Pervasive computing at tableside : a wireless web-based ordering system

Purpose &ndash; The purpose of this paper is to introduce a wireless web-based ordering system called iMenu in the restaurant industry. Design/methodology/approach &ndash; By using wireless devices such as personal digital assistants and WebPads, this system realizes the paradigm of pervasive computing at tableside. Detailed system requirements, design, implementation and evaluation of iMenu are presented.Findings &ndash; The evaluation of iMenu shows it explicitly increases productivity of restaurant staff. It also has other desirable features such as integration, interoperation and scalability. Compared to traditional restaurant ordering process, by using this system customers get faster and better services, restaurant staff cooperate more efficiently with less working mistakes, and enterprise owners thus receive more business profits. Originality/value &ndash; While many researchers have explored using wireless web-based information systems in different industries, this paper presents a system that employs wireless multi-tiered web-based architecture to build pervasive computing systems. Instead of discussing theoretical issues on pervasive computing, we focus on practical issues of developing a real system, such as choosing of web-based architecture, design of input methods in small screens, and response time in wireless web-based systems.<br /

Information Outlook, September 2004

Volume 8, Issue 9https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_io_2004/1008/thumbnail.jp

Information Outlook, September 2004

Volume 8, Issue 9https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_io_2004/1008/thumbnail.jp

Establishing a Central Archive for Transit Passenger Data

This report describes the rationale, background, establishing organization, and future steps of CATPAD, the Central Archive for Transit Passenger Data. The Central Archive for Transit Passenger Data is a repository that collects, indexes, archives, and makes available online the transit survey instruments, data, and reports collected across the country. This resource is unique in its focus on the disaggregated information of individual transit users – information that is critical for a range of transportation planning analyses. In addition, where available, CATPAD contains aggregated information, such as station boardings and service and fare schedules, to provide key context for the disaggregate person-level data. The Central Archive for Transit Passenger Data seeks to overcome the current impediments to accessing transit survey data by providing a single, searchable, internet archive to store and disseminate this valuable information. The Central Archive for Transit Passenger Data explicitly aims to expand the public return on the considerable investment made to gather transit passenger data. The resource is designed from the start to serve the needs of a range of use cases from transportation planners and policy makers to researchers and community advocates. The goal of CATPAD is to make useful data available to inform transit decision making at all levels and to foster ongoing refinement of the nation’s transit network

Information Outlook, September 2004

Volume 8, Issue 9https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_io_2004/1008/thumbnail.jp

A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes

Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear security systems face. All of the cases of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of the theft are known were perpetrated either by insiders or with the help of insiders; given that the other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they were perpetrated by insiders as well. Similarly, disgruntled workers from inside nuclear facilities have perpetrated many of the known incidents of nuclear sabotage. The most recent example of which we are aware is the apparent insider sabotage of a diesel generator at the San Onofre nuclear plant in the United States in 2012; the most spectacular was an incident three decades ago in which an insider placed explosives directly on the steel pressure vessel head of a nuclear reactor and then detonated them.While many such incidents, including the two just mentioned, appear to have been intended to send a message to management, not to spread radioactivity, they highlight the immense dangers that could arise from insiders with more malevolent intent. As it turns out, insiders perpetrate a large fraction of thefts from heavily guarded non-nuclear facilities as well. Yet organizations often find it difficult to understandand protect against insider threats. Why is this the case?Part of the answer is that there are deep organizational and cognitive biases that lead managers to downplay the threats insiders pose to their nuclear facilities and operations. But another part of the answer is that those managing nuclear security often have limited information about incidents that have happened in other countries or in other industries, and the lessons that might be learned from them.The IAEA and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) produce"best practices" guides as a way of disseminating ideas and procedures that have been identified as leading to improved security. Both have produced guides on protecting against insider threats.5 But sometimes mistakes are even moreinstructive than successes.Here, we are presenting a kind of "worst practices" guide of serious mistakes made in the past regarding insider threats. While each situation is unique, and serious insider problems are relatively rare, the incidents we describe reflect issues that exist in many contexts and that every nuclear security manager should consider. Common organizational practices -- such as prioritizing production over security, failure to share information across subunits, inadequate rules or inappropriate waiving of rules, exaggerated faith in group loyalty, and excessive focus on external threats -- can be seen in many past failures to protect against insider threats

Information Outlook, May 1997

Volume 1, Issue 5https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_io_1997/1004/thumbnail.jp