Wireless and Physical Security via Embedded Sensor Networks

Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS) monitor 802.11 wireless frames (Layer-2) in an attempt to detect misuse. What distinguishes a WIDS from a traditional Network IDS is the ability to utilize the broadcast nature of the medium to reconstruct the physical location of the offending party, as opposed to its possibly spoofed (MAC addresses) identity in cyber space. Traditional Wireless Network Security Systems are still heavily anchored in the digital plane of "cyber space" and hence cannot be used reliably or effectively to derive the physical identity of an intruder in order to prevent further malicious wireless broadcasts, for example by escorting an intruder off the premises based on physical evidence. In this paper, we argue that Embedded Sensor Networks could be used effectively to bridge the gap between digital and physical security planes, and thus could be leveraged to provide reciprocal benefit to surveillance and security tasks on both planes. Toward that end, we present our recent experience integrating wireless networking security services into the SNBENCH (Sensor Network workBench). The SNBENCH provides an extensible framework that enables the rapid development and automated deployment of Sensor Network applications on a shared, embedded sensing and actuation infrastructure. The SNBENCH's extensible architecture allows an engineer to quickly integrate new sensing and response capabilities into the SNBENCH framework, while high-level languages and compilers allow novice SN programmers to compose SN service logic, unaware of the lower-level implementation details of tools on which their services rely. In this paper we convey the simplicity of the service composition through concrete examples that illustrate the power and potential of Wireless Security Services that span both the physical and digital plane.National Science Foundation (CISE/CSR 0720604, ENG/EFRI 0735974, CIES/CNS 0520166, CNS/ITR 0205294, CISE/ERA RI 0202067

Portunes: analyzing multi-domain insider threats

The insider threat is an important problem in securing information systems. Skilful insiders use attack vectors that yield the greatest chance of success, and thus do not limit themselves to a restricted set of attacks. They may use access rights to the facility where the system of interest resides, as well as existing relationships with employees. To secure a system, security professionals should therefore consider attacks that include non-digital aspects such as key sharing or exploiting trust relationships among employees. In this paper, we present Portunes, a framework for security design and audit, which incorporates three security domains: (1) the security of the computer system itself (the digital domain), (2) the security of the location where the system is deployed (the physical domain) and (3) the security awareness of the employees that use the system (the social domain). The framework consists of a model, a formal language and a logic. It allows security professionals to formally model elements from the three domains in a single framework, and to analyze possible attack scenarios. The logic enables formal specification of the attack scenarios in terms of state and transition properties

State-of-the-art on evolution and reactivity

This report starts by, in Chapter 1, outlining aspects of querying and updating resources on the Web and on the Semantic Web, including the development of query and update languages to be carried out within the Rewerse project. From this outline, it becomes clear that several existing research areas and topics are of interest for this work in Rewerse. In the remainder of this report we further present state of the art surveys in a selection of such areas and topics. More precisely: in Chapter 2 we give an overview of logics for reasoning about state change and updates; Chapter 3 is devoted to briefly describing existing update languages for the Web, and also for updating logic programs; in Chapter 4 event-condition-action rules, both in the context of active database systems and in the context of semistructured data, are surveyed; in Chapter 5 we give an overview of some relevant rule-based agents frameworks

Multidisciplinary analysis of actively controlled large flexible spacecraft

The control of Flexible Structures (COFS) program has supported the development of an analysis capability at the Langley Research Center called the Integrated Multidisciplinary Analysis Tool (IMAT) which provides an efficient data storage and transfer capability among commercial computer codes to aid in the dynamic analysis of actively controlled structures. IMAT is a system of computer programs which transfers Computer-Aided-Design (CAD) configurations, structural finite element models, material property and stress information, structural and rigid-body dynamic model information, and linear system matrices for control law formulation among various commercial applications programs through a common database. Although general in its formulation, IMAT was developed specifically to aid in the evaluation of the structures. A description of the IMAT system and results of an application of the system are given