Questions related to Bitcoin and other Informational Money

A collection of questions about Bitcoin and its hypothetical relatives Bitguilder and Bitpenny is formulated. These questions concern technical issues about protocols, security issues, issues about the formalizations of informational monies in various contexts, and issues about forms of use and misuse. Some questions are formulated in the more general setting of informational monies and near-monies. We also formulate questions about legal, psychological, and ethical aspects of informational money. Finally we formulate a number of questions concerning the economical merits of and outlooks for Bitcoin.Comment: 31 pages. In v2 the section on patterns for use and misuse has been improved and expanded with so-called contaminations. Other small improvements were made and 13 additional references have been include

Bitcoin: the wrong implementation of the right idea at the right time

This paper is a study into some of the regulatory implications of cryptocurrencies using the CAMPO research framework (Context, Actors, Methods, Methods, Practice, Outcomes). We explain in CAMPO format why virtual currencies are of interest, how self-regulation has failed, and what useful lessons can be learned. We are hopeful that the full paper will produce useful and semi-permanent findings into the usefulness of virtual currencies in general, block chains as a means of mining currency, and the profundity of current ‘media darling’ currency Bitcoin as compared with the development of block chain generator Ethereum. While virtual currencies can play a role in creating better trading conditions in virtual communities, despite the risks of non-sovereign issuance and therefore only regulation by code (Brown/Marsden 2013), the methodology used poses significant challenges to researching this ‘community’, if BitCoin can even be said to have created a single community, as opposed to enabling an alternate method of exchange for potentially all virtual community transactions. First, BitCoin users have transparency of ownership but anonymity in many transactions, necessary for libertarians or outright criminals in such illicit markets as #SilkRoad. Studying community dynamics is therefore made much more difficult than even such pseudonymous or avatar based communities as Habbo Hotel, World of Warcraft or SecondLife. The ethical implications of studying such communities raise similar problems as those of Tor, Anonymous, Lulzsec and other anonymous hacker communities. Second, the journalistic accounts of BitCoin markets are subject to sensationalism, hype and inaccuracy, even more so than in the earlier hype cycle for SecondLife, exacerbated by the first issue of anonymity. Third, the virtual currency area is subject to slowly emerging regulation by financial authorities and police forces, which appears to be driving much of the early adopter community ‘underground’. Thus, the community in 2016 may not bear much resemblance to that in 2012. Fourth, there has been relatively little academic empirical study of the community, or indeed of virtual currencies in general, until relatively recently. Fifth, the dynamism of the virtual currency environment in the face of the deepening mistrust of the financial system after the 2008 crisis is such that any research conclusions must by their nature be provisional and transient. All these challenges, particularly the final three, also raise the motivation for research – an alternative financial system which is separated from the real-world sovereign and which can use code regulation with limited enforcement from offline policing, both returns the study to the libertarian self-regulated environment of early 1990s MUDs, and offers a tantalising prospect of a tool to evade the perils of ‘private profit, socialized risk’ which existing large financial institutions created in the 2008-12 disaster. The need for further research into virtual currencies based on blockchain mining, and for their usage by virtual communities, is thus pressing and should motivate researchers to solve the many problems in methodology for exploring such an environment

Contracts Ex Machina

Smart contracts are self-executing digital transactions using decentralized cryptographic mechanisms for enforcement. They were theorized more than twenty years ago, but the recent development of Bitcoin and blockchain technologies has rekindled excitement about their potential among technologists and industry. Startup companies and major enterprises alike are now developing smart contract solutions for an array of markets, purporting to offer a digital bypass around traditional contract law. For legal scholars, smart contracts pose a significant question: Do smart contracts offer a superior solution to the problems that contract law addresses? In this article, we aim to understand both the potential and the limitations of smart contracts. We conclude that smart contracts offer novel possibilities, may significantly alter the commercial world, and will demand new legal responses. But smart contracts will not displace contract law. Understanding why not brings into focus the essential role of contract law as a remedial institution. In this way, smart contracts actually illuminate the role of contract law more than they obviate it

Do consumers need a ‘Bit’ more protection under Australian consumer laws? The regulatory risks and challenges of Bitcoin

The creation of Bitcoin, as a digital currency, has been a significant development in the world of finance, in that it provides an alternative method of payment to consumers and businesses who use Bitcoin as a means to buy or sell goods or simply as an investment arrangement. The use of Bitcoin, as a decentralised peer-to-peer network, provides numerous benefits as a payment system, but at the same time, creates challenges for consumers due to its unregulated nature and volatile status. Therefore, when Bitcoin users enter into agreements with Initial Coin Offering (ICO) hosted companies and Bitcoin exchange platforms, the conduct by these ICOs and exchanges may be misleading and unconscionable in relation to the information they disclose to the Bitcoin user (as a consumer). This paper will consider the application of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) and whether the Australian Consumer Law is suited to take into consideration Bitcoin transactions under the misleading and unconscionable provisions

Architectural Adequacy and Evolutionary Adequacy as Characteristics of a Candidate Informational Money

For money-like informational commodities the notions of architectural adequacy and evolutionary adequacy are proposed as the first two stages of a moneyness maturity hierarchy. Then three classes of informational commodities are distinguished: exclusively informational commodities, strictly informational commodities, and ownable informational commodities. For each class money-like instances of that commodity class, as well as monies of that class may exist. With the help of these classifications and making use of previous assessments of Bitcoin, it is argued that at this stage Bitcoin is unlikely ever to evolve into a money. Assessing the evolutionary adequacy of Bitcoin is perceived in terms of a search through its design hull for superior design alternatives. An extensive comparison is made between the search for superior design alternatives to Bitcoin and the search for design alternatives to a specific and unconventional view on the definition of fractions.Comment: 25 page

$=€=Bitcoin?

Bitcoin (and other virtual currencies) have the potential to revolutionize the way that payments are processed, but only if they become ubiquitous. This Article argues that if virtual currencies are used at that scale, it would pose threats to the stability of the financial system—threats that have been largely unexplored to date. Such threats will arise because the ability of a virtual currency to function as money is very fragile—Bitcoin can remain money only for so long as people have confidence that bitcoins will be readily accepted by others as a means of payment. Unlike the U.S. dollar, which is backed by both a national government and a central bank, and the euro, which is at least backed by a central bank, there is no institution that can shore up confidence in Bitcoin (or any other virtual currency) in the event of a panic. This Article explores some regulatory measures that could help address the systemic risks posed by virtual currencies, but argues that the best way to contain those risks is for regulated institutions to out-compete virtual currencies by offering better payment services, thus consigning virtual currencies to a niche role in the economy. This Article therefore concludes by exploring how the distributed ledger technology pioneered by Bitcoin could be adapted to allow regulated entities to provide vastly more efficient payment services for sovereign currency-denominated transactions, while at the same time seeking to avoid concentrating the provision of those payment services within “too big to fail” banks

Bitcoin: a Money-like Informational Commodity

The question "what is Bitcoin" allows for many answers depending on the objectives aimed at when providing such answers. The question addressed in this paper is to determine a top-level classification, or type, for Bitcoin. We will classify Bitcoin as a system of type money-like informational commodity (MLIC)