An Improved Upper Bound for the Ring Loading Problem

The Ring Loading Problem emerged in the 1990s to model an important special case of telecommunication networks (SONET rings) which gained attention from practitioners and theorists alike. Given an undirected cycle on $n$ nodes together with non-negative demands between any pair of nodes, the Ring Loading Problem asks for an unsplittable routing of the demands such that the maximum cumulated demand on any edge is minimized. Let $L$ be the value of such a solution. In the relaxed version of the problem, each demand can be split into two parts where the first part is routed clockwise while the second part is routed counter-clockwise. Denote with $L^*$ the maximum load of a minimum split routing solution. In a landmark paper, Schrijver, Seymour and Winkler [SSW98] showed that $L \leq L^* + 1.5D$, where $D$ is the maximum demand value. They also found (implicitly) an instance of the Ring Loading Problem with $L = L^* + 1.01D$. Recently, Skutella [Sku16] improved these bounds by showing that $L \leq L^* + \frac{19}{14}D$, and there exists an instance with $L = L^* + 1.1D$. We contribute to this line of research by showing that $L \leq L^* + 1.3D$. We also take a first step towards lower and upper bounds for small instances

The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two

We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.Comment: Full version of WINE 2012 paper, 24 page

Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing

We study the asymmetric atomic selfish routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical applications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency of source-destination node-pairs over links with linear latencies. We obtain the first constant upper bound on the price of anarchy and significantly improve the existing upper bounds on the price of stability. Moreover, we show that any optimal solution is a good approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present better performance analysis and fast implementation of pseudo-polynomial algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria