6 research outputs found
Belief as Willingness to Bet
We investigate modal logics of high probability having two unary modal
operators: an operator expressing probabilistic certainty and an operator
expressing probability exceeding a fixed rational threshold . Identifying knowledge with the former and belief with the latter, we may
think of as the agent's betting threshold, which leads to the motto "belief
is willingness to bet." The logic for has an
modality along with a sub-normal modality that extends
the minimal modal logic by way of four schemes relating
and , one of which is a complex scheme arising out of a theorem due to
Scott. Lenzen was the first to use Scott's theorem to show that a version of
this logic is sound and complete for the probability interpretation. We
reformulate Lenzen's results and present them here in a modern and accessible
form. In addition, we introduce a new epistemic neighborhood semantics that
will be more familiar to modern modal logicians. Using Scott's theorem, we
provide the Lenzen-derivative properties that must be imposed on finite
epistemic neighborhood models so as to guarantee the existence of a probability
measure respecting the neighborhood function in the appropriate way for
threshold . This yields a link between probabilistic and modal
neighborhood semantics that we hope will be of use in future work on modal
logics of qualitative probability. We leave open the question of which
properties must be imposed on finite epistemic neighborhood models so as to
guarantee existence of an appropriate probability measure for thresholds
.Comment: Removed date from v1 to avoid confusion on citation/reference,
otherwise identical to v
The complexity of probabilistic EL
We analyze the complexity of subsumption in probabilistic variants of
the description logic EL. In the case where probabilities apply only to concepts,
we map out the borderline between tractability and EXPTIME-completeness. One
outcome is that any probability value except zero and one leads to intractability
in the presence of general TBoxes, while this is not the case for classical TBoxes.
In the case where probabilities can also be applied to roles, we show PSPACEcompleteness.
This result is (positively) surprising as the best previously known
upper bound was 2-EXPTIME and there were reasons to believe in completeness
for this class
Probabilistic description logics for subjective uncertainty
We propose a family of probabilistic description logics (DLs) that are derived in a principled way from Halpern's probabilistic first-order logic. The resulting probabilistic DLs have a two-dimensional semantics similar to temporal DLs and are well-suited for representing subjective probabilities. We carry out a detailed study of reasoning in the new family of logics, concentrating on probabilistic extensions of the DLs ALC and EL, and showing that the complexity ranges from PTime via ExpTime and 2ExpTime to undecidable
Reasoning in Many Dimensions : Uncertainty and Products of Modal Logics
Probabilistic Description Logics (ProbDLs) are an extension of Description Logics that are designed to capture uncertainty. We study problems related to these logics. First, we investigate the monodic fragment of Probabilistic first-order logic, show that it has many nice properties, and are able to explain the complexity results obtained for ProbDLs. Second, in order to identify well-behaved, in best-case tractable ProbDLs, we study the complexity landscape for different fragments of ProbEL; amongst others, we are able to identify a tractable fragment. We then study the reasoning problem of ontological query answering, but apply it to probabilistic data. Therefore, we define the framework of ontology-based access to probabilistic data and study the computational complexity therein. In the final part of the thesis, we study the complexity of the satisfiability problem in the two-dimensional modal logic KxK. We are able to close a gap that has been open for more than ten years
Modal probability, belief, and actions
International audienceWe investigate a modal logic of probability with a unary modal operator expressing that a proposition is more probable than its negation. Such an operator is not closed under conjunction, and its modal logic is therefore non-normal. Within this framework we study the relation of probability with other modal concepts: belief and action. We focus on the evolution of belief, and propose an integration of revision. For that framework we give a regression algorithm