On horizontal cooperation in linear production processes with a supplier that controls a limited resource

In this paper we consider a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier that controls a limited resource and a finite set of manufacturers who need to purchase this resource. We analyze the effect of the limited resource on the horizontal cooperation of manufacturers. To this end, we use cooperative game theory and the existence of stable distributions of the total profit among the manufacturers as a measure of the possibilities of cooperation. The game theoretical model that describes the horizontal cooperation involves externalities, which arise because of the possible scarcity of the limited resource and the possible coalition structures that can be formed. Furthermore, manufacturers do not know how the supplier will allocate the limited resource, therefore, how much of this resource they will obtain is uncertain for all concerned. Nevertheless, when the limited resource is not scarce for the grand coalition, the existence of stable distributions of the total profit is guaranteed and consequently the collaboration among the manufacturers is profitable for them all. In the event that the limited resource is insufficient for the grand coalition, we introduce a new cooperative game that assesses the expectations of each coalition of manufacturers regarding the amount of the limited resource they can obtain. We analyze two extreme expectations: the optimistic and the pessimistic. In the optimistic case, we cannot reach a conclusion regarding the full cooperation of the manufacturers. In the pessimistic case, with one reasonable assumption, the existence of stable distributions of the total profit is guaranteed and as a result the collaboration among manufacturers is a win–win deal.Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-54199-PMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-3-PFundación Séneca | Ref. 19320/PI/1

Contributions to Game Theory and Management. Vol. III. Collected papers presented on the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management.

The collection contains papers accepted for the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 24-26, 2009, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.

Linear production games with fuzzy control

The aim of this paper is to analyse linear production with committee control situations arising when controllers face the possibility of graduating their options. In order to model these situations, we consider several kinds of fuzzy controls, which can be modelled as different simple fuzzy games. An LP-game which is an extension of LP-games with committee control introduced in Curiel et al. [on balanced games and games with committee control, OR Spectrum 11 (1989) 83-88] is obtained and its core is studied