European Integration and the Future of Social Policy Making

The basic aim of this paper is a brief presentation of the current situation as regards some central aspects of social policy formation and implementation in the European Union. The general rationale of the paper is the viewing of the European Union as one of the major global actors towards neoliberal globalization, resulting by the contemporary ideological and political dominance of certain social forces within it. The drive towards greater socio-economic liberalization, the emphasis on international competitiveness and the gradual commodification of previously considered public goods pose a remarkable threat to the European social model (or social models). The paper starts with a synoptic account of some crucial aspects of the contemporary social situation in the European Union (notably income distribution, unemployment, poverty and social exclusion) and of the most important social policy frameworks at European level. Subsequently the future prospects of the European social policy regime under the dominance of neoliberalism is discussed, opening new questions about the ways of reversing contemporary trends.

Changing Views of Competition and EC Antitrust Law

During the last few years the application of EC antitrust law has been subject to a number of changes, aiming at giving a greater role to economic analysis. This is leading to the abandonment of the traditional ordoliberal inspiration of EC competition law. This paper explores how justi ed is this change. In particular it argues that economic analysis provides di erent views of how competition works and thet it may a ect the application of antitrust at di erent stages. From this point of view a more economic approach is not necessarily incompatible with a reformed ordoliberal paradigm. What appears incompatible is an approach which substitutes eciency for competition. Such an approach has gained a role in the US antitrust, but its extension to the EC legal context is bound to produce a number of problems, and to lead to results di erent from the desired ones.antitrust,models of competition,ordoliberal paradigm,EC competition law

The effect of competition among brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services

Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.This work has been partly supported by National Science Foundation awards: CNS-0963974, CNS-1346688, CNS-1536090 and CNS-1647084

New insights on the role of location advantages in international innovation

This paper takes a closer look at the role of location advantages in the spatial distribution of MNE R&D activity. In doing so, we have returned to first principles by revisiting our understanding of L and O advantages and their interaction. We revisit the meaning of L advantages, and offer a succinct differentiation of L advantages. We emphasise the importance of institutions, and flesh out the concept of collocation L advantages, which play an important role at the industry and firm levels of analysis. Just because a country possesses certain L advantages when viewed at a macro-level, does not imply that these are available to all industries or all firms in that location without differential cost. When these are linked to the distinction between location-bound and non location-bound O advantages, and we distinguish between MNEs and subsidiaries it allows for a clearer understanding of the MNE's spatially distributed activities. These are discussed here in the context of R&D, which - in addition to the usual uncertainties faced by firms - must deal with the uncertainties associated with innovation. Although prior literature has sometimes framed the centralisation/decentralisation, spatial separation/collocation debates as a paradox facing firms, when viewed within the context of the cognitive limits to resources, the complexities of institutions, and the slow pace of the evolving specialisation of locations, these are in actuality trade-offs firms must make.FDI, foreign investment, direct investment, multinationals, transnational corporations, MNEs, eclectic paradigm, collocation, locational advantage, country specific advantages

Inclusive governance in non-profit organisations

The study of private non-profit enterprises that offer general interest services is only at the start. The understanding of existing organisations resists an inclusive, public interest view of governance. This contribution aims at providing a reflection on specific features that non-profit enterprises should have, and outlines four main justifications for including stakeholders in production governance: 1) access to knowledge and other resources, 2) trust creation, 3) internal efficiency, 4) external efficiency. Conclusions elaborate on Hansmann’s classic theory of the firm to suggest that governance solutions need to be assessed on the basis of total costs, considering also the lower level of social costs that is created when governance includes relevant stakeholders. Our model highlights that when social costs are high, even an enterprise with costly decisional processes, such as the multi-stakeholder, can be the most efficient solution amongst other possible alternatives

The Responsible Gambling Code in Queensland, Australia: Implementation and Venue Assessment

In Australia, the state of Queensland introduced a voluntary Responsible Gambling Code of Practice in 2002. This investigation examines levels of implementation and perceptions of adequacy of the Code in casinos, hotels and licensed clubs in three Queensland regions. It involved on-site inspections of 30 venues and semi-structured interviews with 35 venue managers and staff. The level of implementation varied but most venues had implemented between 40 and 60 percent of the Code\u27s practices. Managers\u27 perceptions of the adequacy of the Code\u27s practices revealed that some practices, such as physical layout of the venue, were considered much more effective than others, such as the provision of information and signage

Perverse cross-subsidization in the credit market

We show how asymmetric information and borrowers' heterogeneity in wealth may produce equilibria in which, due to decreasing absolute risk aversion, hard working poor borrowers subsidize richer borrowers. In particular, a model of adverse selection and moral hazard in a competitive credit market is developed with private information on borrowers' wealth. Because of the ambiguous effect of decreasing risk aversion on the willingness to post collateral, both separating and pooling equilibria are possible in principle. Under separation the poor borrowers bear the cost of separation in terms of excessive risk taking. In a more likely pooling equilibrium poor hard-working borrowers subsidize richer ones