Fair Coexistence of Scheduled and Random Access Wireless Networks: Unlicensed LTE/WiFi

We study the fair coexistence of scheduled and random access transmitters sharing the same frequency channel. Interest in coexistence is topical due to the need for emerging unlicensed LTE technologies to coexist fairly with WiFi. However, this interest is not confined to LTE/WiFi as coexistence is likely to become increasingly commonplace in IoT networks and beyond 5G. In this article we show that mixing scheduled and random access incurs and inherent throughput/delay cost, the cost of heterogeneity. We derive the joint proportional fair rate allocation, which casts useful light on current LTE/WiFi discussions. We present experimental results on inter-technology detection and consider the impact of imperfect carrier sensing.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures, journa

Survey of Spectrum Sharing for Inter-Technology Coexistence

Increasing capacity demands in emerging wireless technologies are expected to be met by network densification and spectrum bands open to multiple technologies. These will, in turn, increase the level of interference and also result in more complex inter-technology interactions, which will need to be managed through spectrum sharing mechanisms. Consequently, novel spectrum sharing mechanisms should be designed to allow spectrum access for multiple technologies, while efficiently utilizing the spectrum resources overall. Importantly, it is not trivial to design such efficient mechanisms, not only due to technical aspects, but also due to regulatory and business model constraints. In this survey we address spectrum sharing mechanisms for wireless inter-technology coexistence by means of a technology circle that incorporates in a unified, system-level view the technical and non-technical aspects. We thus systematically explore the spectrum sharing design space consisting of parameters at different layers. Using this framework, we present a literature review on inter-technology coexistence with a focus on wireless technologies with equal spectrum access rights, i.e. (i) primary/primary, (ii) secondary/secondary, and (iii) technologies operating in a spectrum commons. Moreover, we reflect on our literature review to identify possible spectrum sharing design solutions and performance evaluation approaches useful for future coexistence cases. Finally, we discuss spectrum sharing design challenges and suggest future research directions

The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical and Economic Perspective

The traditional system of radio spectrum allocation has inefficiently restricted wireless services. Alternatively, liberal licenses ceding de facto spectrum ownership rights yield incentives for operators to maximize airwave value. These authorizations have been widely used for mobile services in the U.S. and internationally, leading to the development of highly productive services and waves of innovation in technology, applications and business models. Serious challenges to the efficacy of such a spectrum regime have arisen, however. Seeing the widespread adoption of such devices as cordless phones and wi-fi radios using bands set aside for unlicensed use, some scholars and policy makers posit that spectrum sharing technologies have become cheap and easy to deploy, mitigating airwave scarcity and, therefore, the utility of exclusive rights. This paper evaluates such claims technically and economically. We demonstrate that spectrum scarcity is alive and well. Costly conflicts over airwave use not only continue, but have intensified with scientific advances that dramatically improve the functionality of wireless devices and so increase demand for spectrum access. Exclusive ownership rights help direct spectrum inputs to where they deliver the highest social gains, making exclusive property rules relatively more socially valuable. Liberal licenses efficiently accommodate rival business models (including those commonly associated with unlicensed spectrum allocations) while mitigating the constraints levied on spectrum use by regulators imposing restrictions in traditional licenses or via use rules and technology standards in unlicensed spectrum allocations.

Comprehensive survey on quality of service provisioning approaches in cognitive radio networks : part one

Much interest in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) has been raised recently by enabling unlicensed (secondary) users to utilize the unused portions of the licensed spectrum. CRN utilization of residual spectrum bands of Primary (licensed) Networks (PNs) must avoid harmful interference to the users of PNs and other overlapping CRNs. The coexisting of CRNs depends on four components: Spectrum Sensing, Spectrum Decision, Spectrum Sharing, and Spectrum Mobility. Various approaches have been proposed to improve Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning in CRNs within fluctuating spectrum availability. However, CRN implementation poses many technical challenges due to a sporadic usage of licensed spectrum bands, which will be increased after deploying CRNs. Unlike traditional surveys of CRNs, this paper addresses QoS provisioning approaches of CRN components and provides an up-to-date comprehensive survey of the recent improvement in these approaches. Major features of the open research challenges of each approach are investigated. Due to the extensive nature of the topic, this paper is the first part of the survey which investigates QoS approaches on spectrum sensing and decision components respectively. The remaining approaches of spectrum sharing and mobility components will be investigated in the next part

A Hierarchical Spectrum Access Scheme for TV White Space Coexistence in Hetergeneous Networks

Among current techniques for dynamic access to television (TV) white space (TVWS), geolocation database-based access provides a promising performance in protecting the TV-band incumbents from interference that cannot be efficiently achieved in other license-exempt models. However, in heterogeneous wireless networks, most portable devices do not have such access and may cause interference to TV incumbents. We propose a hierarchical model for spectrum sharing in TVWS that includes a wide range of fixed and portable devices. In the first tier, the TV broadcaster can lease the spectrum bands to local fixed users based on a soft license agreement. The fixed users are allowed to share access to this spectrum with some mobile users in their proximity in exchange for cooperative relaying. We consider a practical scenario, where only partial channel state information (CSI) is available at the users\u27 transmitters, and we propose a robust algorithm against such uncertainties in CSI values. We also propose a reputation-based relay selection mechanism to identify selfish portable users. The proposed spectrum sharing framework can provide a practical model for TVWS-coexistence that prevents undesired interference to the incumbents while restricting interference among the unlicensed devices. The simulation results show the enhancement of fixed users\u27 rate compared with alternative relay selection methods

Spectrum utilization using game theory

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.Spectrum utilization is the most recent communications issue which takes great deal of attention from communication researchers where most of the efforts have been dedicated for spectral efficient utilization. Spectrum sharing is one of the solutions considered in the problem of lack of available frequency for new communication services which are unlicensed. In this work we propose an optimal method for spectrum utilization to increase spectral efficiency. It considers the problem of spectrum holes found in Primary User's (PU) band and detected using one of the spectral sensing methods. The solution is formulated with the help of Game theory approach in such a way that the primary user who has unoccupied frequency can share it with a group of secondary users (SU) in a competitive way. One of the SUs will be a secondary primary user (SPU), share available frequency from PU then offer his sharing to serve other SUs in different rate of sharing. Each user in the group of secondary users has a chance to be secondary primary user depending on reputation of each SU. Enhancing reputation is the only way for any SU to assure a share in the spectrum where it considered the factor of increasing or decreasing rate of sharing as well as factor of being SPU or an ordinary SU. A theoretical non-cooperative game model is introduced in a comparison with a proposed non-dynamic technique which depends on number of subscribers who occupy frequency in each time period. Multi-users compete on sharing the frequency from one of the users who offers sharing at a time when he has low number of subscribers that occupy his band. It is found that non-dynamic sharing results in inefficient spectrum utilization which is one of the reasons of spectrum scarcity where this resource is allocated in fixed way. Spectrum sharing using game theory solves this problem by its ability to make users compete to gain highest rate of spectrum allocation according to the real requirement of each user at each time interval. The problem of urgent case is also discussed when the primary user comes back to using his band which is the specific band of sharing with the secondary users group. SPU makes it easy to unload the required band from multi-users because PU does not need to request his band from each SU in the group