The power of words in financial markets: soft versus hard communication,a strategy method experiment

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of non-informative communications on asset prices. An experimental approach allows us to control for the release of non-relevant messages. We introduce the release of messages in standard experimental asset markets with bubbles (Smith, Suchanek and Williams 1988) through a strategy method experiment. We conjecture that a priori uninformative messages can significantly impact the level of asset prices. Uninformative communications may be used by boundedly rational subjects to compute the fundamental value of the asset. In addition, rational agents may anticipate such an effect and adapt their strategy to the messages received. We asked 182 subjects to construct strategies about their action in a standard experimental asset market environment. Our analysis sheds light on the possibility of manipulation and stabilization of financial markets by influential agents such as financial “gurus” or central bankers.experiment

The effect of reliability, content and timing of public announcements on asset trading behavior

Financial markets are overwhelmed by daily announcements. We use experimental asset markets to assess the impact of releasing public messages with different levels of reliability on asset prices. Subjects receive qualitative announcements in predetermined trading periods that are either preset by the experimenter, randomly selected, or determined by past asset market prices. We find that messages can play a significant role in bubble abatement, or rekindling. The preset message, “The price is too high,” decreases the amplitude and duration of bubbles for inexperienced subjects. Announcements that depend on the actual level of mispricing reduce bubble magnitude. Meanwhile, a preset or random message, “The price is too low,” prevents experienced subjects from abating bubbles. We account for the effect of public messages by showing that they significantly reduce inconsistent (“irrational”) trading behavior.Experimental asset markets, Bubbles, Market communications, Bounded rationality

The Effect of Reliability, Content and Timing of Public Announcements on Asset Trading Behavior

Financial markets are overwhelmed by daily announcements. We use experimental asset markets to assess the impact of releasing public messages with different levels of reliability on asset prices. Subjects receive qualitative announcements in predetermined trading periods that are either preset by the experimenter, randomly selected, or determined by past asset market prices. We find that messages can play a significant role in bubble abatement, or rekindling. The preset message, “The price is too high,” decreases the amplitude and duration of bubbles for inexperienced subjects. Announcements that depend on the actual level of mispricing reduce bubble magnitude. Meanwhile, a preset or random message, “The price is too low,” prevents experienced subjects from abating bubbles. We account for the effect of public messages by showing that they significantly reduce inconsistent (“irrational”) trading behavior.experimental asset markets, bubbles, market communications, bounded rationality

Inflation Targeting and Sudden Stops

Emerging economies experience sudden stops in capital inflows. As we have argued in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002), having access to monetary policy during these sudden stops is useful, but mostly for insurance' rather than for aggregate demand reasons. In this environment, a central bank that cannot commit to monetary policy choices will ignore the insurance aspect and follow a procyclical rather than the optimal countercyclical monetary policy. The central bank will also intervene excessively to support the exchange rate. These inefficiencies are exacerbated by the presence of an expansionary bias. In order to solve these problems, we propose modifying the central bank's objective to (i) include state-contingent inflation targets, (ii) target a measure of inflation that overweights non-tradable inflation

Loyalt\u27s Reward - A Felony Conviction: Recent Prosecutions of High-Status Female Offenders

This Article analyzes white-collar female crime and compares several high profile cases to those of regular female offenders. It uses government statistical data on female crime to paint a portrait of the female offender. It then compares the prosecution of street-level and white-collar female offenders. The Article discusses the prosecutions of Martha Stewart, Betty, Vinson, and Lea Fastow. The Article argues that these women often share a similar trait of committing the crime out of loyalty to a man engaged in wrong-doing