From Völkerpsychologie to Cultural Anthropology: Erich Rothacker’s Philosophy of Culture

Erich Rothacker (1888–1965) was a key figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy in Germany. In this paper, I examine the development of Rothacker’s philosophy of culture from 1907 to 1945. Rothacker began his philosophical career with a völkerpsychological dissertation on history, outlining his early biologistic conception of culture (1907–1913). In his mid-career work, he then turned to Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833–1911) Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life), advancing a hermeneutic approach to culture (1919–1928). In his later work (1929–1945), Rothacker developed a cultural anthropology. I shall argue that Rothacker’s later theory of culture retained key motifs of his earlier works. In this way, I trace central aspects of Rothacker’s reception of both Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie. The paper focuses on two aspects of Rothacker’s philosophical development that deserve more attention than they have received to date: his reception of Völkerpsychologie and the political character of his theories of culture. Rothacker’s theoretical work was closely connected to his political conservatism, which culminated in his engagement with National Socialism. The paper unearths problematic aspects of the legacy of Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie in early twentieth-century German thought

Psychologism And Its History Revalued

A hundred years ago Frege had published most of his arguments against psychologism and Husserl was busy writing his Logical Investigations, which was to appear at the turn of the century and open with a long onslaught on psychologism. The arguments of these two logicians against the psychologistic view - of Mill, Erdmann and many others - that the discipline of logic, its sentences, or its "laws", deal with psychological phenomena met with widespread approval from those best qualified to judge (for example Lukasiewicz). They set the agenda for most twentieth century work in exact, "scientific", or analytic philosophy. As the century draws to its close, many of the arguments of Frege and Husserl have been found wanting by analytic philosophers and cognitive scientists who are prepared to argue that the laws of logic are just laws of human thought

Cassirer and Steinthal on Expression and the Science of Language

Ernst Cassirer’s focus on the expressive function of language should be read, not in the context of Carnap’s debate with Heidegger, but in the context of the earlier work of Chajim (Heymann) Steinthal. Steinthal distinguishes the expressive form of language, when language is studied as a natural phenomenon, from language as a logical, inferential system. Steinthal argues that language always can be expressed in terms of logical inference. Thus, he would disagree with Heidegger, just as Carnap does. But, Steinthal insists, that is not to say that language, as a natural phenomenon, is exhausted by logic or by the place of terms or relations in inferential structures. Steinthal’s “form” of linguistic “expression” is an early version of Cassirer’s “expressive function” for language. The expressive function, then, should not be seen to place a barrier between Carnap and Cassirer. Rather, Steinthal and Cassirer deal with a question that, as far as I know, Carnap does not address directly: how should philosophers analyze human language as a natural phenomenon, as a part of our expression as animals? And how does that expression determine the semantic categories, kind terms, and other structures that develop within, and characterize, human language itself

Relativism in the Context of National Socialism

The aim of this chapter is to clarify the use and meaning of the concept of relativism in the context of National Socialism (NS). Section 1 examines the critical reproach that NS is a form of relativism. I analyze and criticize the common core of this widespread argument which has dominated discussions about the topic up to the present. Section 2 sketches the general debates on relativism before and during NS. I show that fascist thought could be associated with both relativism and anti-relativism. In contrast to the received view, I argue that Nazi intellectuals regarded relativism as problem, and presented NS as the overcoming of relativism. Subsequently I turn to two major philosophers who connected their philosophy with NS. Section 3 investigates Bruno Bauch’s (1887–1942) nationalist philosophy. I show that he linked his concept of the nation with an objectivist value theory intended to oppose all kinds of relativism. Section 4 turns to Erich Rothacker’s (1888–1965) cultural anthropology. I argue that the revision of his philosophical views in the 1930s was accompanied by a political turn towards NS and a withdrawal from relativism. The brief conclusion (Section 5) summarizes the findings of the chapter. I conclude that, in the context of NS, relativism is mostly used in a pejorative sense

Painting Philosophically in 20th Century Vienna: A Comparison of Gustav Klimt and Friedrich Nietzsche

When interpreting a work of art, it is not uncommon that the piece to be labeled philosophical, yet identifying the features which enable visual art to express philosophy is often troublesome. The scandal circling Gustav Klimt’s 1901 painting entitled “Philosophy” elucidates many of these concerns. Commissioned by the University of Vienna as a ceiling painting for the Great Hall, the painting was rejected based on its depiction of philosophical content as well as its form – the faculty expected a painting of philosophers engaged in critical thought and discourse which was done in the Italien Fresco style, but instead were presented with Klimt’s philosophy of life which was done in the then-radical style of the Viennese Seccession. For these reasons, the painting was rejected by the professors of the University of Vienna. Further, the painting is criticized today as a failure in that its style is not innovative enough and because of the painting’s alleged use of allegory; the use of symbol does not, according to the art historian, signify art, but rather instead allows the painting to function merely as a sign. However, Klimt’s “Philosophy” appeals to themes such as eternal recurrence and the struggle for freedom and authenticity found in contemporaneous texts such as Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which faced similar concerns of form in that it presents philosophical ideas in a modern and unprecedented fashion and lacks a clear argumentative structure as seen traditionally. By appeal to a formal analysis of Klimt’s “Philosophy”, a close reading of influential reviews of the painting, Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and contemporary philosophical theories of painting, I argue that one finds a new defense against the argument of “Philosophy” as merely a failed work, and that these parallels not only show “Philosophy” to be a valuable piece of art, but also demonstrate that “Philosophy” is in fact a historical philosophical work. Through this multi-dimensional analysis, I hope to show that through form, painting can express philosophy in a nuanced way which language and literature are unable to present.No embargoAcademic Major: Germa

Pfropfreiser der Moral in allen Gattungen der Literatur : Karl Philipp Moritz´ "Beiträge zur Philosophie des Lebens" und die Anfänge der Lebensphilosophie

Daß es neben dem unstrittigen Mittelmaß an lebenspraktischer Ratgeberliteratur auch originelle Traditionsbegründer gab, soll im folgenden am Beispiel von Karl Philipp Moritz gezeigt werden. Zwar wird er mit seinen Beiträgen zur Philosophie des Lebens als einer der frühesten Namensgeber für die Bewegung bis hinauf zum Lexikonartikel erwähnt, eine inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung fand aber bisher kaum statt. Ein gutes Beispiel dafür ist eine jüngere Darstellung zur Lebensphilosophie (1993) von Ferdinand Fellmann. In wenigen Zeilen wird Moritz´ Werk kurz erwähnt und hervorgehoben, daß er “psychologische Erkenntnisse mit pädagogischen Intentionen” verbinde. Schon im nächsten Absatz versieht ihn Fellmann aber mit dem Etikett “romantische Lebensphilosophie”, trotz der markierten Gegensätze gemeinsam mit Friedrich Schlegel, dem Verfasser von Vorlesungen zur Philosophie des Lebens (1827). Zusammen werden sie einer ersten Epoche zugerechnet, von der sich eine zweite radikal unterscheide, die erstmals mit Nietzsche, Bergson und Simmel zu einer “Theorie der Selbsterfahrung” ansetze. Gegen diese schroffe Entgegenstellung möchte ich aus zwei Gründen deutliche Kontinuitäten zwischen Moritz und der moderneren Lebensphiloso-phie betonen: Erstens sind seine Beiträge ein literarisch ambitioniertes Experiment mit Darstellungsformen, die sich ähnlich konträr zur akademischen Schulphilosophie der jeweiligen Zeit verhalten wie Schopenhauers Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit (1851) oder Nietzsches Menschliches, Allzu-menschliches (1878). Zweitens entfaltet Moritz in diesem Frühwerk Überlegungen zur Selbstbeobachtung, zu Selbstgefühl und Selbstreflexion, die das Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde sowie den Anton Reiser vorbereiten und letztlich durchaus zu einer “Theorie der Selbsterfahrung” in Fellmanns Sinne führen. Kaum zufällig haben die von ihm aufgebotenen Autoren sich gelegentlich auf Moritz berufen