A tableau system for Quasi-hybrid logic

Hybrid logic is a valuable tool for specifying relational structures, at the same time that allows defining accessibility relations between states, it provides a way to nominate and make mention to what happens at each specific state. However, due to the many sources nowadays available, we may need to deal with contradictory information. This is the reason why we came with the idea of Quasi-hybrid logic, which is a paraconsistent version of hybrid logic capable of dealing with inconsistencies in the information, written as hybrid formulas. In [5] we have already developed a semantics for this paraconsistent logic. In this paper we go a step forward, namely we study its proof-theoretical aspects. We present a complete tableau system for Quasi-hybrid logic, by combining both tableaux for Quasi-classical and Hybrid logics

Knowledge and ignorance in Belnap--Dunn logic

In this paper, we argue that the usual approach to modelling knowledge and belief with the necessity modality $\Box$ does not produce intuitive outcomes in the framework of the Belnap--Dunn logic ($\mathsf{BD}$, alias $\mathsf{FDE}$ -- first-degree entailment). We then motivate and introduce a non\-standard modality $\blacksquare$ that formalises knowledge and belief in $\mathsf{BD}$ and use $\blacksquare$ to define $\bullet$ and $\blacktriangledown$ that formalise the \emph{unknown truth} and ignorance as \emph{not knowing whether}, respectively. Moreover, we introduce another modality $\mathbf{I}$ that stands for \emph{factive ignorance} and show its connection with $\blacksquare$. We equip these modalities with Kripke-frame-based semantics and construct a sound and complete analytic cut system for $\mathsf{BD}^\blacksquare$ and $\mathsf{BD}^\mathbf{I}$ -- the expansions of $\mathsf{BD}$ with $\blacksquare$ and $\mathbf{I}$. In addition, we show that $\Box$ as it is customarily defined in $\mathsf{BD}$ cannot define any of the introduced modalities, nor, conversely, neither $\blacksquare$ nor $\mathbf{I}$ can define $\Box$. We also demonstrate that $\blacksquare$ and $\mathbf{I}$ are not interdefinable and establish the definability of several important classes of frames using $\blacksquare$

Zero-one laws with respect to models of provability logic and two Grzegorczyk logics

It has been shown in the late 1960s that each formula of first-order logic without constants and function symbols obeys a zero-one law: As the number of elements of finite models increases, every formula holds either in almost all or in almost no models of that size. Therefore, many properties of models, such as having an even number of elements, cannot be expressed in the language of first-order logic. Halpern and Kapron proved zero-one laws for classes of models corresponding to the modal logics K, T, S4, and S5 and for frames corresponding to S4 and S5. In this paper, we prove zero-one laws for provability logic and its two siblings Grzegorczyk logic and weak Grzegorczyk logic, with respect to model validity. Moreover, we axiomatize validity in almost all relevant finite models, leading to three different axiom systems

Fuzzy bi-G\"{o}del modal logic and its paraconsistent relatives

We present the axiomatisation of the fuzzy bi-G\"{o}del modal logic (formulated in the language containing $\triangle$ and treating the coimplication as a defined connective) and establish its PSpace-completeness. We also consider its paraconsistent relatives defined on fuzzy frames with two valuations $e_1$ and $e_2$ standing for the support of truth and falsity, respectively, and equipped with \emph{two fuzzy relations} $R^+$ and $R^-$ used to determine supports of truth and falsity of modal formulas. We establish embeddings of these paraconsistent logics into the fuzzy bi-G\"{o}del modal logic and use them to prove their PSpace-completeness and obtain the characterisation of definable frames