A Combinatorial, Strongly Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Minimizing Submodular Functions

This paper presents the first combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for minimizing submodular set functions, answering an open question posed in 1981 by Grotschel, Lovasz, and Schrijver. The algorithm employs a scaling scheme that uses a flow in the complete directed graph on the underlying set with each arc capacity equal to the scaled parameter. The resulting algorithm runs in time bounded by a polynomial in the size of the underlying set and the largest length of the function value. The paper also presents a strongly polynomial-time version that runs in time bounded by a polynomial in the size of the underlying set independent of the function value.Comment: 17 page

Duality between Feature Selection and Data Clustering

The feature-selection problem is formulated from an information-theoretic perspective. We show that the problem can be efficiently solved by an extension of the recently proposed info-clustering paradigm. This reveals the fundamental duality between feature selection and data clustering,which is a consequence of the more general duality between the principal partition and the principal lattice of partitions in combinatorial optimization

Envy-freeness and maximum Nash welfare for mixed divisible and indivisible goods

We study fair allocation of resources consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations. When only divisible or indivisible goods exist, it is known that an allocation that achieves the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) satisfies the classic fairness notions based on envy. In addition, properties of the MNW allocations for binary valuations are known. In this paper, we show that when all agents' valuations are binary and linear for each good, an MNW allocation for mixed goods satisfies the envy-freeness up to any good for mixed goods. This notion is stronger than an existing one called envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), and our result generalizes the existing results for the case when only divisible or indivisible goods exist. Moreover, our result holds for a general fairness notion based on minimizing a symmetric strictly convex function. For the general additive valuations, we also provide a formal proof that an MNW allocation satisfies a weaker notion than EFM

Reflection methods for user-friendly submodular optimization

Recently, it has become evident that submodularity naturally captures widely occurring concepts in machine learning, signal processing and computer vision. Consequently, there is need for efficient optimization procedures for submodular functions, especially for minimization problems. While general submodular minimization is challenging, we propose a new method that exploits existing decomposability of submodular functions. In contrast to previous approaches, our method is neither approximate, nor impractical, nor does it need any cumbersome parameter tuning. Moreover, it is easy to implement and parallelize. A key component of our method is a formulation of the discrete submodular minimization problem as a continuous best approximation problem that is solved through a sequence of reflections, and its solution can be easily thresholded to obtain an optimal discrete solution. This method solves both the continuous and discrete formulations of the problem, and therefore has applications in learning, inference, and reconstruction. In our experiments, we illustrate the benefits of our method on two image segmentation tasks.Comment: Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), \'Etats-Unis (2013

Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations

A group of players in a cooperative game are partners (e.g., as in the form of a union or a joint ownership) if the prospects for cooperation are restricted such that cooperation with players outside the partnership requires the accept of all the partners. The formation of such partnerships through binding agreements may change the game implying that players could have incentives to manipulate a game by forming or dissolving partnerships. The present paper seeks to explore the existence of allocation rules that are immune to this type of manipulation. An allocation rule that distributes the worth of the grand coalition among players, is called partnership formation-proof if it ensures that it is never jointly profitable for any group of players to form a partnership and partnership dissolution-proof if no group can ever profit from dissolving a partnership. The paper provides results on the existence of such allocation rules for general classes of games as well as more specific results concerning well known allocation rules.cooperative games; partnerships; partnership formation-proof; partnership dissolution-proof