Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core

The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura's theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.Comment: 35 pages; To appear in Journal of Mathematical Economics; Appendix added, Propositions, Remarks, etc. are renumbere

Kaleidoscope JEIRP on Learning Patterns for the Design and Deployment of Mathematical Games: Final Report

Project deliverable (D40.05.01-F)Over the last few years have witnessed a growing recognition of the educational potential of computer games. However, it is generally agreed that the process of designing and deploying TEL resources generally and games for mathematical learning specifically is a difficult task. The Kaleidoscope project, "Learning patterns for the design and deployment of mathematical games", aims to investigate this problem. We work from the premise that designing and deploying games for mathematical learning requires the assimilation and integration of deep knowledge from diverse domains of expertise including mathematics, games development, software engineering, learning and teaching. We promote the use of a design patterns approach to address this problem. This deliverable reports on the project by presenting both a connected account of the prior deliverables and also a detailed description of the methodology involved in producing those deliverables. In terms of conducting the future work which this report envisages, the setting out of our methodology is seen by us as very significant. The central deliverable includes reference to a large set of learning patterns for use by educators, researchers, practitioners, designers and software developers when designing and deploying TEL-based mathematical games. Our pattern language is suggested as an enabling tool for good practice, by facilitating pattern-specific communication and knowledge sharing between participants. We provide a set of trails as a "way-in" to using the learning pattern language. We report in this methodology how the project has enabled the synergistic collaboration of what started out as two distinct strands: design and deployment, even to the extent that it is now difficult to identify those strands within the processes and deliverables of the project. The tools and outcomes from the project can be found at: http://lp.noe-kaleidoscope.org

Mathematical models of games of chance: Epistemological taxonomy and potential in problem-gambling research

Games of chance are developed in their physical consumer-ready form on the basis of mathematical models, which stand as the premises of their existence and represent their physical processes. There is a prevalence of statistical and probabilistic models in the interest of all parties involved in the study of gambling – researchers, game producers and operators, and players – while functional models are of interest more to math-inclined players than problem-gambling researchers. In this paper I present a structural analysis of the knowledge attached to mathematical models of games of chance and the act of modeling, arguing that such knowledge holds potential in the prevention and cognitive treatment of excessive gambling, and I propose further research in this direction

Sequentiality vs. Concurrency in Games and Logic

Connections between the sequentiality/concurrency distinction and the semantics of proofs are investigated, with particular reference to games and Linear Logic.Comment: 35 pages, appeared in Mathematical Structures in Computer Scienc

Linear algebraic structure of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games

Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, a recently found novel class of strategies in repeated games, has attracted much attention in evolutionary game theory. A ZD strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between average payoffs of players. Although existence and evolutional stability of ZD strategies have been studied in simple games, their mathematical properties have not been well-known yet. For example, what happens when more than one players employ ZD strategies have not been clarified. In this paper, we provide a general framework for investigating situations where more than one players employ ZD strategies in terms of linear algebra. First, we theoretically prove that a set of linear relations of average payoffs enforced by ZD strategies always has solutions, which implies that incompatible linear relations are impossible. Second, we prove that linear payoff relations are independent of each other under some conditions. These results hold for general games with public monitoring including perfect-monitoring games. Furthermore, we provide a simple example of a two-player game in which one player can simultaneously enforce two linear relations, that is, simultaneously control her and her opponent's average payoffs. All of these results elucidate general mathematical properties of ZD strategies.Comment: 19 pages, 2 figure