Computational Models (of Narrative) for Literary Studies

In the last decades a growing body of literature in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Cognitive Science (CS) has approached the problem of narrative understanding by means of computational systems. Narrative, in fact, is an ubiquitous element in our everyday activity and the ability to generate and understand stories, and their structures, is a crucial cue of our intelligence. However, despite the fact that - from an historical standpoint - narrative (and narrative structures) have been an important topic of investigation in both these areas, a more comprehensive approach coupling them with narratology, digital humanities and literary studies was still lacking. With the aim of covering this empty space, in the last years, a multidisciplinary effort has been made in order to create an international meeting open to computer scientist, psychologists, digital humanists, linguists, narratologists etc.. This event has been named CMN (for Computational Models of Narrative) and was launched in the 2009 by the MIT scholars Mark A. Finlayson and Patrick H. Winston1

On Cognitive Preferences and the Plausibility of Rule-based Models

It is conventional wisdom in machine learning and data mining that logical models such as rule sets are more interpretable than other models, and that among such rule-based models, simpler models are more interpretable than more complex ones. In this position paper, we question this latter assumption by focusing on one particular aspect of interpretability, namely the plausibility of models. Roughly speaking, we equate the plausibility of a model with the likeliness that a user accepts it as an explanation for a prediction. In particular, we argue that, all other things being equal, longer explanations may be more convincing than shorter ones, and that the predominant bias for shorter models, which is typically necessary for learning powerful discriminative models, may not be suitable when it comes to user acceptance of the learned models. To that end, we first recapitulate evidence for and against this postulate, and then report the results of an evaluation in a crowd-sourcing study based on about 3.000 judgments. The results do not reveal a strong preference for simple rules, whereas we can observe a weak preference for longer rules in some domains. We then relate these results to well-known cognitive biases such as the conjunction fallacy, the representative heuristic, or the recogition heuristic, and investigate their relation to rule length and plausibility.Comment: V4: Another rewrite of section on interpretability to clarify focus on plausibility and relation to interpretability, comprehensibility, and justifiabilit