How much of commonsense and legal reasoning is formalizable? A review of conceptual obstacles

Fifty years of effort in artificial intelligence (AI) and the formalization of legal reasoning have produced both successes and failures. Considerable success in organizing and displaying evidence and its interrelationships has been accompanied by failure to achieve the original ambition of AI as applied to law: fully automated legal decision-making. The obstacles to formalizing legal reasoning have proved to be the same ones that make the formalization of commonsense reasoning so difficult, and are most evident where legal reasoning has to meld with the vast web of ordinary human knowledge of the world. Underlying many of the problems is the mismatch between the discreteness of symbol manipulation and the continuous nature of imprecise natural language, of degrees of similarity and analogy, and of probabilities

The commodity chain of the household: from survey design to policy and practice

Data collection and analysis and policy formulation all require a social unit to be defined, generally called the household. Multidisciplinary evidence shows that households as defined by survey practitioners often bear little resemblance to lived socio-economic units. This study examines how a shared language, the 'household', can generate misunderstandings because different groups with distinctive understandings of the term 'household' are often unaware that others may be using ‘household’ differently. Results from 4 interlinked and iterative methods are presented: review of household survey documentation (1950s-present); ethnographic ground-truthing fieldwork; in-depth key informant interviews; and modelling. Results show that whereas data collectors have a clear idea of what a `household` is, data users are often unaware of the nuances of the constraints imposed by data collection. This has implications for policy planning and practice. What interviewees consider when they think of their household can differ systematically from data collectors' definitions

What’s Wrong with Contemporary Economics?

It is argued that in educating economists we should sacrifice some of the more technical aspects of economics (which can be learned later), in favour of the compulsory inclusion of (a) philosophy, (b) political science and (c) economic history. Three reasons for interdisciplinary studies are given. In the discussion of the place of mathematics in economics fuzziness enters when the symbols a, b, c are identified with individuals, firms, or farms. The identification of the precise symbol with the often ambiguous and fuzzy reality, invites lack of precision and blurs the concepts. If the social sciences, including economics, are regarded as a “soft” technology compared with the “hard” technology of the natural sciences, development studies have been regarded as the soft underbelly of “economic science”. In development economics the important question is: what are the springs of development? We must confess that we cannot answer this question, that we do not know what causes successful development.

Fuzzy Logic in Clinical Practice Decision Support Systems

Computerized clinical guidelines can provide significant benefits to health outcomes and costs, however, their effective implementation presents significant problems. Vagueness and ambiguity inherent in natural (textual) clinical guidelines is not readily amenable to formulating automated alerts or advice. Fuzzy logic allows us to formalize the treatment of vagueness in a decision support architecture. This paper discusses sources of fuzziness in clinical practice guidelines. We consider how fuzzy logic can be applied and give a set of heuristics for the clinical guideline knowledge engineer for addressing uncertainty in practice guidelines. We describe the specific applicability of fuzzy logic to the decision support behavior of Care Plan On-Line, an intranet-based chronic care planning system for General Practitioners

An Introduction to Ontology

Analytical philosophy of the last one hundred years has been heavily influenced by a doctrine to the effect that one can arrive at a correct ontology by paying attention to certain superficial (syntactic) features of first-order predicate logic as conceived by Frege and Russell. More specifically, it is a doctrine to the effect that the key to the ontological structure of reality is captured syntactically in the ‘Fa’ (or, in more sophisticated versions, in the ‘Rab’) of first-order logic, where ‘F’ stands for what is general in reality and ‘a’ for what is individual. Hence “f(a)ntology”. Because predicate logic has exactly two syntactically different kinds of referring expressions—‘F’, ‘G’, ‘R’, etc., and ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, etc.—so reality must consist of exactly two correspondingly different kinds of entity: the general (properties, concepts) and the particular (things, objects), the relation between these two kinds of entity being revealed in the predicate-argument structure of atomic formulas in first-order logic

From Simple to Complex and Ultra-complex Systems:\ud A Paradigm Shift Towards Non-Abelian Systems Dynamics

Atoms, molecules, organisms distinguish layers of reality because of the causal links that govern their behavior, both horizontally (atom-atom, molecule-molecule, organism-organism) and vertically (atom-molecule-organism). This is the first intuition of the theory of levels. Even if the further development of the theory will require imposing a number of qualifications to this initial intuition, the idea of a series of entities organized on different levels of complexity will prove correct. Living systems as well as social systems and the human mind present features remarkably different from those characterizing non-living, simple physical and chemical systems. We propose that super-complexity requires at least four different categorical frameworks, provided by the theories of levels of reality, chronotopoids, (generalized) interactions, and anticipation

From Simple to Complex and Ultra-complex Systems:\ud A Paradigm Shift Towards Non-Abelian Systems Dynamics

Atoms, molecules, organisms distinguish layers of reality because of the causal links that govern their behavior, both horizontally (atom-atom, molecule-molecule, organism-organism) and vertically (atom-molecule-organism). This is the first intuition of the theory of levels. Even if the further development of the theory will require imposing a number of qualifications to this initial intuition, the idea of a series of entities organized on different levels of complexity will prove correct. Living systems as well as social systems and the human mind present features remarkably different from those characterizing non-living, simple physical and chemical systems. We propose that super-complexity requires at least four different categorical frameworks, provided by the theories of levels of reality, chronotopoids, (generalized) interactions, and anticipation

Inherent Holography In Fuzzy Spaces and An N-tropic Approach To The Cosmological Constant Problem

In this letter we show that the noncommutative spaces, and in particular fuzzy spheres, are natural candidates which explicitly exhibit the holography, by noting that the smallest physically accessible volume is much larger that the expected Planckian size. Moreover, we show that fuzzy spheres provide us with a new approach, ''an $N$-tropic'' approach, to the cosmological constant problem, though in a Euclidean space-time.Comment: 11 pages, no figures; v3: Presentation improved by adding a discussion on the Schwarzchild blackhole entropy, the version to appear in PL