13 research outputs found

    A fuzzy Bayesian network approach for risk analysis in process industries

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    YesFault tree analysis is a widely used method of risk assessment in process industries. However, the classical fault tree approach has its own limitations such as the inability to deal with uncertain failure data and to consider statistical dependence among the failure events. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for the risk assessment in process industries under the conditions of uncertainty and statistical dependency of events. The proposed approach makes the use of expert knowledge and fuzzy set theory for handling the uncertainty in the failure data and employs the Bayesian network modeling for capturing dependency among the events and for a robust probabilistic reasoning in the conditions of uncertainty. The effectiveness of the approach was demonstrated by performing risk assessment in an ethylene transportation line unit in an ethylene oxide (EO) production plant

    Development of New Metrics and a Tool for Social Quantification of Sustainable Process Design

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    The concept of sustainable design has emerged as a new paradigm. Sustainability combines economic, environmental and social aspects of Process design. In our research all the available metrics, tools that are being used for social quantification with good definition, description and calculation methodology is reviewed. Then a new tool is proposed which considers both the inherent safety and occupational health quantification for sustainable process design. The method is tailored for the process research and development stage by including only such chemical properties and process operating conditions which are obtainable at early design stage. The approach is demonstrated for the two alternative processes of DME production and for the base case and optimized case Acrylonitrile production using simulation engine ASPEN PLUSTM . With the help of the developed standard index scale and the retrofitted SUSTAINABILITY EVALUATOR the best socially sustainable process design is assessed.Chemical Engineerin

    DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SMART ADVISORY SYSTEM FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION RISK ANALYSIS VIA QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES

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    Safe transportation of hazardous materials is critical as it has a high potential of catastrophic accidents depending on the amount of transported product, its hazardous characteristics and the environmental conditions. Consequently, an efficient, smart and reliable intervention is essential to enhance prediction on the impacts of transportation hazards. Although various risk assessment techniques have been used in industry and regulatory bodies, they were developed for evaluating risk of hazardous materials for fixed installation cases instead of moving risk sources. This study applies the Transportation Risk Analysis (TRA), which is an extension of a well-known Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) technique in developing and design a Smart Advisory Systems (SAS), to determine the safest routes for transportation of hazardous materials according to Malaysia scenario

    Social, Economic and Environmental Metrics for the Sustainable Optimization of Chemical and Petroleum Processes

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    This research is focused on adopting a systematic methodology for address sustainability concerns during early stages of engineering design. Traditionally, engineers designed processes to achieve beneficial operations and economic goals. However, given the need to balance the economic benefits of chemical engineering processes, safety, health and environmental impacts, the improved focus on sustainability of production processes has introduced more complex dimensions to consider. When it comes to addressing the three conflicting dimensions of sustainability, there is no well-defined methodology or tool for achieving this. A thorough review was completed to investigate the applications and limitations of existing economic, environmental, health and safety evaluation tools. Therefore, the methodology combines already established approaches, concepts and tools into a novel systematic technique that addresses sustainability concerns during early stages of chemical process design. A methodology that involves the use of the SUSTAINABILITY EVALUATOR and ASPEN PLUS was developed for evaluating processes for sustainability. The SUSTAINABILITY EVALUATOR is a novel impact assessment tool developed for this research. This tool applies selected metrics that address economic, environmental as well as health and safety concerns. The SUSTAINABILITY EVALUATOR is a Microsoft Excel based tool that uses mass and energy balance inputs from ASPEN PLUS to evaluate the sustainability of a process. This impact assessment tool equips the process designer with a framework to design industrial processes for sustainability. The objective is for processes designers to use the results generated from the tool to assess and improve the sustainability of a process. The proposed framework involved the use of ASPEN PLUS to simulate processes, calculate mass and energy balances, complete sensitivity analysis and lastly optimize processes An overall sustainability impact which has been incorporated into the SUSTAINABILITY EVALUATOR was developed to quantify sustainability issues in process design. The methodology was demonstrated on two case studies: the acrylonitrile process and the allyl chloride process. The application of the methodology on the two case studies resulted in a more economic, environmental and socially acceptable processes.School of Chemical Engineerin

    A Study on the Efficient Framework and Methodology for Quantifying the Risk in the Process Industry

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (๋ฐ•์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ํ™”ํ•™์ƒ๋ฌผ๊ณตํ•™๋ถ€, 2012. 8. ์œค์ธ์„ญ.์„์œ , ๊ฐ€์Šค ๋ฐ ํ™”ํ•™ ๊ณต์ •์‚ฐ์—…์€ ์ธ๋ฅ˜์—๊ฒŒ ํŽธ๋ฆฌ์„ฑ๊ณผ ๋”๋ถˆ์–ด ์‚ฌ๊ณ  ๋ฐœ์ƒ์‹œ ๊ทผ๋กœ์ž, ์ธ์ ‘ ์ฃผ๋ฏผ ๋ฐ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ ๋“ฑ์— ๋ง‰๋Œ€ํ•œ ํ”ผํ•ด๋ฅผ ์ค„ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ์„ ๋™์‹œ์— ๋ถ€๊ฐ€ํ•˜๋Š” ์–‘๋ฉด์„ฑ์„ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ ์—ญ์‚ฌ์  ์‚ฌ๊ฑด๋“ค์€ ์ด๋ฅผ ์ฆ๋ช…ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ์ „ ์„ธ๊ณ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€ ๋ฐ ์œ„ํ—˜๊ด€๋ฆฌ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ๊ทœ์ œ ๋ฐ ์ฝ”๋“œ/ํ‘œ์ค€๋“ค์ด ๋Š์ž„์—†์ด ์ƒ์„ฑ, ์ ์šฉ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ ๊ทธ๊ฒƒ๋“ค์˜ ํ•ต์‹ฌ์  ์ฒ ํ•™์€ ์ˆœํ™˜์  ์œ„ํ—˜ ๋ถ„์„ ๋ฐ ์‹คํ–‰์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ์œ„ํ—˜์„ ์ง€์†์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ†ต์ œํ† ๋ก ํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€๋Š” ํฌ๊ฒŒ ๋‘ ๊ฐ€์ง€๋กœ ๋ถ„๋ฅ˜๋˜๋ฉฐ ๊ทธ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š” ์œ„ํ—˜์˜ ํ™•์ธ์— ์ฃผ๋กœ ์ดˆ์ ์„ ๋‘๋Š” ์ •์„ฑ์  ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€์ด๊ณ  ๋˜ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š” ๊ทœ์ •ํ•œ ์œ„ํ—˜์„ ํ™•๋ฅ ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ณ„์‚ฐํ•˜๋Š” ์ •๋Ÿ‰์  ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€(QRA)์ด๋‹ค. ๊ฐ๊ฐ์˜ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์€ ๊ณ ์œ ์˜ ์—ญํ• ๊ณผ ์žฅ๋‹จ์ ์ด ์žˆ๊ณ  ํ†ต์ƒ์ ์œผ๋กœ QRA๋Š” ์ •์„ฑ์  ํ‰๊ฐ€์— ์ด์–ด ์ˆ˜ํ–‰์ด ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ตœ๊ทผ ์•ˆ์ „ ๊ทœ์ œ๊ธฐ๊ด€๊ณผ ๊ณต์ • ์‚ฐ์—…๊ณ„์—์„œ๋Š” ์ •๋Ÿ‰์  ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€์˜ ํ™œ์šฉ๋„๊ฐ€ ์ ์ฐจ ์ปค์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ ์ด์œ ๋Š” ์‚ฐ์—…์˜ ํŒฝ์ฐฝ๊ณผ ์ธ๊ตฌ์ฆ๊ฐ€๋กœ ์ธํ•œ ๊ฑด์„ค ๋ถ€์ง€์˜ ๋ถ€์กฑ, ๊ณต์‚ฌ ๋ฐ ์šด์˜ ๋น„์šฉ ํ•œ๊ณ„ ๋“ฑ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ์ œ์•ฝ๋“ค๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ๊ณผ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์„ฑ์˜ ์ƒ๊ด€๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ๋”์šฑ ๋ณต์žกํ•ด์ ธ ์•ˆ์ „์˜์‚ฌ ๊ฒฐ์ •์‹œ ๊ณ„๋Ÿ‰์  ์œ„ํ—˜๋„ ์‚ฐ์ถœ์ด ์ ˆ๋Œ€์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ•„์š”ํ•˜๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ํ•„์š”์„ฑ๊ณผ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์  ๋™ํ–ฅ์— ์˜ํ•ด ์ตœ๊ทผ 20๋…„๊ฐ„ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ์ •๋Ÿ‰ ์œ„ํ—˜ ๋ถ„์„ ๋ชจ๋ธ์ด ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ๋˜๊ณ  ๋งŽ์€ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์— ๊ด€๋ จ ๊ทœ์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋„์ž…, ์ ์šฉ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ์—๋„ ๋ถˆ๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ  ์œ„ํ—˜๊ด€๋ฆฌ ํ”„๋กœ์„ธ์Šค์—์„œ QRA๋ฅผ ํšจ์œจ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ถ”์ง„ํ‚ค ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ , ์‹คํ–‰์  ์ฐจ์›์—์„œ์˜ ์ฒด๊ณ„(๋ชจ๋ธ)๋Š” ์•„์ง ์ œ์‹œ๋œ ๋ฐ”๊ฐ€ ์—†์–ด ๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์„ ํ™œ์„ฑํ™”ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐ ์žˆ์–ด์„œ๋Š” ํ•œ๊ณ„์— ๋„๋‹ฌํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š” ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ƒํ™ฉ์„ ๊ทน๋ณตํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•˜์—ฌ ์œ„ํ—˜๊ด€๋ฆฌ์— ์žˆ์–ด ์ •๋Ÿ‰์  ์œ„ํ—˜ ๋ถ„์„์„ ์ง€์†์  ๋„๊ตฌ๋กœ ํฌ์šฉํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๋ชฉ์  ํŠน์„ฑ์„ 3๊ฐ€์ง€๋กœ ๊ทœ์ •ํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋‹ฌ์„ฑํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ฒด๊ณ„์— ๊ด€ํ•˜์—ฌ ์—ฐ๊ตฌํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋‹ฌ์„ฑ์ฝ”์ž ํ•˜๋Š” 3๊ฐ€์ง€ ํŠน์„ฑ์€ ํ˜‘๋ ฅ์„ฑ(๋ถ„์—…์„ฑ)๊ณผ ์œ„ํ—˜ ๋ถ„์„ ๋ชจ๋ธ์˜ ๊ฒ€ํ† ์„ฑ๊ณผ ์—ฐ์†์„ฑ์˜ ์‹คํ˜„์ด๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š” ARHSP(Accidental Release Hazard Scenario Point)๋ผ๊ณ  ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ตฌ์‹ฌ์  ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์˜ ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ์ œ์•ˆํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ์ •๋Ÿ‰ ์œ„ํ—˜ ๋ถ„์„ ๊ณผ์ •์˜ ์ค‘๊ฐ„ ์‚ฐ์ถœ๋ฌผ์ธ ์ค‘์š” ์‚ฌ๊ณ ๊ฒฝ์œ„๋ฅผ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ์‚ฌ๊ณ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ๋ถ„์„ ์ด๋ก ๊ณผ ํ†ตํ•ฉํ•˜์—ฌ ํ™•๋ฅ ์  ํ•ด์„์„ ์™„๋ฃŒํ•˜๋Š” ์ฒด๊ณ„๋ก ์  ์ ‘๊ทผ๋ฒ•์ด๋‹ค. ARHSP๋Š” ์‚ฌ๊ณ ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์ค‘์š” ์‚ฌ๊ฑด๋“ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ๋‹ด๊ณ  ์žˆ์–ด ๋น„์ „๋ฌธ๊ฐ€, ์ฆ‰ ์ดํ•ด๊ด€๊ณ„์ž๋“ค์˜ ์œ„ํ—˜ ๋ถ„์„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ดํ•ด๋ฅผ ๋•๊ณ  ๊ฐ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ์‚ฌ๊ฑด๋“ค์˜ ํ™•๋ฅ ์„ ์‰ฝ๊ฒŒ ์–ป๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๋ถ„์—…ํ™” ์ฒด๊ณ„๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์ง์œผ๋กœ์„œ ํšจ์œจ์  QRA๋ฅผ ์ถ”๊ตฌํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฐ ์ฒด๊ณ„๋ฅผ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์œผ๋กœ ํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ณต์ •์˜ ์ดˆ๊ธฐ์„ค๊ณ„๋‹จ๊ณ„๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์šด์˜๋‹จ๊ณ„๊นŒ์ง€ ์œ„ํ—˜ ๋ถ„์„ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ์ถ•์ ํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ณต์œ ํ•  ๋ฟ๋งŒ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ๋ฐœ์ „์‹œ์ผœ๋‚˜๊ฐˆ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ •๋Ÿ‰์  ์œ„ํ—˜๊ด€๋ฆฌ ํ”„๋กœ์„ธ์Šค ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์„ ์‹คํ˜„ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์ธ QRA ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์™€ ๋ถ„์„ ์ ˆ์ฐจ๋ฅผ ์„ค๊ณ„ํ•˜๊ณ  ์ž‘์„ฑํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š” 2๊ฐœ์˜ ์‚ฌ๋ก€ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•˜์—ฌ ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์— ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ํ•œ QRA ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์„ ๊ตฌ์ถ•ํ•˜๊ณ  ์‹ค์ œ ์‚ฐ์—…์˜ ์•ˆ์ „๊ด€๋ฆฌ์— ์ ์šฉํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ณด์ž„์œผ๋กœ์„œ ๊ทธ ์œ ํšจ์„ฑ์„ ์‹ค์ฆํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์‚ฌ๋ก€์—ฐ๊ตฌ1์—์„œ๋Š” ๊ฐ€์Šค ๊ณต๊ธ‰์‹œ์„ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์›น๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์˜ QRA ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์„ ๊ตฌ์ถ•ํ•˜๊ณ  ์ ์šฉํ•˜์˜€๋Š”๋ฐ ๋ฐฑ์—ฌ๊ฐœ ์ด์ƒ์˜ ์‹œ์„ค๋“ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ „๋ฌธ๊ฐ€์™€ ์•ˆ์ „๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž๊ฐ€ ๋ถ„์—…์  ํ˜‘๋ ฅ์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ๋ถ„์„ ์‹œ๊ฐ„์„ ๊ธฐ์กด ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์— ๋น„ํ•ด ํš๊ธฐ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ค„์ž„์œผ๋กœ์„œ ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์ด ๋งค์šฐ ํšจ์œจ์ ์ž„์„ ์ž…์ฆํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์‚ฌ๋ก€์—ฐ๊ตฌ2์—์„œ๋Š” ๋ณด๋‹ค ์œ ์—ฐํ•œ ARHSP ์ž‘์„ฑ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์„ ๊ฐ€์ง„ ์ผ๋ฐ˜ํ™”๋œ QRA ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์„ ๊ตฌ์ถ•ํ•˜๊ณ  LNG ์‹œ์„ค์— ์ ์šฉํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋” ๋‚˜์•„๊ฐ€ ์ด๋ฏธ ์ ์šฉ๋œ ARHSP๋ฅผ ์‰ฝ๊ฒŒ ๊ฐœ์„ ํ•˜๊ณ  ์‘์šฉํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ณด์ž„์œผ๋กœ์„œ ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์ด QRA ์—ฐ์†์„ฑ๊ณผ ์ดํ•ด์„ฑ์˜ ์‹คํ˜„์„ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์ผ€ ํ•˜๋Š” ๋งค์šฐ ์‹ค์šฉ์ ์ธ ์ฒด๊ณ„์ž„์„ ํ™•์ธํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ฒฐ๋ก ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ ๊ธฐ์กด QRA ์ˆ˜ํ–‰๊ณผ์ •, ์ฆ‰ ์œ„ํ—˜์š”์†Œ ํ™•์ธ, ๋ชจ๋ธ ์ˆ˜๋ฆฝ, ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ ์„ค์ •, ์œ„ํ—˜๋„ ํ•ด์„ ๊ณผ์ •์— ์žˆ์–ด ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์„ ์ „๋ฌธ๊ฐ€์— ์˜์กดํ–ˆ๋˜ ๊ธฐ์กด ์ฒด๊ณ„๋ฅผ ํƒˆํ”ผํ•˜๊ณ  ํ˜‘๋ ฅ์  ์ฒด๊ณ„๋กœ ๋ถ„์„์„ ํšจ์œจ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋‚˜ ๊ธฐ์—…์—์„œ QRA๋ฅผ ๋ณด๋‹ค ์‰ฝ๊ฒŒ ์ ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ๊ธฐํ‹€(ํŒจ๋Ÿฌ๋‹ค์ž„)์„ ๋งˆ๋ จํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์œ„ํ—˜๊ด€๋ฆฌ ํ”„๋กœ์„ธ์Šค์—์„œ ๊ฐ€์žฅ ํ•ต์‹ฌ ์ฒ ํ•™์ธ ๋ชจ๋“  ๊ด€๋ จ์ž์˜ ์œ„ํ—˜ ๋ถ„์„ ๋ฐ ์‹คํ–‰ ์ฐธ์—ฌ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์ผ€ ํ•˜๋Š” ์‹ค์šฉ์  ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•จ์œผ๋กœ์„œ QRA ๊ทœ์ œ/ํ‘œ์ค€ ์ˆ˜๋ฆฝ ๋ฐ ๊ทธ ํ™œ์„ฑํ™”์™€ ์‘์šฉ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๋ฐœ์ „์— ๊ธฐ์—ฌํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋งˆ์ง€๋ง‰์œผ๋กœ ๊ณต์ •์‚ฐ์—…์—์„œ QRA๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ๊ทผ๋กœ์ž ๋ฐ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ์˜ ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ์„ ๋‹ด๋ณดํ•˜๊ณ  ํ•ฉ๋ฆฌ์  ์˜์‚ฌ ๊ฒฐ์ •์„ ์ด๋ฃฐ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์œ„ํ—˜ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ ๊ด€๋ฆฌ ๊ธฐ์ˆ  ํ™•์‚ฐ์— ๊ธฐ์—ฌํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค.1. ์„œ ๋ก  1 1.1 ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๋ฐฐ๊ฒฝ 1 1.2 ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๋ชฉ์  ๋ฐ ๋ฒ”์œ„ 7 1.3 ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์˜ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ 9 2. ๊ณต์ • ์‚ฐ์—…์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€ 12 2.1 ์ •์„ฑ์  ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€ ๊ฐœ๋ก  13 2.2 ์ •๋Ÿ‰์  ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€ ์ ˆ์ฐจ ๋ฐ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•๋ก  ๊ณ ์ฐฐ 20 2.2.1 QRA ๋ชฉ์  ์ˆ˜๋ฆฝ ๋ฐ ์œ„ํ—˜์š”์†Œ ํ™•์ธ 25 2.2.2 ๋ˆ„์ถœ ์‚ฌ๊ณ  ์ƒ์„ฑ ๋ฐ ์„ ํƒ 25 2.2.3 ์‚ฌ๊ณ ๋นˆ๋„ ๋ถ„์„ 28 2.2.4 ์‚ฌ๊ณ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ๋ถ„์„ 40 2.2.5 ์œ„ํ—˜(๋„)์˜ ํ‘œํ˜„ ๋ฐ ๊ธฐ์ค€ 43 3. ์ •๋Ÿ‰์  ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€ ์ ์šฉ/์—ฐ๊ตฌ ํ˜„ํ™ฉ ๋ฐ ๋ฌธ์ œ์  55 3.1 ๊ณต์ •์‚ฐ์—…์—์„œ ๋ฌผ์งˆ ์œ„ํ—˜์š”์†Œ์˜ ์ค‘์š”์„ฑ 55 3.2 QRA ์ ์šฉ ๋ฐ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ํ˜„ํ™ฉ 61 3.3 ๊ธฐ์กด ์œ„ํ—˜ ์ •๋Ÿ‰ํ™” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• ๋ฐ ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ์  74 4. ์ œ์•ˆํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•๋ก  77 4.1 ๊ธฐ๋ณธ ์•„์ด๋””์–ด 77 4.2 ARHSP ์ œ์•ˆ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ ๋…ผ๋ฆฌ 83 4.3 ARHSP ๋‚ด๋ถ€ ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ 86 4.3.1 ์งˆ์˜๋“ค ๋ฐ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ ์‚ฌ๊ฑด ํ™•๋ฅ  ๋ถ€๋ถ„ 87 4.3.2 ์‚ฌ๊ณ  ๊ฒฝ์œ„ ๋ฐ ๋นˆ๋„ ๊ณ„์‚ฐ ๋ถ€๋ถ„ 92 4.3.3 ์ตœ์ข… ์‚ฌ๊ณ  ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค ๋ฐ ๋นˆ๋„ ๋ถ€๋ถ„ 93 4.4 ์‚ฌ๊ณ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ๋ฐ ์œ„ํ—˜๋„ ๋ถ„์„ ํ๋ฆ„๋„ 94 4.5 ์ •๋Ÿ‰์  ์œ„ํ—˜๊ด€๋ฆฌ ํ”„๋กœ์„ธ์Šค ๋ชจ๋ธ 98 4.6 ARHSP ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ ์—ฐ์†์  ์ •๋Ÿ‰ ์œ„ํ—˜ ๋ถ„์„ ์‹คํ˜„ 101 5. ARHSP ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ QRA ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ํ”Œ๋žซํผ ๋ฐ ๋ถ„์„ ์ ˆ์ฐจ 104 5.1 QRA ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ํ”Œ๋žซํผ ๊ตฌ์กฐ 104 5.2 ARHSP ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์  ์„ธ๋ถ€ ๊ตฌ์กฐ 108 5.3 ARHSP ์ž‘์„ฑ ํ๋ฆ„๋„ 112 5.3.1 ํ•˜๋‚˜์˜ ๋ˆ„์ถœ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋ฅผ ํฌํ•จํ•œ ARHSP ์ž‘์„ฑ ํ๋ฆ„๋„ 114 5.3.2 ๋‘๊ฐœ ์ด์ƒ์˜ ๋ˆ„์ถœ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋ฅผ ํฌํ•จํ•œ ARHSP ์ž‘์„ฑ ํ๋ฆ„๋„ 116 5.3.3 ์‚ฌ๊ณ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ๋ถ„์„ ARHSP ๊ฐœ์„  ์ž‘์„ฑ ํ๋ฆ„๋„ 118 5.4 ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ QRA ํ”Œ๋žซํผ์— ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ํ•œ ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€ ์ ˆ์ฐจ 121 5.4.1 ์ดˆ๊ธฐ ์„ค๊ณ„ ๋‹จ๊ณ„์—์„œ์˜ ๋ถ„์„ ์ ˆ์ฐจ 123 5.4.2 ์ƒ์„ธ ์„ค๊ณ„ ๋‹จ๊ณ„์—์„œ์˜ ๋ถ„์„ ์ ˆ์ฐจ 126 5.4.3 ์„ค๋น„ ์šด์˜ ๋‹จ๊ณ„์—์„œ์˜ ๋ถ„์„ ์ ˆ์ฐจ 129 6. ์‚ฌ๋ก€ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ 132 6.1 ์‚ฌ๋ก€ 1 : ๊ฐ€์Šค์‹œ์„ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์›น๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ QRA ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ตฌ์ถ•๊ณผ ์ ์šฉ 134 6.1.1 ์ ์šฉ ๊ฐœ์š” 134 6.1.2 ์ฒœ์—ฐ๊ฐ€์Šค ๊ณต๊ธ‰์‹œ์„ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ดํ•ด์™€ ARHSP ์ž‘์„ฑ ์‚ฌ์ „ ์ค€๋น„ 136 6.1.3 ๊ฐ€์Šค ๊ณต๊ธ‰์‹œ์„ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ QRA ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ตฌ์ถ• 144 6.1.4 ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ์ ์šฉ๊ณผ ๊ณ ์ฐฐ 149 6.2 ์‚ฌ๋ก€ 2 : ์œ ์—ฐํ•œ ARHSP ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์„ ๊ฐ€์ง„ ์›น๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ LNG ํ”Œ๋žœํŠธ ์ •๋Ÿ‰์  ์œ„ํ—˜์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ตฌ์ถ•๊ณผ ์ ์šฉ 152 6.2.1 ์ ์šฉ ๊ฐœ์š” 152 6.2.2 LNG ์ธ์ˆ˜์‹œ์„ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ดํ•ด์™€ ARHSP ์ž‘์„ฑ ์‚ฌ์ „ ์ค€๋น„ 153 6.2.3 ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ตฌ์ถ•๊ณผ ์ ์šฉ 161 6.2.4 ํ™œ์šฉ ๋ฐ ๊ณ ์ฐฐ 169 7. ๊ฒฐ๋ก  ๋ฐ ์ œ์•ˆ์‚ฌํ•ญ 172 7.1 ๊ฒฐ๋ก  ๋ฐ ๊ธฐ์—ฌ 172 7.2 ์ œ์•ˆ ์‚ฌํ•ญ 178 ์ฐธ๊ณ ๋ฌธํ—Œ 181 ์˜๋ฌธ ์š”์•ฝ์„œ 192Docto

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    Cascading events triggering industrial accidents: quantitative assessment of NaTech and domino scenarios

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    The so called cascading events, which lead to high-impact low-frequency scenarios are rising concern worldwide. A chain of events result in a major industrial accident with dreadful (and often unpredicted) consequences. Cascading events can be the result of the realization of an external threat, like a terrorist attack a natural disaster or of โ€œdomino effectโ€. During domino events the escalation of a primary accident is driven by the propagation of the primary event to nearby units, causing an overall increment of the accident severity and an increment of the risk associated to an industrial installation. Also natural disasters, like intense flooding, hurricanes, earthquake and lightning are found capable to enhance the risk of an industrial area, triggering loss of containment of hazardous materials and in major accidents. The scientific community usually refers to those accidents as โ€œNaTechsโ€: natural events triggering industrial accidents. In this document, a state of the art of available approaches to the modelling, assessment, prevention and management of domino and NaTech events is described. On the other hand, the relevant work carried out during past studies still needs to be consolidated and completed, in order to be applicable in a real industrial framework. New methodologies, developed during my research activity, aimed at the quantitative assessment of domino and NaTech accidents are presented. The tools and methods provided within this very study had the aim to assist the progress toward a consolidated and universal methodology for the assessment and prevention of cascading events, contributing to enhance safety and sustainability of the chemical and process industry
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