Information display for decisions under uncertainty

In the early product design stage, considering the Through Life Cost and uncertainty are important. However, the information given to the decision maker is often limited, resulting in a large level of subjectivity. This paper introduces experimental research exploring different information displays and their subjective interpretation by cost forecasters within the defence and aerospace sector. Three different kinds of information display and different levels of detail of contextual information were tested, showing that they impact the decision making process and subjective interpretation

Matrix Representations and Extension of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

The graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) provides a convenient and effective means to model and analyze a strategic conflict. Standard practice is to carry out a stability analysis of a graph model, and then to follow up with a post-stability analysis, two critical components of which are status quo analysis and coalition analysis. In stability analysis, an equilibrium is a state that is stable for all decision makers (DMs) under appropriate stability definitions or solution concepts. Status quo analysis aims to determine whether a particular equilibrium is reachable from a status quo (or an initial state) and, if so, how to reach it. A coalition is any subset of a set of DMs. The coalition stability analysis within the graph model is focused on the status quo states that are equilibria and assesses whether states that are stable from individual viewpoints may be unstable for coalitions. Stability analysis began within a simple preference structure which includes a relative preference relationship and an indifference relation. Subsequently, preference uncertainty and strength of preference were introduced into GMCR but not formally integrated. In this thesis, two new preference frameworks, hybrid preference and multiple-level preference, and an integrated algebraic approach are developed for GMCR. Hybrid preference extends existing preference structures to combine preference uncertainty and strength of preference into GMCR. A multiple-level preference framework expands GMCR to handle a more general and flexible structure than any existing system representing strength of preference. An integrated algebraic approach reveals a link among traditional stability analysis, status quo analysis, and coalition stability analysis by using matrix representation of the graph model for conflict resolution. To integrate the three existing preference structures into a hybrid system, a new preference framework is proposed for graph models using a quadruple relation to express strong or mild preference of one state or scenario over another, equal preference, and an uncertain preference. In addition, a multiple-level preference framework is introduced into the graph model methodology to handle multiple-level preference information, which lies between relative and cardinal preferences in information content. The existing structure with strength of preference takes into account that if a state is stable, it may be either strongly stable or weakly stable in the context of three levels of strength. However, the three-level structure is limited in its ability to depict the intensity of relative preference. In this research, four basic solution concepts consisting of Nash stability, general metarationality, symmetric metarationality, and sequential stability, are defined at each level of preference for the graph model with the extended multiple-level preference. The development of the two new preference frameworks expands the realm of applicability of the graph model and provides new insights into strategic conflicts so that more practical and complicated problems can be analyzed at greater depth. Because a graph model of a conflict consists of several interrelated graphs, it is natural to ask whether well-known results of Algebraic Graph Theory can help analyze a graph model. Analysis of a graph model involves searching paths in a graph but an important restriction of a graph model is that no DM can move twice in succession along any path. (If a DM can move consecutively, then this DM's graph is effectively transitive. Prohibiting consecutive moves thus allows for graph models with intransitive graphs, which are sometimes useful in practice.) Therefore, a graph model must be treated as an edge-weighted, colored multidigraph in which each arc represents a legal unilateral move and distinct colors refer to different DMs. The weight of an arc could represent some preference attribute. Tracing the evolution of a conflict in status quo analysis is converted to searching all colored paths from a status quo to a particular outcome in an edge-weighted, colored multidigraph. Generally, an adjacency matrix can determine a simple digraph and all state-by-state paths between any two vertices. However, if a graph model contains multiple arcs between the same two states controlled by different DMs, the adjacency matrix would be unable to track all aspects of conflict evolution from the status quo. To bridge the gap, a conversion function using the matrix representation is designed to transform the original problem of searching edge-weighted, colored paths in a colored multidigraph to a standard problem of finding paths in a simple digraph with no color constraints. As well, several unexpected and useful links among status quo analysis, stability analysis, and coalition analysis are revealed using the conversion function. The key input of stability analysis is the reachable list of a DM, or a coalition, by a legal move (in one step) or by a legal sequence of unilateral moves, from a status quo in 2-DM or $n$-DM ($n > 2$) models. A weighted reachability matrix for a DM or a coalition along weighted colored paths is designed to construct the reachable list using the aforementioned conversion function. The weight of each edge in a graph model is defined according to the preference structure, for example, simple preference, preference with uncertainty, or preference with strength. Furthermore, a graph model and the four basic graph model solution concepts are formulated explicitly using the weighted reachability matrix for the three preference structures. The explicit matrix representation for conflict resolution (MRCR) that facilitates stability calculations in both 2-DM and $n$-DM ($n > 2$) models for three existing preference structures. In addition, the weighted reachability matrix by a coalition is used to produce matrix representation of coalition stabilities in multiple-decision-maker conflicts for the three preference frameworks. Previously, solution concepts in the graph model were traditionally defined logically, in terms of the underlying graphs and preference relations. When status quo analysis algorithms were developed, this line of thinking was retained and pseudo-codes were developed following a similar logical structure. However, as was noted in the development of the decision support system (DSS) GMCR II, the nature of logical representations makes coding difficult. The DSS GMCR II, is available for basic stability analysis and status quo analysis within simple preference, but is difficult to modify or adapt to other preference structures. Compared with existing graphical or logical representation, matrix representation for conflict resolution (MRCR) is more effective and convenient for computer implementation and for adapting to new analysis techniques. Moreover, due to an inherent link between stability analysis and post-stability analysis presented, the proposed algebraic approach establishes an integrated paradigm of matrix representation for the graph model for conflict resolution

Strategische Verschlechterungen in dynamischen Konflikten: Eine empirische Untersuchung im Rahmen der Konfliktanalyse

Die Arbeit befasst sich mit dem Spieltheorie-basierten Modell der Konfliktanalyse nach Fraser und Hipel (1979, 1984). In diesem Kontext untersucht sie das empirische Auftreten strategisch-motivierter Verschlechterungshandlungen in dynamischen Konflikten. Das zentrale konfliktanalyti-sche Lösungskonzept SEQ schließt unmittelbare Verschlechterungshandlungen für die modellierten Parteien aus. Die Arbeit greift die theoretische Diskussion um das Auftreten von strategisch-motivierten Verschlechterungen aus empirischer Perspektive auf und identifiziert Strukturmerkale von Situationen unter denen strategische Verschlechterungen vermehrt beobachtet werden können. Im Zentrum der Untersuchung stehen drei Struktureigenschaften, für die eine Wahl von Ver-schlechterungshandlungen erwartet wird: (1) Der Status quo einer Situation wird von der handeln-den Partei weniger präferiert als der von ihr im schlechtesten Fall erwartete Konfliktausgang (auch Minimalpunkt), (2) es existiert ein Gleichgewicht, das gegenüber dem Status quo Pareto-superior ist, und (3) die aktive Partei kann ein gegenüber dem Status quo präferiertes Gleichgewicht induzieren, indem sie die Gegenpartei durch eine Verschlechterung zu einer Reaktion zwingt. Zur Untersu-chung der Assoziation dieser Struktureigenschaften mit der Wahl von Verschlechterungen wird ein dynamisches spieltheoretisches Laborexperiment auf Basis von 3x3 Matrixspielen durchgeführt. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Konfliktparteien keine grundsätzliche Vermeidung von Verschlechterungshandlungen forcieren. Verschlechterungen werden insbesondere durchgeführt, sofern auf Basis strategischer Überlegungen eine präferierte Konfliktlösung erreichbar scheint. Ins-besondere für zwei Konstellationen kann dies signifikant und robust gezeigt werden: Einerseits für Nash-stabilen Status quo, in denen sich die handelnde Partei in ihrem Minimalpunkt, also dem im schlechtesten Fall erwarteten Konfliktausgang, befindet. Und andererseits für (rein) SEQ-stabilen Status quo, aus denen die handelnde Partei ein präferiertes (reines) SEQ-Gleichgewicht über eine Verschlechterung induzieren kann. Besteht also die Wahl zwischen Verbesserungs- und Verschlechterungshandlungen, kann nur eine Induzierbarkeit die explizite Wahl einer Verschlechterungshandlung begünstigen

Uncertainty analysis in competitive bidding for service contracts

Sustainable production and consumption have become more important internationally, which has led to the transformation of market structures and competitive situations into the direction of servitisation. This means that manufacturing companies are forced to compete through the supply of services as opposed to products. Particularly the suppliers of long-life products such as submarines and airplanes no longer simply sell these products but provide their capability or availability. Companies such as Rolls-Royce Engines achieve 60% of their revenue through selling a service rather than the engine itself. For a manufacturing company, the shift towards being a service provider means that they usually have to bid for service contracts, sometimes competitively. In the context of competitive bidding, the decision makers face various uncertainties that influence their decision. Ignoring these uncertainties or their influences can result in problems such as the generation of too little profit or even a loss or the exposure to financial risks. Raising the decision maker’s awareness of the uncertainties in the form of e.g. a decision matrix, expressing the trade-off between the probability of winning the contract and the probability of making a profit, aims at integrating these factors in the decision process. The outcome is to enable the bidding company to make a more informed decision. This was the focus of the research presented in this thesis. The aim of this research was to support the pricing decision by defining a process for modelling the influencing uncertainties and including them in a decision matrix depicting the trade-off between the probability of winning the contract and the probability of making a profit. Three empirical studies are described and the associated decision process and influencing uncertainties are discussed. Based on these studies, a conceptual framework was defined which depicts the influencing factors on a pricing decision at the bidding stage and the uncertainties within these. The framework was validated with a case study in contract bidding where the uncertainties were modelled and included in a decision matrix depicting the probability of winning the contract and the probability of making a profit. The main contributions of this research are the identification of the uncertainties influencing a pricing decision, the depiction of these in a conceptual framework, a method for ascertaining how to model these uncertainties and assessing the use of such an approach via an industrial case study.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo