Meier, Reimarus and Kant on Animal Minds

Close attention to Kant’s comments on animal minds has resulted in radically different readings of key passages in Kant. A major disputed text for understanding Kant on animals is his criticism of G. F. Meier’s view in the 1762 ‘False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’. In this article, I argue that Kant’s criticism of Meier should be read as an intervention into an ongoing debate between Meier and H. S. Reimarus on animal minds. Specifically, while broadly aligning himself with Reimarus, Kant distinguishes himself from both Meier and Reimarus on the role of judgement in human consciousness

Animal Experience in Kant’s Philosophy

The role of animals in the philosophy of mind is primarily to help understand the human mind by serving as practical examples of cognition that differs from ours either in kind or in degree. Kant regarded animals as beings that only have the faculty of sensibility. By examining what Kant writes about animal experience we gain knowledge concerning the role of sensibility in experience, free from the influence of understanding and reason. I look at Kant’s view of animals in the historical context of alternative views presented by Descartes’ and Hume’s views. Kant’s view can be seen as a counterargument against Descartes’ doctrine of animal machines according to which animals do not have minds and they do not think. I suggest that while it can be argued that some kind of elementary experience could be possible in the physiological level, this only makes sense when it is possible to become conscious of the unconscious sensation, and this requires a mind. A further option is to claim that there is only a difference in degree between human and animal cognitive capacities. This is Hume’s view. I argue that even though Kant’s and Hume’s view on the cognitive capacities of animals seems to depart from each other to a considerable extent, the differences between them diminish when the focus is on the experience these capacities enable. I also briefly discuss the relation of the metaphysics of animal minds to animal ethics.Eläinten rooli mielenfilosofiassa on ensisijaisesti auttaa ymmärtämään ihmismieltä toimimalla esimerkkeinä kognitiosta joka eroaa omastamme asteeltaan tai laadultaan. Kant piti eläimiä olentoina, joilla on vain aistimellisuuden kyky. Tutkimalla, mitä Kant kirjoittaa eläinten kokemuksesta, saadaan tietoa ymmärryksen ja järjen vaikutuksesta vapaan aistimellisuuden roolista kokemuksessa. Tarkastelen Kantin näkemystä myös suhteessa sitä historiallisesti lähellä oleviin Descartesin ja Humen vaihtoehtoisiin tapoihin lähestyä eläinten kokemusta. Kantin eläinkäsitys voidaan nähdä vasta-argumenttina Descartesin eläinkoneopille, jonka mukaan eläimillä ei ole mieltä eivätkä ne ajattele. Vaikka on ajateltavissa, että jonkinlainen alkeellinen kokemus olisi mahdollista fysiologisella tasolla, tällainen kokemus tulee merkityksellisesti vasta kun siitä on mahdollista tulla tietoiseksi, ja tähän vaaditaan mieli. Toisaalta voidaan esittää, että eläinten ja ihmisen kognitiiviset kyvyt eroavat vain asteeltaan. Tämä on Humen näkemys. Väitän että vaikka Humen ja Kantin käsitykset eläinten kognitiivisista kyvyistä eroavat toisistaan merkittävästi, niiden väliset erot kapenevat kun tarkastellaan heidän käsityksiään eläinten mahdollisesta kokemuksesta. Pohdin myös lyhyesti eläinmielten metafysiikan suhdetta eläinetiikkaanSiirretty Doriast

A blooming and buzzing confusion: Buffon, Reimarus, and Kant on animal cognition

Kant’s views on animals have received much attention in recent years. According to some, Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, even though he denied that they have concepts. This position is difficult to square with a conceptualist reading of Kant, according to which objective perceptual awareness requires concepts. Others take Kant’s views on animals to imply that the mental life of animals is a blooming, buzzing confusion. In this article I provide a historical reconstruction of Kant’s views on animals, relating them to eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition. I reconstruct the views of Buffon and Reimarus and show that (i) both Buffon and Reimarus adopted a conceptualist position, according to which concepts structure the cognitive experience of adult humans, and (ii) that both described the mental life of animals as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Kant’s position, I argue, is virtually identical to that of Reimarus. Hence Kant’s views on animals support a conceptualist reading of Kant. The article further articulates the historical antecedents of the Kantian idea that concepts structure human cognitive experience and provides a novel account of how the ideas of similarity and difference were conceptualized in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition

Eläinten hyvinvointi uuden ajan alun eläinkäsitysten valossa

Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan uuden ajan alun filosofien eläinkäsityksiä ja eläinten hyvinvointitutkimuksessa esiintyviä filosofisia kysymyksiä, jotka koskevat eläinten tietoisuutta, eläinten kokemusmaailmaa koskevan tiedon mahdollisuutta ja eläinten moraalista asemaa. Ilman vastausta näihin kysymyksiin on mahdotonta asettaa kriteereitä eläinten riittävän hyvälle kohtelulle, mihin eläinten hyvinvointitutkimus pohjimmiltaan pyrkii. Eläinten tietoisuus nousi erityiseksi mielenkiinnon kohteeksi uuden ajan alun filosofiassa, jossa myös nykyajan mielenfilosofian juuret ovat. Juuri tästä syystä uuden ajan alun filosofian eläinkäsitykset ovat hedelmällinen lähtökohta eläinten tietoisuutta koskevalle filosofiselle tutkimukselle. Vaikka tieto eläinten kognitiivisista kyvyistä on aikojen kuluessa lisääntynyt huomattavasti, eläinkäsitysten taustalta löytyy edelleen jo uuden ajan alun filosofiassa esiintyneitä teemoja: onko ihmisellä sellaisia kognitiivisia kykyjä, joita eläimillä ei ole, vai ovatko ihmisen ja eläinten kyvyt samat, jolloin eroja on vain edellytyksissä käyttää näitä kykyjä? Tutkimuksessa esitellään ensin eläinten hyvinvointitutkimuksen sisältöä ja tuodaan esiin sen keskeisimmät tutkimuskysymykset. Seuraavaksi perehdytään yksityiskohtaisesti René Descartesin, Immanuel Kantin ja David Humen eläinkäsityksiin sekä sivutaan John Locken, H.S. Reimaruksen ja G.F. Meierin näkemyksiä. Reimaruksen ja Meierin eläinkäsityksiä ei ole aikaisemmin juurikaan tutkittu, vaikka he olivat hyvin vaikutusvaltaisia ajattelijoita uuden ajan alussa. Lopuksi luodaan katsaus hyvinvointitutkimuksen kysymyksiin uuden ajan alun filosofien näkökulmasta. Descartesin ja Kantin eläinkäsitysten näkyvin ero on siinä, että Descartes piti eläimiä pelkästään ruumiillisina olentoina kun taas Kant katsoi, että eläimillä on välttämättä sielu. Tästä huolimatta heidän käsityksensä eläinten tietoisuudesta eivät poikkea toisistaan kovinkaan paljon. Heidän näkökulmastaan eläinten hyvinvointi voidaan pitkälti rinnastaa kasvien hyvinvointiin, jota arvioitaessa voidaan nojautua fysiologiaan ja käyttäytymiseen. Hume puolestaan ei katso eläinten mielten poikkeavan ihmismielistä millään merkityksellisellä tavalla, joten hänen on mahdollista puhua myös eläinten hyvinvoinnin subjektiivisesta kokemuksesta. Kenenkään tässä tarkastellun filosofin mielestä meillä ei ole varsinaisesti moraalista velvollisuutta eläinten hyvään kohteluun, mutta tämä on kuitenkin Kantin ja Humen mukaan muista syistä suositeltavaa.Siirretty Doriast

Kant, Animal Minds, and Conceptualism

Kant holds that some nonhuman animals “are acquainted with” objects, despite lacking conceptual capacities. What does this tell us about his theory of human cognition? Numerous authors have argued that this is a significant point in favour of Nonconceptualism—the claim that, for Kant, sensible representations of objects do not depend on the understanding. Against this, I argue that Kant’s views about animal minds can readily be accommodated by a certain kind of Conceptualism. It remains viable to think that, for Kant, humans’ sensible representations necessarily represent objects as temporally structured in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, and such representations are produced, and could only be produced, by the understanding. This allows Conceptualists to maintain that humans’ sensible representations depend on the understanding, while accepting that animals have sensible representations of objects too. We must, therefore, reassess both the warrant for Nonconceptualism and the shape Conceptualist readings must take

Remembrance of Things Past? Albert Schweitzer, the Anxiety of Influence, and the Untidy Jesus of Markan Memory.

The aim of this thesis is to consider the formation and reception of the historical Jesus genre through a detailed analysis of its “strong poet,” Albert Schweitzer. Though the classification of this thesis is most likely to be designated as Leben Jesu Forschung and the rise of early Christianity, it encompasses several adjacent fields of research: viz., social and literary theories, philosophies of history, biblical studies, critical memory theory, and classical history. Leben Jesu Forschung is therefore a kind of case study for the construction and reception of ideas. Part One suggests, after a sustained engagement with Schweitzer and his constructive project, that his pervading influence is most strongly felt in the underlying assumptions of his method of konsequente Eschatologie. Schweitzer’s concept of konsequente Eschatologie is the singular criterion by which all the material is judged and filtered so as to construct a singular profile of the historical Jesus. It is this desire for a “tidy” Jesus which this thesis attempts to problematize. Part Two attempts a constructive counter proposal by appropriating theories of memory to historical Jesus research and concludes by demonstrating the appropriation of this theory within the Gospel of Mark. I understand the Markan author as evoking Jesus memories and setting them within a narrative framework for the purposes of identity construction and communal direction. As such, we are presented with an “untidy” Jesus of Markan memory

Kant on Plants: Self-Activity, Representations, and the Analogy with Life

Do plants represent according to Kant? This is closely connected to the question of whether he held plants are alive, because he explains life in terms of the faculty to act on one’s own representations. He also explains life as having an immaterial principle of self-motion, and as a body’s interaction with a supersensible soul. I argue that because of the way plants move themselves, Kant is committed to their being alive, to their having a supersensible ground of their self-activity, and to their having desires (although these are not conscious). This has important ramifications for Kant’s teleology and philosophy of mind

Enlightenment Messiah, 1627-1778: Jesus in history, morality and political theology

This is a study of intellectual encounters with the figure of Christ during the European Enlightenment. In the first instance, it contributes to a body of research which has sought to revise the customary view in New Testament studies, that the historical study of Jesus began with the posthumous publication of Herman Samuel Reimarus's Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger (1778), the last in a series of Fragments published by G. E. Lessing. The thesis proposed here is that Reimarus’s writings on Jesus are a notable but relatively late entry, by the German intellectual establishment, into arguments about Jesus and Christian origins which had been raging across Europe for more than a century: arguments concerning history, morality and political theology. In my Introduction I explain the rationale for this study within the context of contemporary scholarship and contemporary culture, giving a brief outline of my methodology. In Part I of the thesis I outline my project, its themes and methods. In Chapter One I introduce the ‘quest for the historical Jesus’ as a major concern in modern New Testament studies, and a persistent source of interest in wider intellectual discourse. I then take the reader back into the eighteenth century, placing Reimarus’s seminal contribution to the discipline within the context of the wider publishing controversy in which it featured (the Fragmentenstreit). In Chapter Two I explain the historical, moral and political theological dimensions of my analysis; in particular, I define the relationship between my history of scholarship on Jesus, and the one offered by Albert Schweitzer in Von Reimarus zu Wrede (1906), the single most influential work on the rise of historical Jesus studies. In Chapter Three I outline my periodisation and interpretive stance on the main context for my study: the European Enlightenment. Part II of the thesis concerns history. In Chapter Four I review a range of literature on the origins of historical Jesus studies, discussing the advances made since Schweitzer, and sketching the contours of a new, more comprehensive interpretation. In Chapters Five and Six I supplement that sketch with my own account of the emergence of the modern historical-critical conscience within European intellectual culture during the Enlightenment, and its application to the Bible. I profile some of the scholars who blazed the trail for Reimarus, showing where, and by whom, he was anticipated in some of his critical stances regarding Jesus and Christian origins. Part III of the thesis addresses morality. In Chapters Seven and Eight I consider why for so many thinkers in the Enlightenment, including Reimarus, morality came to be seen as central to Jesus' historical mission and his most important theological legacy. I locate this ethical turn within a long history of Western philosophical and theological disputation, with origins in antiquity, culminating in early modernity with the reassertion of moral-theological rationalism which was buttressed by an early modern Thomist revival. I also argue for the influence of a particular vision of Christian reform which prioritised freedom over predestination, and the moral example of Jesus and primitive Christian piety. Part IV of the thesis concerns political theology. In Chapter Nine I consider this generally neglected dimension of Reimarus’ work, placing him in a tradition of Enlightenment intellectuals who drew upon Jesus and primitive Christianity, in conjunction with theological metaphysics, to give weight to their own particular arguments for religious toleration. In my Conclusion, as throughout this thesis, I argue that some of the writers who paved the way of Reimarus’s writings on Jesus and Christian origins have their roots in much older, theological preoccupations, and often in heretical versions of Christianity. While these perspectives on Jesus and Christian origins constituted some of the most radical challenges to mainstream religious thought during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they do not submit to a vision of Enlightenment characterised by a straightforward process of overcoming theological worldviews through the emergence of a new secular critique. For the most part, this tradition of scholarship is best understood as a radicalisation of existing tendencies within the history of classical and Christian thought, which continued to understand Jesus, or at least his teachings, as either a path to personal salvation, or as a theologically authoritative court of appeal in the Enlightenment’s protest against religio-political tyranny

Reason and Animals: Descartes, Kant, and Mead on the Place of Humans in Nature

The question of our place in nature has long been with us. One answer lies in comparing humans with other animals , thereby highlighting the uniquely human. To this end, I examine the distinction between humans and brutes as delineated by Descartes, Kant, and the Chicago pragmatist George Mead. This selection mot merely assures a wide-spectrum of opinion still alive today, it marks a general historical shift from the metaphysical dualism of Descartes' mechanical world and spiritual self, to the epistemic dualism of Kant and his double sense of self, finally to Mead's naturalistic monism, wherein consciousness emerges naturally from the non-conscious. ;Apart from illuminating issues current in the animal-rights literature, examining this single topic casts a new light on these figures, especially Kant and Mead . ;Descartes' dualism is understandable simply given his scientific commitments, and the chasm he found in the human/brute gap was as much a result of this scientific motivation as any religious or moral one. For Kant, brutes lack the power to judge, understand, or reason. But more importantly, they lack autonomy and are therefore without moral worth. The unbridgeable chasm, metaphysical for Descartes, became for Kant primarily moral. Brutes do have representations and desires, however, and, by virtue of being alive, an immaterial principle; Kant consequently rejected Descartes' animal-machine hypothesis. ;Darwin's account of the human/brute gap and Mead's Darwinistic psychology are discussed. Selfhood and consciousness are unique to humans, although brutes are conscious in another sense. Mead's different uses of 'consciousness' are separated so as to clarify this difference as well as the role of language in the emergence of mind. Mead argued that humans perceive social objects prior to physical objects while brutes perceive none of these, lacking the capacities of universalization and object-manipulation. Like Descartes and Kant, Mead minimized brute experience, thereby maintaining a wide gulf between humans and brutes despite his Darwinian naturalism

IN SEARCH OF ADEQUATE FAITH: RELIGIOUS SKEPTICISM IN GERMAN LETTERS (1750-1800)

The following dissertation, “In Search of Adequate Faith: Religious Skepticism in German Letters (1750–1800),” is an interdisciplinary study exploring the religious writings of Klopstock, Lessing, and Novalis. During the mid- to late-eighteenth century the struggle to articulate a distinctly modern faith becomes audible across the literary and aesthetic works of writers who were committed to making the biblical tradition more appealing to an increasingly skeptical age. Rather than driving a wedge between sacred and secular cultures, these writers promised greater spiritual cohesion. Instead of simply yielding to the authority of tradition and scripture, their works strove to articulate more adequate means of forging religious bonds. This study investigates how a number of writers turned the spirit of religion into a weapon, which precipitated a second reformation in the latter half of the eighteenth century. How did literature and aesthetics challenge the authority of the five Lutheran Solae? How might they offer more effective strategies for reconciling faith and reason than philosophy and theology? What role did material and visual culture play in mediating religious experience at this time? To answer these questions, I analyze a constellation of documents associated with each writer. My first chapter interrogates the poetic methodology of Klopstock’s Der Messias by exploring his extensive amplification of the New Testament figure Doubting Thomas. In my analysis, Klopstock's poetics inadvertently reproduce Thomas’ tragic “mistake” by doubting the efficacy of unaided scripture to communicate religious truth; a doubt that he attempts to resolve by intensifying the reader’s affective experience of the gospel narratives. My second chapter argues that Lessing develops a more powerful defense against religious skepticism than Klopstock by appealing to the spirit of religion rather than to the authority of its letter. By reorienting faith around the spirit of religion, Lessing sparks a Copernican turn in religious consciousness that helped emancipate modern believers from theological regimes that had become increasingly normative in their approach to the letter of scripture. My final chapter considers how Novalis confronts the ways in which Lessing and the Protestant tradition deminishes the value of sensible forms of religious mediation by “spiritualizing” modern faith. Unlike Lessing, Novalis insists that revealed knowledge demands material mediation like images and symbols in order to (re)shape and (re)generate religious experience