Submodular Welfare Maximization

An overview of different variants of the submodular welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In particular, I studied the existing algorithmic and game theoretic results for submodular welfare maximization problem and its applications in other areas such as social networks

A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem

We propose a truthful-in-expectation, $(1-1/e)$-approximation mechanism for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP). In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the capacity of any singular bin. In the strategic variant of the problem we study, values for assigning items to bins are the private information of bidders and the mechanism should provide bidders with incentives to truthfully report their values. The approximation ratio of the mechanism is a significant improvement over the approximation ratio of the existing truthful mechanism for GAP. The proposed mechanism comprises a novel convex optimization program as the allocation rule as well as an appropriate payment rule. To implement the convex program in polynomial time, we propose a fractional local search algorithm which approximates the optimal solution within an arbitrarily small error leading to an approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism. The presented algorithm improves upon the existing optimization algorithms for GAP in terms of simplicity and runtime while the approximation ratio closely matches the best approximation ratio given for GAP when all inputs are publicly known.Comment: 18 pages, Earlier version accepted at WINE 201

Locally Adaptive Optimization: Adaptive Seeding for Monotone Submodular Functions

The Adaptive Seeding problem is an algorithmic challenge motivated by influence maximization in social networks: One seeks to select among certain accessible nodes in a network, and then select, adaptively, among neighbors of those nodes as they become accessible in order to maximize a global objective function. More generally, adaptive seeding is a stochastic optimization framework where the choices in the first stage affect the realizations in the second stage, over which we aim to optimize. Our main result is a $(1-1/e)^2$-approximation for the adaptive seeding problem for any monotone submodular function. While adaptive policies are often approximated via non-adaptive policies, our algorithm is based on a novel method we call \emph{locally-adaptive} policies. These policies combine a non-adaptive global structure, with local adaptive optimizations. This method enables the $(1-1/e)^2$-approximation for general monotone submodular functions and circumvents some of the impossibilities associated with non-adaptive policies. We also introduce a fundamental problem in submodular optimization that may be of independent interest: given a ground set of elements where every element appears with some small probability, find a set of expected size at most $k$ that has the highest expected value over the realization of the elements. We show a surprising result: there are classes of monotone submodular functions (including coverage) that can be approximated almost optimally as the probability vanishes. For general monotone submodular functions we show via a reduction from \textsc{Planted-Clique} that approximations for this problem are not likely to be obtainable. This optimization problem is an important tool for adaptive seeding via non-adaptive policies, and its hardness motivates the introduction of \emph{locally-adaptive} policies we use in the main result

Reallocation Mechanisms

We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to redistribute resources among agents to maximize efficiency. Monetary transfers are allowed, but participation is voluntary. We develop incentive-compatible, individually-rational and budget balanced mechanisms for several classic settings, including bilateral trade, partnership dissolving, Arrow-Debreu markets, and combinatorial exchanges. All our mechanisms (except one) provide a constant approximation to the optimal efficiency in these settings, even in ones where the preferences of the agents are complex multi-parameter functions

The Limitations of Optimization from Samples

In this paper we consider the following question: can we optimize objective functions from the training data we use to learn them? We formalize this question through a novel framework we call optimization from samples (OPS). In OPS, we are given sampled values of a function drawn from some distribution and the objective is to optimize the function under some constraint. While there are interesting classes of functions that can be optimized from samples, our main result is an impossibility. We show that there are classes of functions which are statistically learnable and optimizable, but for which no reasonable approximation for optimization from samples is achievable. In particular, our main result shows that there is no constant factor approximation for maximizing coverage functions under a cardinality constraint using polynomially-many samples drawn from any distribution. We also show tight approximation guarantees for maximization under a cardinality constraint of several interesting classes of functions including unit-demand, additive, and general monotone submodular functions, as well as a constant factor approximation for monotone submodular functions with bounded curvature

Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices

We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing her favorite bundle from among the unsold items at the posted prices. These mechanisms are simple, transparent and trivially dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). We show that when agent preferences are fractionally subadditive (which includes all submodular functions), there always exist prices that, in expectation, obtain at least half of the optimal welfare. Our result is constructive: given black-box access to a combinatorial auction algorithm A, sample access to the prior distribution, and appropriate query access to the sampled valuations, one can compute, in polytime, prices that guarantee at least half of the expected welfare of A. As a corollary, we obtain the first polytime (in n and m) constant-factor DSIC mechanism for Bayesian submodular combinatorial auctions, given access to demand query oracles. Our results also extend to valuations with complements, where the approximation factor degrades linearly with the level of complementarity

Learning Coverage Functions and Private Release of Marginals

We study the problem of approximating and learning coverage functions. A function $c: 2^{[n]} \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^{+}$ is a coverage function, if there exists a universe $U$ with non-negative weights $w(u)$ for each $u \in U$ and subsets $A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n$ of $U$ such that $c(S) = \sum_{u \in \cup_{i \in S} A_i} w(u)$. Alternatively, coverage functions can be described as non-negative linear combinations of monotone disjunctions. They are a natural subclass of submodular functions and arise in a number of applications. We give an algorithm that for any $\gamma,\delta>0$, given random and uniform examples of an unknown coverage function $c$, finds a function $h$ that approximates $c$ within factor $1+\gamma$ on all but $\delta$-fraction of the points in time $poly(n,1/\gamma,1/\delta)$. This is the first fully-polynomial algorithm for learning an interesting class of functions in the demanding PMAC model of Balcan and Harvey (2011). Our algorithms are based on several new structural properties of coverage functions. Using the results in (Feldman and Kothari, 2014), we also show that coverage functions are learnable agnostically with excess $\ell_1$-error $\epsilon$ over all product and symmetric distributions in time $n^{\log(1/\epsilon)}$. In contrast, we show that, without assumptions on the distribution, learning coverage functions is at least as hard as learning polynomial-size disjoint DNF formulas, a class of functions for which the best known algorithm runs in time $2^{\tilde{O}(n^{1/3})}$ (Klivans and Servedio, 2004). As an application of our learning results, we give simple differentially-private algorithms for releasing monotone conjunction counting queries with low average error. In particular, for any $k \leq n$, we obtain private release of $k$-way marginals with average error $\bar{\alpha}$ in time $n^{O(\log(1/\bar{\alpha}))}$