Multiple man-machine interfaces

The multiple man machine interfaces inherent in military pilot training, their social implications, and the issue of possible negative feedback were explored. Modern technology has produced machines which can see, hear, and touch with greater accuracy and precision than human beings. Consequently, the military pilot is more a systems manager, often doing battle against a target he never sees. It is concluded that unquantifiable human activity requires motivation that is not intrinsic in a machine

An approach toward function allocation between humans and machines in space station activities

Basic guidelines and data to assist in the allocation of functions between humans and automated systems in a manned permanent space station are provided. Human capabilities and limitations are described. Criteria and guidelines for various levels of automation and human participation are described. A collection of human factors data is included

Automation in organizations: Eternal conflict

Some ideas on and insights into the problems associated with automation in organizations are presented with emphasis on the concept of automation, its relationship to the individual, and its impact on system performance. An analogy is drawn, based on an American folk hero, to emphasize the extent of the problems encountered when dealing with automation within an organization. A model is proposed to focus attention on a set of appropriate dimensions. The function allocation process becomes a prominent aspect of the model. The current state of automation research is mentioned in relation to the ideas introduced. Proposed directions for an improved understanding of automation's effect on the individual's efficiency are discussed. The importance of understanding the individual's perception of the system in terms of the degree of automation is highlighted

Recent results from zero g cargo handling studies

Cargo handling, transfer, and stowage under weightlessness conditions of space shuttl

Technology assessment of advanced automation for space missions

Six general classes of technology requirements derived during the mission definition phase of the study were identified as having maximum importance and urgency, including autonomous world model based information systems, learning and hypothesis formation, natural language and other man-machine communication, space manufacturing, teleoperators and robot systems, and computer science and technology

Evolution and Revolution: The Drama of Realtime Complementarity

This article is by design a response to Alastair M. Taylor's "For Philosophers and Scientists: A General Systems Paradigm." That work is an advance over stage theories. But its focus on modernization tacitly accepts marginalization. Its focus on an undifferentiated evolving human species disregards intra- and intersocietal conflicts. Its uncritical talk of societal energy shifts obscures the reality of conquest and exploitation. If general systems theory is to be truly objective, it should take into account world-around system imbalance and the relevance of Newton's Third Law. (Publisher omitted title of this article and used only its subtitle.

An open-ended future: In defense of a new humanism

The edge between technology and humanism is discussed. Advances in biology, in medicine, energy technology, tools and weapons, communications, psychology, problem solving and information storage, transportation, and other fields are presented. Ecology in self-transcendence and space travel as a survival tool are considered

The Other Side of the Hill: Combat Intelligence in the Canadian Corps, 1914–1918

For some, a discussion on military intelligence and the First World War is the ultimate oxymoron. They might ask: when and where did generals display any use of intelligence? That the Battle of the Somme continued beyond the first day, they might argue, demonstrates a complete lack of military intelligence, or any other type of intelligence for that matter. If there ever was a war, they might add, where donkeylike officers led lion-like soldiers to slaughter against barbed wire, machine guns, and trenches, then the Great War was it. The oft told story of how Sir Launcelot Kiggell, Sir Douglas Haig’s chief of staff, upon seeing the Passchendaele battlefield and its sea of mud and carnage, reportedly wept, “My God! Did we send men to fight in that?” only to be answered by an aid: “It’s worse further up,” has lent credence to the position that the British high command was, indeed, incompetent. The myth that British generals were donkeys is an old one, and not likely to disappear completely anytime soon—at least in popular imagination. However, a study of combat intelligence should help to dispel this myth, for when intelligence was used wisely—as it usually was in the Canadian Corps—it increased the likelihood of success in the field. It did this by dispersing some of the fog of war and the resulting battlefield confusion. Good intelligence gave planners the details necessary for preparing the incredibly complex set-piece battles that were the hallmark of First World War combat. Such meticulous care and precision preparation ensured that there were fewer surprises on Zero Day, the day of attack, then otherwise would have been the case. By cutting through the fog of war, intelligence reduced the assaulting troops’ dependence on circumstance and luck, while restoring to commanders some degree of control over events in what was an otherwise highly chaotic environment. This was no small matter, especially on battlefields where communications were painfully slow, erratic and unreliable. Officers and men of the Great War faced conditions and technological advances that had completely altered warfare from what they had expected and trained for. To compensate, the Canadians, and others, used combat intelligence to help overcome such obstacles as poor communications, heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, entrenchments and barbed wire, and came to see it as a crucial element in waging successful trench warfare