Long-Run Equilibrium Modeling of Alternative Emissions Allowance Allocation Systems in Electric Power Markets

A question in the design of carbon dioxide trading systems is how allowances are to be initially allocated: by auction, by giving away fixed amounts, or by allocating based on output, fuel, or other decisions. The latter system can bias investment, operations, and pricing decisions, and increase costs relative to other systems. A nonlinear complementarity model is used to investigate long-run equilibria that would result under alternative systems for power markets characterized by time varying demand and multiple generation technologies. Existence of equilibria is shown under mild conditions. Solutions show that allocating allowances to new capacity based on fuel use or generator type can distort generation mixes, invert the operating order of power plants, and inflate consumer costs. The distortions can be smaller for tighter CO2 restrictions, and are somewhat mitigated if there are also electricity capacity markets or minimum-run restrictions on coal plants

Allocation and Leakage in Regional Cap-And-Trade Markets for CO2

The allocation or assignment of emissions allowances is among the most contentious elements of the design of emissions trading systems. �Policy-makers usually try to satisfy a range of goals through the allocation process, including easing the transition costs for high-emissions firms, reducing leakage to unregulated regions, and mitigating the impact of the regulations on product prices such as electricity. �In this paper we develop a detailed representation of the US western electricity market to assess the potential impacts of various allocation proposals. �Several proposals involve the ``updating'' of allowance allocation, where the allocation is tied to the ongoing output of plants. �These allocation proposals are designed with the goals of limiting the pass-through of carbon costs to product prices, mitigating leakage, and of mitigating the costs to high-emissions firms. �However, �some forms of allocation updating can also inflate allowance prices, thereby limiting the benefits of such schemes to high emissions firms. � Thus, the anticipated benefits from allocation updating can be diluted and further distortions introduced into the trading system.electricity markets; Cap-and-Trade; Emissions Leakage

Distributional Impacts of a U.S. Greenhouse Gas Policy: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Carbon Pricing

Abstract and PDF report are also available on the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://globalchange.mit.edu/).We develop a new model of the U.S., the U.S. Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model that is resolved for large states and regions of the U.S. and by income class and apply the model to investigate a $15 per ton CO2 equivalent price on greenhouse gas emissions. Previous estimates of distributional impacts of carbon pricing have been done outside of the model simulation and have been based on energy expenditure patterns of households in different regions and of different income levels. By estimating distributional effects within the economic model, we include the effects of changes in capital returns and wages on distribution and find that the effects are significant and work against the expenditure effects. We find the following: First, while results based only on energy expenditure have shown carbon pricing to be regressive we find the full distributional effect to be neutral or slightly progressive. This demonstrates the importance of tracing through all economic impacts and not just focusing on spending side impacts. Second, the ultimate impact of such a policy on households depends on how allowances, or the revenue raised from auctioning them, is used. Free distribution to firms would be highly regressive, benefiting higher income households and forcing lower income households to bear the full cost of the policy and what amounts to a transfer of wealth to higher income households. Lump sum distribution through equal-sized household rebates would make lower income households absolutely better off while shifting the costs to higher income households. Schemes that would cut taxes are generally slightly regressive but improve somewhat the overall efficiency of the program. Third, proposed legislation would distribute allowances to local distribution companies (electricity and natural gas distributors) and public utility commissions would then determine how the value of those allowances was used. A significant risk in such a plan is that distribution to households might be perceived as lowering utility rates That reduced the efficiency of the policy we examined by 40 percent. Finally, the states on the coasts bear little cost or can benefit because of the distribution of allowance revenue while mid-America and southern states bear the highest costs. This regional pattern reflects energy consumption and energy production difference among states. Use of allowance revenue to cut taxes generally exacerbates these regional differences because coastal states are also generally higher income states, and those with higher incomes benefit more from tax cuts.MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change through a combination of government, industry, and foundation funding, the MIT Energy Initiative, and additional support for this work from a coalition of industrial sponsors

The environment as a factor of production

The authors develop a model of environmental resource use in production with an empirical analysis of how electric power companies consume and bank sulfur dioxide pollution permits. The model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed inputs of permits and capital. Incorporating information from permit markets allows the authors to distinguish between user costs and asset shadow values. Their findings indicate that firms are holding stocks of pollution permits for reasons other than short-term cost savings. The results also reveal substantial substitution possibilities between emissions, permits stocks, and other factors of production. The authors speculate that anticipated secondary markets for carbon-offset inventories related to the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol will have similar effects for greenhouse-gas emitting firms.Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Environmental Economics&Policies,Montreal Protocol,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Energy and Environment,Carbon Policy and Trading,Montreal Protocol

Economics of Pollution Trading for SO2 and NOx

For years economists have urged policymakers to use market-based approaches such as cap-and-trade programs or emission taxes to control pollution. The SO2 allowance market created by Title IV of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments represents the first real test of the wisdom of economists’ advice. Subsequent urban and regional applications of NOx emission allowance trading took shape in the 1990s in the United States, culminating in a second large experiment in emission trading in the eastern United States that began in 2003. This paper provides an overview of the economic rationale for emission trading and a description of the major U.S. programs for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). We evaluate these programs along measures of performance including cost savings, environmental integrity, and incentives for technological innovation. We offer lessons for the design of future programs including, most importantly, those reducing carbon dioxide.sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, emission trading, power plants, air pollution

The European Carbon Market in Action: Lessons from the First Trading Period Interim Report

Abstract and PDF report are also available on the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://globalchange.mit.edu/).The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest greenhouse gas market ever established. The European Union is leading the world's first effort to mobilize market forces to tackle climate change. A precise analysis of the EU ETS's performance is essential to its success, as well as to that of future trading programs. The research program "The European Carbon Market in Action: Lessons from the First Trading Period," aims to provide such an analysis. It was launched at the end of 2006 by an international team led by Frank Convery, Christian De Perthuis and Denny Ellerman. This interim report presents the researchers' findings to date. It was prepared after the research program's second workshop, held in Washington DC in January 2008. The first workshop was held in Paris in April 2007. Two additional workshops will be held in Prague in June 2008 and in Paris in September 2008. The researchers' complete analysis will be published at the beginning of 2009.The research program “The European Carbon Market in Action: Lessons from the First Trading Period” has been made possible thanks to the support of: Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, BlueNext, EDF, Euronext, Orbeo, Suez, Total, Veolia

The valuation of clean spread options: linking electricity, emissions and fuels

The purpose of the paper is to present a new pricing method for clean spread options, and to illustrate its main features on a set of numerical examples produced by a dedicated computer code. The novelty of the approach is embedded in the use of a structural model as opposed to reduced-form models which fail to capture properly the fundamental dependencies between the economic factors entering the production process

Space and Time: Wind in an Investment Planning Model

Investment planning models inform investment decisions and government policies. Current models do not capture the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources, restricting the applicability of the models for high penetrations of renewables. We provide a methodology to capture spatial variation in wind output in combination with transmission constraints. The representation of wind distributions with stochastic approaches or an extensive historic data set would exceed computational constraints for real world application. Hence we restrict the amount of input data, and use boot-strapping to illustrate the robustness of the results. For the UK power system we model wind deployment and the value of transmission capacity

The EU ETS: CO2 prices drivers during the learning experience (2005-2007)

This chapter identifies the main price drivers of European Union Allowances (EUAs), valid for compliance under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) created in 2005 to regulate CO2 emissions of more than 10,000 high carbon-intensive installations across Member States. Based on key design features of the EU ETS, this chapter develops carbon pricing strategies based on allowances supply and demand, institutional decisions, and the influence of other energy markets and weather conditions. Finally, we discuss the likely effects on economic growth on CO2 emissions and carbon prices as a by product. The discussions developed in this chapter focus on Phase I (2005-2007) of the EU ETS, which may described as the “pilot” period for the future development of this environmental market scheme.EU ETS; Cap-and-Trade Program; Climate Change Policy; CO2 Price; Energy Markets; Weather Influences; Institutional Influences; Energy Policy