5,614 research outputs found
Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid under Colored Gaussian Noise
In this paper, we consider the problems of state estimation and false data
injection detection in smart grid when the measurements are corrupted by
colored Gaussian noise. By modeling the noise with the autoregressive process,
we estimate the state of the power transmission networks and develop a
generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) detector for the detection of false
data injection attacks. We show that the conventional approach with the
assumption of Gaussian noise is a special case of the proposed method, and thus
the new approach has more applicability. {The proposed detector is also tested
on an independent component analysis (ICA) based unobservable false data attack
scheme that utilizes similar assumptions of sample observation.} We evaluate
the performance of the proposed state estimator and attack detector on the IEEE
30-bus power system with comparison to conventional Gaussian noise based
detector. The superior performance of {both observable and unobservable false
data attacks} demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach and
indicates a wide application on the power signal processing.Comment: 8 pages, 4 figures in IEEE Conference on Communications and Network
Security (CNS) 201
Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey
The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the
spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of
the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the
past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense
strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide
a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine
attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the
preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection
techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear
and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects:
the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the
games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing
Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack
parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next,
from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify
the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the
state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure
CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research
challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral
A Survey on Wireless Security: Technical Challenges, Recent Advances and Future Trends
This paper examines the security vulnerabilities and threats imposed by the
inherent open nature of wireless communications and to devise efficient defense
mechanisms for improving the wireless network security. We first summarize the
security requirements of wireless networks, including their authenticity,
confidentiality, integrity and availability issues. Next, a comprehensive
overview of security attacks encountered in wireless networks is presented in
view of the network protocol architecture, where the potential security threats
are discussed at each protocol layer. We also provide a survey of the existing
security protocols and algorithms that are adopted in the existing wireless
network standards, such as the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and the long-term
evolution (LTE) systems. Then, we discuss the state-of-the-art in
physical-layer security, which is an emerging technique of securing the open
communications environment against eavesdropping attacks at the physical layer.
We also introduce the family of various jamming attacks and their
counter-measures, including the constant jammer, intermittent jammer, reactive
jammer, adaptive jammer and intelligent jammer. Additionally, we discuss the
integration of physical-layer security into existing authentication and
cryptography mechanisms for further securing wireless networks. Finally, some
technical challenges which remain unresolved at the time of writing are
summarized and the future trends in wireless security are discussed.Comment: 36 pages. Accepted to Appear in Proceedings of the IEEE, 201
Attack Resilience and Recovery using Physical Challenge Response Authentication for Active Sensors Under Integrity Attacks
Embedded sensing systems are pervasively used in life- and security-critical
systems such as those found in airplanes, automobiles, and healthcare.
Traditional security mechanisms for these sensors focus on data encryption and
other post-processing techniques, but the sensors themselves often remain
vulnerable to attacks in the physical/analog domain. If an adversary
manipulates a physical/analog signal prior to digitization, no amount of
digital security mechanisms after the fact can help. Fortunately, nature
imposes fundamental constraints on how these analog signals can behave. This
work presents PyCRA, a physical challenge-response authentication scheme
designed to protect active sensing systems against physical attacks occurring
in the analog domain. PyCRA provides security for active sensors by continually
challenging the surrounding environment via random but deliberate physical
probes. By analyzing the responses to these probes, and by using the fact that
the adversary cannot change the underlying laws of physics, we provide an
authentication mechanism that not only detects malicious attacks but provides
resilience against them. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PyCRA through
several case studies using two sensing systems: (1) magnetic sensors like those
found wheel speed sensors in robotics and automotive, and (2) commercial RFID
tags used in many security-critical applications. Finally, we outline methods
and theoretical proofs for further enhancing the resilience of PyCRA to active
attacks by means of a confusion phase---a period of low signal to noise ratio
that makes it more difficult for an attacker to correctly identify and respond
to PyCRA's physical challenges. In doing so, we evaluate both the robustness
and the limitations of PyCRA, concluding by outlining practical considerations
as well as further applications for the proposed authentication mechanism.Comment: Shorter version appeared in ACM ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications (CCS) 201
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