Measurement and Analysis of Mobile Web Cache Performance

The Web browser is a killer app on mobile devices such as smartphones. However, the user experience of mobile Web browsing is undesirable because of the slow resource loading. To improve the performance of Web resource loading, caching has been adopted as a key mechanism. However, the existing passive measurement studies cannot comprehensively characterize the performance of mobile Web caching. For example, most of these studies mainly focus on client-side implementations but not server-side configurations, suffer from biased user behaviors, and fail to study 'miscached' resources. To address these issues, in this paper, we present a proactive approach for a comprehensive measurement study on mobile Web cache performance. The key idea of our approach is to proactively crawl resources from hundreds of websites periodically with a fine-grained time interval. Thus, we are able to uncover the resource update history and cache configurations at the server side, and analyze the cache performance in various time granularities. Based on our collected data, we build a new cache analysis model and study the upper bound of how high percentage of resources could potentially be cached and how effective the caching works in practice. We report detailed analysis results of different websites and various types of Web resources, and identify the problems caused by unsatisfactory cache performance. In particular, we identify two major problems - Redundant Transfer and Miscached Resource, which lead to unsatisfactory cache performance. We investigate three main root causes: Same Content, Heuristic Expiration, and Conservative Expiration Time, and discuss what mobile Web developers can do to mitigate those problems.EI691-70

Undermining User Privacy on Mobile Devices Using AI

Over the past years, literature has shown that attacks exploiting the microarchitecture of modern processors pose a serious threat to the privacy of mobile phone users. This is because applications leave distinct footprints in the processor, which can be used by malware to infer user activities. In this work, we show that these inference attacks are considerably more practical when combined with advanced AI techniques. In particular, we focus on profiling the activity in the last-level cache (LLC) of ARM processors. We employ a simple Prime+Probe based monitoring technique to obtain cache traces, which we classify with Deep Learning methods including Convolutional Neural Networks. We demonstrate our approach on an off-the-shelf Android phone by launching a successful attack from an unprivileged, zeropermission App in well under a minute. The App thereby detects running applications with an accuracy of 98% and reveals opened websites and streaming videos by monitoring the LLC for at most 6 seconds. This is possible, since Deep Learning compensates measurement disturbances stemming from the inherently noisy LLC monitoring and unfavorable cache characteristics such as random line replacement policies. In summary, our results show that thanks to advanced AI techniques, inference attacks are becoming alarmingly easy to implement and execute in practice. This once more calls for countermeasures that confine microarchitectural leakage and protect mobile phone applications, especially those valuing the privacy of their users

PerfWeb: How to Violate Web Privacy with Hardware Performance Events

The browser history reveals highly sensitive information about users, such as financial status, health conditions, or political views. Private browsing modes and anonymity networks are consequently important tools to preserve the privacy not only of regular users but in particular of whistleblowers and dissidents. Yet, in this work we show how a malicious application can infer opened websites from Google Chrome in Incognito mode and from Tor Browser by exploiting hardware performance events (HPEs). In particular, we analyze the browsers' microarchitectural footprint with the help of advanced Machine Learning techniques: k-th Nearest Neighbors, Decision Trees, Support Vector Machines, and in contrast to previous literature also Convolutional Neural Networks. We profile 40 different websites, 30 of the top Alexa sites and 10 whistleblowing portals, on two machines featuring an Intel and an ARM processor. By monitoring retired instructions, cache accesses, and bus cycles for at most 5 seconds, we manage to classify the selected websites with a success rate of up to 86.3%. The results show that hardware performance events can clearly undermine the privacy of web users. We therefore propose mitigation strategies that impede our attacks and still allow legitimate use of HPEs