30,471 research outputs found
Credence: A Belief-First Approach
This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed
Strategic Content: Representations of Epistemic Modality in Biosemantics
A central idea in Ruth Millikanâs biosemantics is that a representationâs content is restricted to conditions required for the normal success of actions that it has as its function to guide. This paper raises and responds to a problem for this idea. The problem is that the success requirement seems to block us from saying that epistemic modal judgments represent our epistemic circumstances. For the normal success of actions guided by these judgments seems to depend on what is actually the case, not on whether or to what extent various possibilities were supported by our evidence. In response, I argue, first, that actions guided by epistemic modal judgments have as their function to implement strategies for handling epistemic circumstances, second, that the successful performance of this function requires that aspects of these circumstances obtain, and, third, that biosemantics can thus understand epistemic modal judgments as representing these aspects. The recognition of such strategic contents introduces complications; I further argue that these are benign
On Automating the Doctrine of Double Effect
The doctrine of double effect () is a long-studied ethical
principle that governs when actions that have both positive and negative
effects are to be allowed. The goal in this paper is to automate
. We briefly present , and use a first-order
modal logic, the deontic cognitive event calculus, as our framework to
formalize the doctrine. We present formalizations of increasingly stronger
versions of the principle, including what is known as the doctrine of triple
effect. We then use our framework to simulate successfully scenarios that have
been used to test for the presence of the principle in human subjects. Our
framework can be used in two different modes: One can use it to build
-compliant autonomous systems from scratch, or one can use it to
verify that a given AI system is -compliant, by applying a
layer on an existing system or model. For the latter mode, the
underlying AI system can be built using any architecture (planners, deep neural
networks, bayesian networks, knowledge-representation systems, or a hybrid); as
long as the system exposes a few parameters in its model, such verification is
possible. The role of the layer here is akin to a (dynamic or
static) software verifier that examines existing software modules. Finally, we
end by presenting initial work on how one can apply our layer
to the STRIPS-style planning model, and to a modified POMDP model.This is
preliminary work to illustrate the feasibility of the second mode, and we hope
that our initial sketches can be useful for other researchers in incorporating
DDE in their own frameworks.Comment: 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2017;
Special Track on AI & Autonom
A Cognitive Model for Conversation
International audienceThis paper describes a symbolic model of rational action and decision making to support analysing dialogue. The model approximates principles of behaviour from game theory, and its proof theory makes Gricean principles of cooperativity derivable when the agentsâ preferences align
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