Reasoning About the Transfer of Control

We present DCL-PC: a logic for reasoning about how the abilities of agents and coalitions of agents are altered by transferring control from one agent to another. The logical foundation of DCL-PC is CL-PC, a logic for reasoning about cooperation in which the abilities of agents and coalitions of agents stem from a distribution of atomic Boolean variables to individual agents -- the choices available to a coalition correspond to assignments to the variables the coalition controls. The basic modal constructs of DCL-PC are of the form coalition C can cooperate to bring about phi. DCL-PC extends CL-PC with dynamic logic modalities in which atomic programs are of the form agent i gives control of variable p to agent j; as usual in dynamic logic, these atomic programs may be combined using sequence, iteration, choice, and test operators to form complex programs. By combining such dynamic transfer programs with cooperation modalities, it becomes possible to reason about how the power of agents and coalitions is affected by the transfer of control. We give two alternative semantics for the logic: a direct semantics, in which we capture the distributions of Boolean variables to agents; and a more conventional Kripke semantics. We prove that these semantics are equivalent, and then present an axiomatization for the logic. We investigate the computational complexity of model checking and satisfiability for DCL-PC, and show that both problems are PSPACE-complete (and hence no worse than the underlying logic CL-PC). Finally, we investigate the characterisation of control in DCL-PC. We distinguish between first-order control -- the ability of an agent or coalition to control some state of affairs through the assignment of values to the variables under the control of the agent or coalition -- and second-order control -- the ability of an agent to exert control over the control that other agents have by transferring variables to other agents. We give a logical characterisation of second-order control

Strategic logics : complexity, completeness and expressivity

by transferring normative attributes from an agent to another. Such interactions are called delegation. Formal models of delegation and control were studied in, e.g., [189, 149, 191]. In this work, we consider the scenario where agents delegate control over propositions to other agents. The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable propositions stems from areas like discrete event systems and control theory, where, e.g., Boutilier [39] studied control in the context of deontic logic. Control and controllable propositions were also studied in [52, 66, 249, 248]. We now give an overview of the thesis. The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to introduce basic concepts and notation and to review relevant literature. The first section presents a brief survey on modal logic. Then, in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, we introduce epistemic, temporal and strategic modal logics and state known results that characterise their expressivity and computational complexity. In particular, we consider variants of ATL as extensions of branching-time logics. With such ATL-like logics we can describe dynamic multi-agent interactions. In Section 2.5, we discuss extensions of ATL with epistemic notions. Additionally, we suggest a framework for memory-bounded strategic reasoning. In particular, we introduce an epistemic variant of ATL that accounts for agents with limited memory resources as this case was neglected in the literature to date. In Chapter 3, we investigate the computational complexity of ATL and its epistemic extension ATEL. We show in detail how 'the complexity of the satisfiability problem for both logics can be settled at ExpTIME-complete. The part of the chapter about ATL is based on the paper 'ATL Satisfiability is Indeed ExpTIME-COmplete' by Walther, Lutz, Wolter and Wooldridge in the Journal of Logic and Computation, 2006 (265)' and the part about ATEL is based on the paper 'ATEL with Common and Distributed Knowledge is ExpTime-Complete' by Walther which was presented at the 4th Workshop on Methods for Modalities, Humbolt University, Berlin, December 1-2, 2005 [264]. In Chapter 4, we aim to extend the expressiveness of ATL without increasing its computational complexity. We introduce explicit names for strategies in the object language and extend modal operators with the possibility to bind agents to strategy names. In this way, we can fix the decisions of agents that possibly belong to several coalitions. By identifying the behaviqur of agents, we can reason about the effects of agents changing coalitions. Dynamic coalitions provide more flexibility to adapt abilities to a changing environment. We investigate the expressivity of the resulting logic ATLES and compare it to ATL and ATL*. Moreover, we formulate two model checking problems for ATLES and investigate their complexity as well as the complexity of the satisfiability problem for ATLES. Additionally, we present a complete axiomatisation. This chapter is based on the paper 'Alternating-time Temporal Logic with Explicit Strategies' by Walther, van der Hoek and Wooldridge which is going to presented at the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), Brussels, Belgium, June 25-27, 2007 [266]

Knowledge and Social Laws

In this paper we combine existing work in the area of social laws with a framework for reasoning about knowledge in multi-agent systems. The unifying framework in which this is done is based on Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), to which semantics we add epistemic accessibility relations (to deal with the knowledge), actions (in order to naturally talk about allowed and forbidden actions) and updates (to model the e#ect of the implementation of the constraint in a social law). Apart from a constraint, a social law has an objective: in our formalism, such objectives may refer to the knowledge that agents possess or do not possess. The result is a framework in which we can, for example, express that a desirable property (objective) of a social law is that one agent has the ability to bring about a certain type of knowledge in another agent, or that if one agent knows something, then it should behave in a certain way. We illustrate our approach with a case study, and we use model checking to demonstrate that properties of social laws with respect to this case study