Minimax on the gridiron: Serial correlation and its effects on outcomes in the National Football League

We examine whether the predictions of minimax in zero-sum games holds under highly incentivized conditions with highly informed informed decision makers. We examine data from 3455 National Football League (NFL) games from the 2000 season through the 2012 season. We categorize every relevant play as either a rush or a pass. We find that, despite the predictions of minimax, the pass-rush mix exhibits negative serial correlation. In other words, given the conditions of the play, teams employ an exploitable strategy in that play types alternate more frequently than implied by an independent stochastic process. We also find that the efficacy of plays are affected by previous actions and previous outcomes in a manner that is not consistent with minimax. Our analysis suggests that teams could profit from more clustered play selections, which switch play type less frequently. Our results are consistent with the explanation that teams excessively switch play types in order to not be perceived as predictable

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment

Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings

EXPERIENTIA DOCET: PROFESSIONALS PLAY MINIMAX IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS

We study how professional players and college students play zero-sum two-person strategic games in a laboratory setting. We first ask professionals to play a 2x2 game that is formally identical to a strategic interaction situation that they face in their natural environment. Consistent with their behavior in the field, they play very close to the equilibrium of the game. In particular, (i) they equate their strategies' payoffs to the equilibrium ones, and (ii) they generate sequences of choices that are serially independent. In sharp contrast, however, we find that college students play the game far from the equilibrium predictions. We then study the behavior of professional players and college students in the classic O'Neill's 4x4 zero-sum game, a game that none of the subjects have encountered previously, and find the same differences in the behavior of these two pools of subjects. The transfer of skills and experience from the familiar field to the unfamiliar laboratory observed for professional players is relevant to evaluate the circumstances under which behavior in a laboratory setting may be a reliable indicator of behavior in a naturally occurring setting. From a cognitive perspective, it is useful for research on recognition processes, intuition, and similarity as a basis for inductive reasoning.Laboratory Experiments, Minimax, Experience, Cognition.

Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment: Comment

Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta's results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.tournament, first-mover advantage, psychological pressure, field experiment, soccer, penalty shootouts

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment

Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.Tournament; first-mover advantage; psychological pressure; field experiment; soccer; penalty shootouts

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment

Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta's results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.Tournament, first-mover advantage, psychological pressure, field experiment, soccer, penalty shootouts

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment

Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta?s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.Tournament, first-mover advantage, psychological pressure, field experiment, soccer, penalty shootouts