'I'm not X, I just want Y': formulating 'wants' in interaction

This article provides a conversation analytic description of a two-part structure, ‘I don’t want X, I want/just want Y’. Drawing on a corpus of recordings of family mealtimes and television documentary data, I show how speakers use the structure in two recurrent environments. First, speakers may use the structure to reject a proposal regarding their actions made by an interlocutor. Second, speakers may deliver the structure following a co-interactant’s formulation of their actions or motivations. Both uses decrease the likelihood of challenge in third-turn position. When responding to multi-unit turns speakers routinely deal with the last item first. The value of ‘I want Y’ is to formulate an alternative sense of agency which undermines the preceding turn and shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence. The article contributes to work in discursive psychology as I show how speakers may formulate their ‘wants’ in the service of sequentially unfolding social interaction

"I Want This, I Want That": a discursive analysis of mental state terms in family interaction

Using the theoretical approach of discursive psychology, this thesis examines the interactive uses of mental state talk, in particular the term want , in everyday family interaction. In mainstream cognitive psychology mental state terms are examined as words which signify internal referents. How individuals come to competently participate in social interaction is formulated as a problem of how individual, isolated minds come to understand the contents of other minds. This thesis challenges these individualistic notions and examines notions of wanting as interactionally managed participants concerns. The data are taken from two sources; a set of video recordings taken from a series of fly-on-the-wall documentary programmes which each focus on a particular family and videotapes of mealtimes recorded by three families. Recordings were initially transcribed verbatim and sections related to the emerging themes within the thesis were subsequently transcribed using the Jefferson notation system. These transcripts were then analysed, alongside repeated viewings of the video recordings. The thesis considers a range of analytic themes, which are interlinked via one of the primary research questions, which has been to examine how, and to what end, speakers routinely deploy notions of wanting in everyday talk-in-interaction. A major theme has been to highlight inherent problems with work in social cognition which uses experimental tasks to examine children s Theory of Mind and understanding of desires . I argue that the assumptions of this work are a gross simplification of the meaning wanting for both children and adults. A further theme has been to examine the sequential organisation of directives and requests in both adults and children s talk. Finally, I examine speakers practices for rejecting a proposal regarding their actions and for denying a formulation of their motivations by a co-interactant. The conclusions of the thesis show that expressions of wanting are practical expressions which work within a flow of interactional and deontic considerations and that making claims regarding one s own or others wants is entirely a social matter. I argue that rather than being examined for what they may reveal about the mind , mental state terms may be fruitfully examined as interactional matters

HUMAN-ROBOT COLLABORATION IN ROBOTIC-ASSISTED SURGICAL TRAINING

Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH

Mental States Recognition from Communication

In order to perform effective communication, agents must be able to foresee the effects of their utterances on the addressee's mental state. In this paper we study the consequences of an utterance on the mental state of a hearer. Given an agent communication language with a STRIPS‐like semantics, we propose a set of criteria that allow the binding of the speaker's mental state to its uttering of a certain sentence. On the basis of these criteria, we give an abductive procedure that the hearer can adopt to partially recognize the speaker's mental state that led to a specific utterance

Mental States Recognition from Communication

Effective and useful communication requires the agents' being able to foresee the effects of their utterances over the addressee's mental state. However, referring to the classical Speech Act Theory, it seems to us that the idea of predicting such effects is rather optimistic since they are not really completely "a priori" foreseeable by the speaker. Along with some obvious main effects, there are other side effects which might be regarded as the result of some kind of plausible inference, particularly abduction, performed by the hearerhimself79 the received communication and over: - its own actual mental state (which can be differentfromen one expected by the speaker), - its image (may be incorrect and incomplete) ofthe81-24 's mental state. In this paper we explore the idea that if (and asfar17 it is possible: 1. to formalize in a declarative manner the mental state ofan502-22165 Agent [1], 2. to postulate a correlation between a speaker's mental state and his uttering a certainsent..