Mine Lines topics in the art of mine warfare, awareness precedes preparedness / Vol. 2, No. 4, December 1995

Symposium: Technology and the mine problem mine design, mine countermeasures, humanitarian deminingPublished at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943 in association with the Mine Warfare Asssociation, "To Enhance Communication about Mine Warfare"With sponsorship from the Office of Naval Research, and with the cooperation of Department of Defense and Military Department agencies that are concerned with all aspects of the Mine Problem, te Naval Postgraduate School announces a major Technical Symposium to identify the challenges and opportunities for the application of emergent technologies. This Symposium is a more inclusive sequel to the Symposium on Autonomous Vehicles in Mine Countermeasures that was held at the Naval Postgraduate School in April, 1995.With sponsorship from the Office of Naval Research, and with the cooperation of Department of Defense and Military Department agencie

Multiple Autonomous Vehicle Solutions to Minefield Reconnaissance and Mapping

Proceedings of Australian-American Joint Conference on the Technologies of Mines and Mine Countermeasures, Sydney, Australia, July 12-16, 199

An n-sided polygonal model to calculate the impact of cyber security events

This paper presents a model to represent graphically the impact of cyber events (e.g., attacks, countermeasures) in a polygonal systems of n-sides. The approach considers information about all entities composing an information system (e.g., users, IP addresses, communication protocols, physical and logical resources, etc.). Every axis is composed of entities that contribute to the execution of the security event. Each entity has an associated weighting factor that measures its contribution using a multi-criteria methodology named CARVER. The graphical representation of cyber events is depicted as straight lines (one dimension) or polygons (two or more dimensions). Geometrical operations are used to compute the size (i.e, length, perimeter, surface area) and thus the impact of each event. As a result, it is possible to identify and compare the magnitude of cyber events. A case study with multiple security events is presented as an illustration on how the model is built and computed.Comment: 16 pages, 5 figures, 2 tables, 11th International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems, (CRiSIS 2016), Roscoff, France, September 201

Management of threats and errors in normal operations of assistant controllers : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Aviation at Massey University

"To err is indeed human, so to err is normal" Human errors are usually pronounced in accident or incident reports. Seldom does one pay enough attention to these errors during daily normal operations as these either go unnoticed or unreported for whatsoever the reasons may be. Therefore, the causes of these errors and also the system threats prevalent in the daily operations may not be fully contained. On the other hand, problematic situations that are successfully tackled by human skills are quite often treated as less important than they really are. The job of an assistant controller (AC) is one of the important domains in air traffic management (ATM). The AC work together with air traffic controllers as team members and they do have direct and indirect contributions to the safe, orderly and efficient flow of air traffic. In this study, the threats, errors and potential undesired states occurring with AC during normal operations will be recorded by a methodology, which is new to Hong Kong Air Traffic Control (ATC). This methodology, called Normal Operations Safety Observation (NOSO), is built on the Threat and Error Management (TEM) framework. The results will generate a broad outline on what sorts of threats, errors and undesired states an AC can be facing during normal operations. The relative frequencies of occurrence of these conditions will be presented separately in tables and figures. The AC's potential vulnerabilities and capabilities to cope with these threats, errors and undesired states will be discussed together with a suggested ranking. It is envisaged that an analysis of the data collected will aid the development and evaluation of safety defence measures in ATM and further support the applicability of this data collection methodology in other ATM operations and subsequent researches. KEYWORDS:- Normal Operations Safety Observation, Threat and Error Management, Safety Management, Air Traffic Control

Theoretical Bitcoin Attacks with less than Half of the Computational Power (draft)

A widespread security claim of the Bitcoin system, presented in the original Bitcoin white-paper, states that the security of the system is guaranteed as long as there is no attacker in possession of half or more of the total computational power used to maintain the system. This claim, however, is proved based on theoretically flawed assumptions. In the paper we analyze two kinds of attacks based on two theoretical flaws: the Block Discarding Attack and the Difficulty Raising Attack. We argue that the current theoretical limit of attacker's fraction of total computational power essential for the security of the system is in a sense not $\frac{1}{2}$ but a bit less than $\frac{1}{4}$, and outline proposals for protocol change that can raise this limit to be as close to $\frac{1}{2}$ as we want. The basic idea of the Block Discarding Attack has been noted as early as 2010, and lately was independently though-of and analyzed by both author of this paper and authors of a most recently pre-print published paper. We thus focus on the major differences of our analysis, and try to explain the unfortunate surprising coincidence. To the best of our knowledge, the second attack is presented here for the first time