The applicability of self-play algorithms to trading and forecasting financial markets

The central research question to answer in this study is whether the AI methodology of Self-Play can be applied to financial markets. In typical use-cases of Self-Play, two AI agents play against each other in a particular game, e.g., chess or Go. By repeatedly playing the game, they learn its rules as well as possible winning strategies. When considering financial markets, however, we usually have one player—the trader—that does not face one individual adversary but competes against a vast universe of other market participants. Furthermore, the optimal behaviour in financial markets is not described via a winning strategy, but via the objective of maximising profits while managing risks appropriately. Lastly, data issues cause additional challenges, since, in finance, they are quite often incomplete, noisy and difficult to obtain. We will show that academic research using Self-Play has mostly not focused on finance, and if it has, it was usually restricted to stock markets, not considering the large FX, commodities and bond markets. Despite those challenges, we see enormous potential of applying self-play concepts and algorithms to financial markets and economic forecasts

Use of Markov Chains to Design an Agent Bidding Strategy for Continuous Double Auctions

As computational agents are developed for increasingly complicated e-commerce applications, the complexity of the decisions they face demands advances in artificial intelligence techniques. For example, an agent representing a seller in an auction should try to maximize the seller's profit by reasoning about a variety of possibly uncertain pieces of information, such as the maximum prices various buyers might be willing to pay, the possible prices being offered by competing sellers, the rules by which the auction operates, the dynamic arrival and matching of offers to buy and sell, and so on. A naive application of multiagent reasoning techniques would require the seller's agent to explicitly model all of the other agents through an extended time horizon, rendering the problem intractable for many realistically-sized problems. We have instead devised a new strategy that an agent can use to determine its bid price based on a more tractable Markov chain model of the auction process. We have experimentally identified the conditions under which our new strategy works well, as well as how well it works in comparison to the optimal performance the agent could have achieved had it known the future. Our results show that our new strategy in general performs well, outperforming other tractable heuristic strategies in a majority of experiments, and is particularly effective in a 'seller?s market', where many buy offers are available