indem eine sichere Kommunikation zwischen ihnen gewährleistet wird. Darüber hinaus zielt es darauf ab, Angriffe zu erkennen, die nicht erfolgreich verhindert wurden, und schließlich auf diese Angriffe angemessen zu reagieren, um ein hohes Maß an Sicherheit und Stabilität des Systems zu gewährleisten