Bargaining in Patent Licensing Negotiations under Stochastic Environments: An Experimental Study

Experiments of a bargaining game between licensors and licensees were conducted. The main treatment is to introduce a “second-chance” negotiation for licensors in a context of ultimatum game. The experimental results reveal that the introduction of the “second-chance” negotiation for licensors has significant impacts on behaviors of the licensors and licensees. This “second-chance” negotiation for licensors essentially increases the average offers made by the licensees, expected willingness-to-accept of the licensors, and offers accepted by the licensors. The market efficiency of patent transaction is improved since the rates of acceptance are strikingly raised. The licensors would be the main beneficiary with this additional opportunity

Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction

The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to signal strength through their bids, to the benefit of the innovator. In the present paper we examine whether revealing the winning bid is optimal. We consider three disclosure rules: full, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases the total surplus divided between firms and the innovator as well as social surplus. More disclosure also increases bidders’ payoff. However, no disclosure maximizes the innovator’s expected revenue

Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction

The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to signal strength through their bids, to the benefit of the innovator. In the present paper we examine whether revealing the winning bid is optimal. We consider three disclosure rules: full, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases the total surplus divided between firms and the innovator as well as social surplus. More disclosure also increases bidders’ payoff. However, no disclosure maximizes the innovator’s expected revenue

Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices, Vol. 1

Prepared by and for policy-makers, leaders of public sector research establishments, technology transfer professionals, licensing executives, and scientists, this online resource offers up-to-date information and strategies for utilizing the power of both intellectual property and the public domain. Emphasis is placed on advancing innovation in health and agriculture, though many of the principles outlined here are broadly applicable across technology fields. Eschewing ideological debates and general proclamations, the authors always keep their eye on the practical side of IP management. The site is based on a comprehensive Handbook and Executive Guide that provide substantive discussions and analysis of the opportunities awaiting anyone in the field who wants to put intellectual property to work. This multi-volume work contains 153 chapters on a full range of IP topics and over 50 case studies, composed by over 200 authors from North, South, East, and West. If you are a policymaker, a senior administrator, a technology transfer manager, or a scientist, we invite you to use the companion site guide available at http://www.iphandbook.org/index.html The site guide distills the key points of each IP topic covered by the Handbook into simple language and places it in the context of evolving best practices specific to your professional role within the overall picture of IP management

Innovation Systems, Radical Transformation, Step-by-Step: India in Light of China

The paper introduces a reform trajectory we call ?revolutionary incrementalism? in which partial and incremental measures add up to profound transformation. Recent advances in economic theory demonstrate that growth is not hard to start: it almost starts itself, somewhere, sometimes. But keeping it going is not easy: doing so requires attention to the context of growth binding constraints and situation-specific ways to resolve them. The same goes for institutions: it is almost always possible to find some that are working. The issue is using the ones that work to improve those that don?t. The thrust of the proposal is to rely on variation within existing institutions as the ?Archimedean lever? with which to leverage reform and change. India?s public sector record for implementing and coordinating innovation efforts can be notoriously fragmented and inefficient but there are some parts that perform better than others, and there are recognized pockets of excellence virtually within every ministry or public sector organization. The same internal diversity is even more visible in the private sector. Importantly from a policy perspective, better performing segments of public sector and better performing segments of productive sector are beginning to join forces in a variety of search ...innovation systems, heterogeneity of institutions, radical incrementalism, search networks, open economy industrial policy

Prizes for innovation

The use of prizes to stimulate innovation in education has dramatically increased in recent years, but, to date, no organization has attempted to critically examine the impact these prizes have had on education. This report attempts to fill this gap by conducting a landscape review of education prizes with a focus on technology innovation. This report critically analyses the diversity of education prizes to gauge the extent to which these new funding mechanisms lead to innovative solutions in this sector. This is supplemented with interviews with sponsors and prize participants to gain the much needed practitioner’s perspective. We address important questions that pervade as prizes are being implemented in this sector: What seems to be working and why? How do prizes compare to other funding mechanisms to stimulate technology innovations? How is sustainability achieved? What can be learned that can inform the design of future prizes? A number of important assumptions are re-examined, namely, that technology innovation is central to educational reform, prizes stimulate innovation, scalability is a proxy for sustainability, and prizes are the most efficient funding mechanism to stimulate innovation. We recalibrate expectations of technology innovation prizes in the educational field against empirical evidence. We reveal key trends through the deploying of prizes in this field and offer case studies as good practices for sponsors to consider when designing future prizes. The report makes recommendations to enhance the impact of prizes, drawing from interdisciplinary sources. The intent of this report is to enable sponsors to distinguish the hype surrounding these prizes and proceed to design prizes that can best serve the education sector

America's Basic Research: Prosperity Through Discovery

This report focuses on basic research -- the experimental or theoretical work intended to advance science and engineering knowledge rather than develop a specific product or process. CED recommends policy reforms to ensure that tomorrow's basic research can be as productive and effective as possible. The recommendations address Congress' procedures for allocating funds for basic research, the central role of the research university and the individual scientific investigator, the critical importance of peer review, the need to sustain the pipeline of high-quality scientists and engineers for the long-term, and the implications of an increasingly global research enterprise