Cores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory

Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory, and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network information theory such as Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis testing, and new settings at the intersection of networking and statistics such as distributed estimation problems for sensor networks. Cooperative game theory allows one to understand aspects of all of these problems from a fresh and unifying perspective that treats users as players in a game, sometimes leading to new insights. At the heart of these analyses are fundamental dualities that have been long studied in the context of cooperative games; for information theoretic purposes, these are dualities between information inequalities on the one hand and properties of rate, capacity or other resource allocation regions on the other.Comment: 12 pages, published at http://www.hindawi.com/GetArticle.aspx?doi=10.1155/2008/318704 in EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, Special Issue on "Theory and Applications in Multiuser/Multiterminal Communications", April 200

Submodularity and Its Applications in Wireless Communications

This monograph studies the submodularity in wireless communications and how to use it to enhance or improve the design of the optimization algorithms. The work is done in three different systems. In a cross-layer adaptive modulation problem, we prove the submodularity of the dynamic programming (DP), which contributes to the monotonicity of the optimal transmission policy. The monotonicity is utilized in a policy iteration algorithm to relieve the curse of dimensionality of DP. In addition, we show that the monotonic optimal policy can be determined by a multivariate minimization problem, which can be solved by a discrete simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (DSPSA) algorithm. We show that the DSPSA is able to converge to the optimal policy in real time. For the adaptive modulation problem in a network-coded two-way relay channel, a two-player game model is proposed. We prove the supermodularity of this game, which ensures the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs). We apply the Cournot tatonnement and show that it converges to the extremal, the largest and smallest, PSNEs within a finite number of iterations. We derive the sufficient conditions for the extremal PSNEs to be symmetric and monotonic in the channel signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio. Based on the submodularity of the entropy function, we study the communication for omniscience (CO) problem: how to let all users obtain all the information in a multiple random source via communications. In particular, we consider the minimum sum-rate problem: how to attain omniscience by the minimum total number of communications. The results cover both asymptotic and non-asymptotic models where the transmission rates are real and integral, respectively. We reveal the submodularity of the minimum sum-rate problem and propose polynomial time algorithms for solving it. We discuss the significance and applications of the fundamental partition, the one that gives rise to the minimum sum-rate in the asymptotic model. We also show how to achieve the omniscience in a successive manner

The Green Choice: Learning and Influencing Human Decisions on Shared Roads

Autonomous vehicles have the potential to increase the capacity of roads via platooning, even when human drivers and autonomous vehicles share roads. However, when users of a road network choose their routes selfishly, the resulting traffic configuration may be very inefficient. Because of this, we consider how to influence human decisions so as to decrease congestion on these roads. We consider a network of parallel roads with two modes of transportation: (i) human drivers who will choose the quickest route available to them, and (ii) ride hailing service which provides an array of autonomous vehicle ride options, each with different prices, to users. In this work, we seek to design these prices so that when autonomous service users choose from these options and human drivers selfishly choose their resulting routes, road usage is maximized and transit delay is minimized. To do so, we formalize a model of how autonomous service users make choices between routes with different price/delay values. Developing a preference-based algorithm to learn the preferences of the users, and using a vehicle flow model related to the Fundamental Diagram of Traffic, we formulate a planning optimization to maximize a social objective and demonstrate the benefit of the proposed routing and learning scheme.Comment: Submitted to CDC 201

A system-theoretic approach to multi-agent models

A system-theoretic model for cooperative settings is presented that unifies and ex- tends the models of classical cooperative games and coalition formation processes and their generalizations. The model is based on the notions of system, state and transi- tion graph. The latter describes changes of a system over time in terms of actions governed by individuals or groups of individuals. Contrary to classic models, the pre- sented model is not restricted to acyclic settings and allows the transition graph to have cycles. Time-dependent solutions to allocation problems are proposed and discussed. In par- ticular, Weber’s theory of randomized values is generalized as well as the notion of semi-values. Convergence assertions are made in some cases, and the concept of the Cesàro value of an allocation mechanism is introduced in order to achieve convergence for a wide range of allocation mechanisms. Quantum allocation mechanisms are de- fined, which are induced by quantum random walks on the transition graph and it is shown that they satisfy certain fairness criteria. A concept for Weber sets and two dif- ferent concepts of cores are proposed in the acyclic case, and it is shown under some mild assumptions that both cores are subsets of the Weber set. Moreover, the model of non-cooperative games in extensive form is generalized such that the presented model achieves a mutual framework for cooperative and non-co- operative games. A coherency to welfare economics is made and to each allocation mechanism a social welfare function is proposed